A/S FRIED'S 9/20 MEETING WITH TURKISH PM CHIEF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 001856

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2016
TAGS: GR PREL PTER TU UNGA
SUBJECT: A/S FRIED'S 9/20 MEETING WITH TURKISH PM CHIEF
ADVISOR DAVUTOGLU

(U) Classified by William J. Brencick, Political
Minister-Counselor, for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) EUR A/S Daniel Fried and NSC Director Judy Ansley met
with Ambassador/Chief Advisor to the Turkish Prime Minister
Ahmet Davutoglu September 21 for 90 minutes on the margins of
the UNGA general debate in New York. Following recounts the
meeting's substance by theme.

PKK
--------------

2. (C) A/S Fried devoted the meeting's first fifteen minutes
to an emphatic description of how "we are finally getting
some traction on the PKK issue." General Ralston is a great
choice for special emissary; his first trip was a pretty good
one; Secretary Rice, NSA Hadley and Secretary Rumsfeld are
all very supportive; the Iraqis "understand we are serious
and have started to do the right things." We wanted them to
close down PKK offices, as the GoI has now announced it is
doing, and "there are other steps that may be taken." Our
current USG effort in this direction "is not a one-off but
part of a process" in what we comprehend is a most serious
situation. We were very alarmed by this mid-summer's upswing
in PKK attacks. The July 20 telephone conversation between
President Bush and the Turkish PM left no-one in any doubt re
the gravity of events and joint need for new action. We were
glad at the Turks' appointment of their own special envoy.
We will need GoT help both on the issue and to inform Turkish
public opinion of USG activity regarding it.


3. (C) Ambassador Davutoglu's response was appreciative, but
somewhat cautious. He noted that the PKK "is continuing to
attack," characterizing it as a threat to Turkey's very
national existence, which Al Quaeda is not to that of the
U.S. He had already got word that the Iraqi government had
declared it would close the PKK offices, but understood that
the instruction has yet to be acted upon. Also, the Iraqis
have now named their own special envoy, but little is known
about the latter other than his not being a Kurd -- will he
be trusted? If the Turkish people witness positive results
against Kurdish terrorism, Davutoglu was sure U.S./Turkish
relations can quickly recover towards their apogee of 1999:
Turkish anti-Americanism, he said, is broad but not deep and
arises more from regional issues like Iraq and Lebanon than
intrinsic hostility.


4. (C) Such "positive results" will hinge on more than just
taking down the PKK "infrastructure", i.e., closing one
office only to let the PKK cell leaders bob up in another, he
then said. As in old Marxist structures, the PKK cell
leaders themselves must be removed from activity, he went on.
In the past, Turkey had to tell Damascus "to kick out" PKK
leaders based in Syria; he wouldn't want the GoT to be faced
with the same scenario vis-a-vis Iraq. Davutoglu did not
specify steps (arrests? expulsions?) that the GoT might
expect the GoI to take off its own bat.


5. (SBU) Davutoglu asked about General Ralston's work-plans.
High visibility in Turkey and Iraq will be "most important;"
he urged that Ralston not simply base himself in Washington
with the occasional fly-in to the region. The fact that the
appointment had taken two months had sparked some criticism
in Ankara, he volunteered.


6. (C) A/S Fried then said "at some point there will be the
question of what steps Turkey can take to attract
non-terrorist Kurds back to re-integrate themselves into
Turkish society." Davutoglu reiterated his theme that only
by permanently "dissolving PKK structures" will the stage be
reached where non-terrorist Kurds would feel safe from the
militants and hence free to move back for social
re-integration within Turkey. "If they continue to survive
in the Iranian (sic) mountains, closing their offices will
not help us." A/S Fried asked if this meant there was a
timing question, i.e., that only after such dissolution would
Turkey commence conciliatory steps. Davutoglu gave no direct
reply.


7. (C) He then mentioned that according to Turkish military
intelligence the PKK is now procuring sophisticated European
weapons from Iraq, or perhaps better to say from "the Iraq
environment." These are weapons the Peshmerg cannot get from

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Iran or Syria or any other source. With them, the PKK is
able to exact casualties that the Turkish public sees as a
sign of baffling GoT weakness. Davutoglu volunteered that
General Baser would supply USG with more detail.


