Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06USUNNEWYORK1622
2006-08-25 18:25:00
CONFIDENTIAL
USUN New York
Cable title:  

UNIFIL FORCE GENERATION UPDATE: A/S HILLEN PRESSES

Tags:  PREL UNSC KPKO IS LE 
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FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9969
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
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RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 001622 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2016
TAGS: PREL UNSC KPKO IS LE
SUBJECT: UNIFIL FORCE GENERATION UPDATE: A/S HILLEN PRESSES
SECRETARIAT ON BORDER SECURITY


SIPDIS

Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Molly Phee, per 1.4 (b) and (
d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 001622 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2016 TAGS: PREL UNSC KPKO IS LE SUBJECT: UNIFIL FORCE GENERATION UPDATE: A/S HILLEN PRESSES SECRETARIAT ON BORDER SECURITY SIPDIS Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Molly Phee, per 1.4 (b) and ( d). ¶1. (C) Summary. During separate meetings with UN Deputy Secretary-General Mark Malloch Brown and Department of SIPDIS Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Assistant Secretary-General Hedi Annabi on August 24, PM A/S Hillen emphasized the importance of ensuring that the international community helps the Government of Lebanon (GOL) secure its borders in accordance with UNSCR 1701. While conceding that Israel may be within its rights to draw a link between a secure border and its naval/air blockade of Lebanon, Malloch Brown averred that the blockade is "rapidly becoming counter-productive" and asked if a formal request by Lebanese PM Siniora for UNIFIL assistance in border security would persuade the USG to try to convince Israel to lift the blockade. Even if Siniora submits this request, however, Malloch Brown made clear that SYG Annan believes UNIFIL should only play a supporting role to the GOL in border security efforts. ¶2. (C) Summary, cont'd. Welcoming Italian and (subsequent) French commitments to UNIFIL, Malloch Brown also expressed support for the Italian proposal to establish a UNIFIL "strategic cell" in New York to give guidance to the force commander, but appealed for caution in describing the new unit lest it provoke other TCCs. He and Annabi appealed to the USG to urge Poland, Turkey, Belgium, Romania, and Spain to make firm commitments to contribute to UNIFIL. Malloch Brown said current UNIFIL Force Commander Pelligrini should remain in place until at least February 2007, at which time he might be succeeded by an Italian general. Malloch Brown also noted that the Secretariat wants to appoint a Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) for Lebanon once SYG Annan returns from his regional tour. A/S Hillen previewed USG comments on the draft Rules of Engagement (ROE) and Concept of Operations (CONOPS),and outlined USG support for the expanded UNIFIL as well as for the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). End Summary. Status of Force Generation -------------- ¶3. (C) Malloch Brown and Annabi both welcomed Italy's willingness to provide up to 3,000 troops for the expanded UNIFIL force and predicted that French President Chirac's
August 24 announcement would be good for the force generation effort (Note: Both meetings took place before Chirac's announcement that France would send a total of 2,000 troops to the expanded UNIFIL force. End Note.) Noting that he had recently spoken with EU Foreign Policy Chief Solana as well as the Finns (as President of the EU),however, Malloch Brown suggested there was still "a lot of softness" in terms of contributions by other TCCs. He and Annabi urged A/S Hillen to encourage Poland, Turkey, Belgium, Romania, and Spain, in particular, to contribute forces. Annabi also noted that DPKO was "moving ahead" with Indonesia's offer of one battalion of troops because Israel had not yet clarified to the Secretariat which countries it could absolutely not accept because they do not have diplomatic relations with the GOI. ¶4. (C) Outlining the status of new offers, Annabi noted that SYG Annan had recently spoken to Turkish PM Erdogan but that the GOT was still asking many questions about the ROE and CONOPS and had yet to make a firm commitment. Spain would hopefully contribute a battalion, as might Tanzania. Germany, claiming difficulty in obtaining parliamentary approval to send border police personnel to Lebanon, was now talking only about providing training and equipment for border security. Qatar had offered one company of helicopter pilots (?). While Annabi suggested that India might consider sending additional troops and noted a SYG Annan call to PM Singh, DPKO staff later clarified that the SYG spoke to the Indian PM before comments to the press by the Indian Defense Minister that India might withdraw its current contingent of troops assigned to UNIFIL. Annabi reported that the SYG had also called the Ghanaians, who might be willing to send more soldiers. Romania had yet to make a firm commitment. UN Wants GOL to Monitor Borders -------------- ¶5. (C) A/S Hillen emphasized that the USG wants to ensure that the international community, in accordance with UNSCR 1701, helps the GOL secure its borders against unauthorized USUN NEW Y 00001622 002 OF 003 arms shipments. Syrian President Asad cannot be allowed to intimidate the international community into not carrying out a UNSC mandate, he argued. Ensuring the security of Lebanon's borders is also key to preventing a resumption of hostilities, because Israel will act to block re-supply of Hizballah if the international community or GOL do not. Observing that the international community's support for GOL border security efforts could come either