SE NATSIOS' MEETING WITH SYG ANNAN ON DARFUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 001934 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS DEPT FOR IO, PRM E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER UNSC SU KPKO SUBJECT: SE NATSIOS' MEETING WITH SYG ANNAN ON DARFUR REF: USUN NEW YORK 01911 Classified By: Ambassador John R. Bolton for reasons 1.4 (b,d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: During an October 5 meeting with UN SYG Kofi Annan, Special Presidential Envoy for the Sudan Andrew Natsios underscored the importance of moving forward with UN support for AMIS and persuading Sudanese President Bashir to back down from his rejection of a UN peacekeeping force in Darfur. Accompanied by UN DPKO U/SYG Jean Marie Guehenno and Political Affairs U/SYG Ibrahim Gambari, Annan spoke optimistically, but cautiously, about indications the Government of Sudan (GOS) may have begun to retreat from its hard-line position on UN deployment. Annan described Bashir's October 3 letter to the UN and Arab League, reportedly positive conversation with Arab League SYG Amr Moussa, and Bashir's interest in addressing the UNSC as evidence that the Government of Sudan has begun to move in the right direction. Annan made the case for using UN support for AMIS as a mechanism to push the Sudanese Government to accept a peacekeeping force. Annan said AU plans to retain control of the political aspects of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) even after the transition to a UN force is a bad idea, and we need to think "creatively" about how to effect a transition to the UN on the political aspects of DPA implementation as well. Natsios highlighted the importance of coordinating diplomatic efforts on various fronts. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (U) UN Participants: SYG Kofi Annan, DPKO U/SYG Jean Marie Guehenno, and Political Affairs U/SYG Ibrahim Gambari, UN Notetaker. USG Participants: Special Envoy Andrew Natsios, Chief of Staff Andrew Steinfeld, USUN MSC LTC Patrick Murray, USUN Poloff (notetaker). -------------- Annan: Bashir May Be Beginning to Blink -------------- ¶3. (C) Annan downplayed the significance of a threatening diplomatic note distributed by the Sudanese Permanent Mission to the UN to potential troop contributing countries on October 3 (reftel),instead highlighting positive diplomatic developments originating in Khartoum. While acknowledging that newly arrived Sudanese PermRep Abdul Mahmood Mohammad would not have sent such a provocative message without instructions from Khartoum, Annan emphasized that AMB Mohammad is newly arrived at the UN and lacked the diplomatic experience to push back on ill-advised guidance from his capital. Natsios concurred that there have been mixed messages coming from Khartoum, adding that the diplomatic note was unprecedented and outrageous. ¶4. (C) Annan emphasized growing signs that Bashir may be prepared to step back from his refusal to accept the will of the international community. Annan provided a copy of another letter from Bashir, also dated October 3, detailing Sudanese acceptance of the UN assistance package to AMIS and pledging his "personal support." (NOTE: Bashir's letter does not address the peacekeeping provisions of UNSCR 1706. END NOTE.) Annan reported that he had met with President Bashir on the margins of the NAM summit in Havana and the Sudanese President had agreed to visit New York to address the UNSC "sometime during Ramadan." The UN SYG is providing the Government of Sudan with possible dates. -------------- Arab League Proving Helpful -------------- ¶5. (C) Annan said he had spoken with Arab League SYG Amr Moussa following his October 2 meeting with President Bashir. Moussa purportedly described Bashir as isolated and looking for a face-saving way of backing down on his stance on UNSCR ¶1706. Reportedly, Bashir again raised the idea of an international, i.e. dual hatted, force led by an AMIS commander or an entirely African, or possibly Muslim, force. Annan described these overtures as evidence of Bashir's willingness to consent to a peacekeeping force provided there is a way for him to avoid further political embarrassment, "Making AMIS plus as elastic as possible is the best way to push Bashir in the right direction." Natsios responded that USUN NEW Y 00001934 002 OF 002 the US is ready to consider an arrangement that keeps with the letter and spirit of UNSCR 1706. -------------- AU Wants to Keep Control of Political Aspects of the DPA -------------- ¶6. (C) In response to a question, Annan reported the AU plans to retain control of the political aspects of DPA implementation, in contrast to its desire to turn over the military aspects to the UN. Annan viewed this as problematic, given the weakness of the AU implementation team in Khartoum. He noted that we would have to think "creatively" to get around this. -------------- Natsios: Diplomatic Efforts Must Proceed in Concert -------------- ¶7. (C) Natsios emphasized the importance of diplomatic efforts proceeding in coordinated fashion. Annan concurred and said he is coordinating his message to the GOS closely with all the relevant actors. Annan commented, however, that he was not optimistic about diplomatic efforts spearheaded by HMG, and was not yet sure an October Heads of State FM meeting made sense. Pushing Bashir yet again publicly just when he may be showing signs of willingness to compromise might not be optimal, Annan pointed out. Rather, Annan pointed to the Arab League, Egypt, Qatar, Libya and Jordan as the best intermediaries with Khartoum. The Egyptians, in particular, have a &special relationship with Bashir8 and a strong interest in a stable Sudan because of their proximity. Annan commented, "Mubarak doesn't want more trouble because of Sudanese stubbornness." Natsios concurred that the Arab League and the Egyptians could potentially play a very positive role, adding that any long-term peace in Sudan will be built on an arrangement that addresses the long-standing grievances of all the parties. ¶8. (U) Special Envoy Andrew Natsios' staff cleared this message. BOLTON