Cyprus
--------------

8. (C) A/S Fried said the USG wants to avoid an EU accession
train wreck this autumn, and mooted the Finnish and USG's own
tentative new packages for settlement. He had met with the
Cypriot FM, who at least "had not rejected categorically" the
new packages. NSC's Ansley interjected that the new Finnish
proposal was certainly not conceived as a Grand Bargain for
overall settlement, but rather as a way simply to edge
forward, decrease the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots, etc.
It also has the plus of being an EU proposal.


9. (C) There ensued discussion of various technical details
in some depth and length. However, Davutoglu from start to
finish was definitely, albeit politely, unenthusiastic. He
repeatedly stated that the GoT does not see the Finnish
package as "balanced" (carefully adding each time "but we can
discuss it".) "It does not give Northern Cyprus enough",
especially vis--vis elimination of sanctions, key to the
area's two main revenue sources of tourism and education.
The GoT cannot afford to risk being seen as going along with
the Finnish package as is, in a political atmosphere wherein
it is already accused even by the CHP - Turkey's most secular
party - of defending Israel's interests by dispatching troops
to Lebanon. The Europeans, apart from the UK, are not
objective or neutral on Cyprus, Davutoglu added in
conclusion.

Kirkuk
--------------

10. (C) Davutoglu then said he wanted to raise the subject of
Kirkuk. "Please do not underestimate" its explosive
potential: Kirkuk may not be a hot theme at present but is
bound to become one next year "not just for us but for Iraq,
for you and for the world." Last week's flag-issue episode
was merely a signal. Social polarization around Kirkuk
proceeds amidst intensifying frustration over the oil and
other questions. A delegation of Sunni Arab academics from
Mosul recently told senior Turkish figures that "we can not
now live with the Kurds." Given that the Iraqi constitution
provides for a referendum in 2007, "we have two options" to
keep tensions from becoming critical. The first -- since the
constitution does not stipulate any referendum wording - is
"to work with society" on the formulation so as to avoid that
referendum being posed as "do you want to be part of
Kurdistan?" Failing that, it would be better to postpone the
referendum. The Kurds took 52 percent in Kirkuk's last
election but now account for just 40 percent of its
population after the latest demographic shifts, Davutoglu
reckoned. He said the GoT's new special envoy will discuss
this concern in Washington on 9/25-26.

Al-Qadi
--------------

11. (C) A/S Fried stressed that Turkey is obliged under the
UNSCR to freeze Al-Qadi's assets in the same spirit and
letter of the law with which we and the West Europeans have
worked to freeze PKK assets. Harm to Turkish bank clients is
also in store if this issue abides. Davutoglu said he did
not know details of the Al-Qadi case, but then proceeded to
appear quite informed. He said he understood that there had
been in fact two separate GoT appeals against the court
decision, one from the Prime Ministry (sic),the other from
Foreign Affairs. Possibly just one of these two had been
dropped on technical or duplicative grounds, he suggested.
He then asked if the evidence against Al-Qadi might be old or
insubstantial. Ansley and Fried both reiterated that the
evidence had sufficed for the UN to place Al-Qadi on its
list. They agreed that the Turkish government cannot be held
responsible for a court decision; however, if the Turkish
courts or government had doubts on the case there exists a
formal UN procedure to apply for de-listing - and meanwhile
the GoT is obliged to respect the listing. We were willing
to supply the GoT available additional information.
Davutoglu then reflected as if thinking aloud that long-ago
cooperation between Erdogan and Al-Qadi when the former was

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mayor of Istanbul might be at the root of his reported
directive to unfreeze the latter's assets.

Western Thrace/Halki
--------------

12. (SBU) Davutoglu said he had discussed this issue the
previous day with the Turkish PM. "The problem is a
constitutional barrier." Per Turkey's 1971 law, the Halki
"school" would have to be registered with the Ministry of
Education "This is part of secularism." There would be
absolutely no problem with either the students or the
instruction language being non-Turkish -- but the institution
itself would have to be put under either the Ministry or the
Board of Education. Davutoglu said he had heard the Halki
matter is the subject of an incipient U.S. Congressional
motion, and asked if we could confirm that. As for Western
Thrace, he simply observed that the Mufti's death made the
issue more keen, and that the GoT had re-iterated to the
Greeks its standard position that "according to the 1926
Lausanne agreement, these are not (exclusively) domestic
issues."

Pope's Trip
--------------

13. (SBU) Asked about prospects for Benedict's imminent
scheduled visit, Davutoglu said "I hope the Pope can make
gestures" to abate the Islamic reaction. He did not sound
100% convinced that the visit will take place.


13. (U) A/S Fried cleared this cable.
BOLTON