from UNIFIL or through bilateral assistance, Hillen suggested it would be necessary to think creatively about the right vehicle for such aid. He added that the USG is encouraging Lebanese PM Siniora to either request help from UNIFIL in securing Lebanon's borders, which would satisfy the requirement in UNSCR 1701, or support alternate means of achieving the same objective. ¶6. (C) Malloch Brown agreed that the issue of border security is important, especially given Israel's announcement that it will only lift its naval and air blockade of Lebanon once UNIFIL reinforcments arrive to help secure the border. While conceding that Israel may be within its rights to draw a link between the blockade and a secure border -- despite conclusions by UN lawyers that UNSCR 1701 is "ambiguous" on this point -- Malloch Brown averred that the blockade is "rapidly becoming counter-productive" and that the "two issues cannot be linked together forever." He asked if a formal request from Siniora that UNIFIL help secure Lebanon's borders might be enough to persuade the USG to convince Israel to lift its blockade. ¶7. (C) Even if Siniora does request UNIFIL's assistance in securing Lebanon's borders, though, Malloch Brown made clear that SYG Annan believes the UN mission should only play a supporting role to the GOL in this effort. The D/SYG opined that Germany, the U.S., and the UK should ensure that Lebanon has all the necessary surveillance equipment to monitor its borders and ports. But the question would then become which party would interdict illegal shipments? Arguing it would be "very difficult" to have UNIFIL TCCs take on this role, Malloch Brown averred that the first option should be the LAF with UNIFIL as a fallback. Annabi added that while it would be a problem to have UNIFIL troops support the GOL in terms of border security, it might be possible to provide this assistance through police forces or customs officials. Malloch Brown Supports Italian Proposal for Second-Line UNIFIL Command in New York -------------- ¶8. (C) Malloch Brown also expressed support for Italy's proposal that the Secretariat establish a second-line UNIFIL command in New York to strengthen DPKO and help give the Force Commander guidance (septel),but emphasized that the new office must be called a "strategic cell" rather than a "strategic headquarters" in order to preclude accusations from other TCCs -- which had been leveled in the past -- that DPKO was allowing secunded western officers to manage the entire mission. He said the UNIFIL Force Commander would report to the head of the strategic cell, whom Malloch Brown said would be a three-star Italian general, who would then report to Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Jean-Marie Guehenno. The result of this arrangement would be that DPKO Military Advisor Lt. General Mehta would no longer have responsibility over the expanded UNIFIL mission. ¶9. (C) Malloch Brown argued that current UNIFIL Force Commander Pelligrini should remain on the job until February 2007, when his contract with the UN expires. At that point, the UN could give command of UNIFIL to the Italian three-star general who will soon be appointed head of the strategic cell, although Malloch Brown cautioned that command of the force has been the subject of "intense" negotiations between French President Chirac and Italian PM Prodi. In addition to discussing the military command structure, Malloch Brown also disclosed that the UN planned to appoint a Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) in Lebanon upon SYG Annan's return from the region. While the SRSG could ensure that all the UN's humanitarian and political efforts are coordinated, Malloch Brown confirmed that the SRSG would have no role in the military command structure. Rules of Engagement -------------- ¶10. (C) Congratulating Malloch Brown and Annabi on the USUN NEW Y 00001622 003 OF 003 success of the draft ROE and CONOPS, A/S Hillen said the USG would give DPKO a non-paper August 25 with some suggestions to tighten up the documents. These suggestions, he noted, would include language to state more explicitly UNIFIL's posture regarding armed elements between the Litani River and the Blue Line, the link between the arms embargo and border security, the connection between UNIFIL's humanitarian and security missions, and IDF-LAF-UNIFIL coordination. While agreeing to "take a look" at USG suggestions on the draft ROE, Annabi noted that the documents were in an "advanced stage" after consultations with the French, Italians, and other TCCs. Noting that the French and Italians were pleased with the ROE and CONOPS, he urged A/S Hillen to share USG suggestions with those two countries before presenting them to DPKO. USG Support for UNIFIL -------------- ¶11. (C) Recalling President Bush's remarks on August 21 about USG support for the expanded UNIFIL force and Lebanon, A/S Hillen noted that the USG had earmarked USD 42 million in aid to train and equip the LAF as part of an international effort that would include the UK and France. Confirming that the UN's request for free strategic lift assistance would be difficult to satisfy, A/S Hillen urged the Secretariat to consider commercial transportation options and forward specific requests for items that cannot be shipped commercially to the USG for consideration. The DPKO logistics officer accompanying Annabi replied that using commercial lift should not be a problem -- assuming Israel lifts its blockade of Lebanon -- because Lebanon is easily accessible by air and sea and because DPKO had asked TCCs to self-deploy to the theater. A/S Hillen also noted that the USG would soon dispatch a U.S. military officer to support DPKO planning efforts. ¶12. (U) A/S Hillen cleared this message. BOLTON

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