UNSC/DARFUR: DEPUTY SYG CALLS FOR AFRICAN, ARAB

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 001822 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL SU KPKO SUBJECT: UNSC/DARFUR: DEPUTY SYG CALLS FOR AFRICAN, ARAB AND ASIAN PRESSURE ON KHARTOUM REF: A. KHARTOUM 02240 ¶B. USUN NEW YORK 01780 USUN NEW Y 00001822 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: AMBASSADOR JACKIE W. SANDERS FOR REASONS 1.4 (B,D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. United Nations Deputy Secretary-General Mark Malloch Brown convened a September 14 meeting of P5 Ambassadors plus the Greek Ambassador (as current UN Security Council President) to discuss the way forward on Darfur, based on the briefing SRSG Pronk gave to Darfur Partners in Khartoum (ref A). Malloch Brown said that in the wake of unsuccessful UN and 'Western' attempts to persuade Sudanese President Bashir to accept AMIS transition to a UN operation, it was time for Africans, Arabs and Asians, in particular China, to take the lead on this responsibility. Chinese PermRep Wang was non-committal on Malloch Brown's call for Chinese intervention with Khartoum. ¶2. (C) SUMMARY CONTD. Russian PermRep Churkin alluded to the possibility of a Chapter VIII deployment in Darfur (under which the Council would use regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority) if the Government of National Unity (GNU) continued to refuse its consent for UN deployment. USUN Ambassador Sanders reminded that the obligations of resolution 1706 should serve as the basis of any SYG intervention with President Bashir. Both the UK and French PermReps stressed the need for the UN to address the Chad dimension of the Darfur crisis. Malloch Brown agreed to re-convene the group September 25 to compare notes on the SYG's Havana trip, the extension of AMIS' mandate, the Arab League's pledge to fund AMIS, the possibility of a new diplomatic initiative in Khartoum led by China, the Africans and the Arab League and a short CONOPs from DPKO on Chad. END SUMMARY. ¶3. (C) Accompanied by DPKO U/SYG Guehenno and A/SYG Annabi and by OCHA U/SYG Egeland, Malloch Brown sought the views of P5 Ambassadors and the Security Council Presidency on a potential 'package' that could be presented to the Sudanese, the African Union (AU) and the Arab League (AL) in order to promote Khartoum's acceptance of UNSCR 1706, including an extension of AMIS' mandate until December 31 and provisions for operationalizing a UN support cell to assist AMIS in non-monetary terms. Guehenno reported that DPKO was exploring ways, ahead of the September 18 AU Peace and Security Council meeting, to consolidate the 'light support' for AMIS which AU Peace and Security Commissioner Djinnit had just requested of DPKO. UK PR Jones Parry insisted that this support package should include financial details, and USUN Ambassador Sanders advised that the any package not deviate from the obligations of resolution 1706. ¶4. (C) Both Malloch Brown and Egeland stressed the need to get African and Arab countries, as well as the AU and the AL, more engaged in the process of persuading Bashir to accept a UN force in Darfur, citing Egyptian FM Aboul Gheit as a candidate to 'sell' such a package in Khartoum. UK PR Jones Parry raised Nigerian President Obasanjo and Congolese President Sassou-Nguesso as other possible interlocutors, adding that AL SYG Amre Moussa must also be convinced to assist. Malloch Brown and Egeland pointedly asked Chinese PR Wang how China could help in this effort, now that exhaustive efforts by the UN, the USG and the UK had failed to change Bashir's mind. Wang demurred, saying that 'quiet diplomacy' in the form of bilateral and collective efforts must be undertaken to convince the GNU that the Council harbored no 'evil' intentions and that the Council needed GNU consent to proceed with 1706 implementation. Wang saw a joint African-Arab mission and a 'qualified' UN Secretariat representative as useful vehicles for approaching Bashir. ¶5. (C) In direct reference to the draft PRST on Darfur circulated by USUN (ref B),Wang warned against the Council's adopting any measures in the coming days and weeks that might be interpreted as pressure on the GNU, a reaffirmation of his delegation's adamant stance against adopting prior to the AU PSC meeting (NOTE: In subsequent Security Council USUN NEW Y 00001822 002.2 OF 002 consultations September 15, irreconcilable differences among Members over the issue of timing led to the failure to adopt the draft PRST, despite general agreement on its content. END NOTE). Russian PR Churkin stressed that the level of AU activity and engagement in the near future would be crucial in turning Khartoum around, particularly a strong statement from the PSC in unambiguous support of AMIS transition to a UN operation. Ambassador Sanders also pushed for the need to lobby the AU before September 18. ¶6. (C) Russian PR Churkin warned that if the GNU continued to refuse its consent to UN Darfur deployment, deployment in the form of an AU operation supported by the UN might become a real possibility (an allusion to a Chapter VIII model),a plan Malloch Brown acknowledged as a reluctant Plan B. In the meantime, Malloch Brown requested participants to reconvene September 25 to re-assess the situation after SYG Annan's September 15 meeting in Havana with President Bashir and after the September 18 AU PSC meeting. He also requested answers to outstanding questions of proposed AL funding for an extended AMIS and of commitments from China and from African and Arab countries to launch a new diplomatic initiative toward Khartoum. ¶7. (C) UK PR Jones Parry and French PR de La Sabliere were insistent that Chad not be neglected in the Council's consideration of the Darfur crisis. Guehenno agreed to present a short concept of operations pursuant to OP13 of UNSCR 1706 at the September 25 meeting. BOLTON