FINAL WEEKS OF THE GUATEMALA-VENEZUELA CONTEST FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 001834 SIPDIS SIPDIS NOFORN FROM AMBASSADOR BOLTON FOR U/S BURNS AND A/S SILVERBERG E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2016 TAGS: PREL UNSC UN GT VE XM SUBJECT: FINAL WEEKS OF THE GUATEMALA-VENEZUELA CONTEST FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL: TIME TO REFINE OUR STRATEGY? REF: LONDON 6591 Classified By: Ambassador John R. Bolton, Permanent Representative, for reasons 1.4 b,d. ¶1. (C/NF) Summary. The General Assembly vote to decide the contested Latin American seat on the Security Council for 2007-2008 is less than a month away -- October 16. As we gear up in New York for the final stages of this campaign, it is time to take stock of the approach and strategy most likely to block Venezuela's bid for a Security Council seat, a primary U.S. goal. We believe that the time is right to use U.S. lobbying efforts to press for more active support from influential countries, rather than on continuing a broad, and perhaps counter-productive, campaign for Guatemala's election. By lobbying supportive countries to do more to lobby for Guatemala, we reduce the U.S. profile and deny Venezuela the argument that they are really running against us. End Summary. Get Guatemala to press the flesh... -------------- ¶2. (C/NF) As the October 16 vote for the elected Security Council seats approaches, Guatemala, Venezuela, and we continue to compile lists of likely voting preferences among the 192 delegations and apply pressure to those seen to be undecided or wavering. We believe this approach is of increasingly marginal utility for us. Available information seems clear: neither Guatemala nor Venezuela is in position to get the required two-thirds support in the first ballot. ¶3. (C/NF) Continuing efforts to arrive at a solid vote count though blanket approaches in capitals may not be the most effective approach in the few remaining weeks. The election is one in which, in any case, many New York-based representatives acting on their own could play a decisive role without capitals knowing how their votes were actually cast. As in previous contests, some delegations will not receive voting instructions at all. ¶4. (C/NF) In the final weeks, we should agree on a division of labor with the Guatemalans, who need to make a personal effort to approach every possible delegation in NY in the time remaining. FM Gert Rosenthal will be in NY and has more than 60 bilaterals already scheduled. He should not leave until he has paid a call on every available Perm Rep. We know that a number of countries have complained that the Guatemalans have not "asked" for their vote. These simple acts of courtesy will pay dividends, but must be done by Guatemala. The U.S. cannot substitute. ... while the U.S. raises the stakes with allies -------------- --- ¶5. (C/NF) The U.S. effort should be focused on gaining allies among influential countries who have a vested interest in preventing Venezuela's disruptive presence on the UNSC. Guatemalan representatives from the FM on down have come to believe firmly that their close identification with the U.S. is problematic, as Venezuela continues - and with growing success - to frame this contest as being between the U.S. and itself. The Guatemalan PR has been quoted repeatedly and unhelpfully as saying that U.S. support is "the kiss of death." The Guatemalans strongly believe - and we agree - that the contest now viewed as between a Venezuelan David and the American Goliath needs to be reframed as a Guatemalan David seeking to defeat the Venezuelan Goliath. ¶6. (C/NF) Our allies and those countries with an interest in maintaining a responsible and effective Council have been slow to respond to either our or the Guatemalan approaches - when they have done so at all. Key countries such as France are not only failing to campaign for Guatemala but also are even withholding the commitment their own presumably "safe" vote. (We are heartened that the UK - per reftel - has agreed to join the debate.) U.S. bilateral efforts should be sharply focused on our influential allies and key regional countries that have a vested interest in an effective UNSC. Our message should stress the danger to the credibility and effectiveness of the Council - and the UN as a whole - if it becomes a platform for Venezuelan rhetoric, emphasize the threat posed to the ability of the Council to act on issues of importance to our friends, and lobby them to do more to lobby on behalf of Guatemala. This approach will encourage the Guatemalans to redouble their own efforts to line up influential supporters and more clearly avoid the appearance that they are simply a stalking horse for U.S. hostility to Venezuela. BOLTON