UNSC CONSULTATIONS: BRIEFING ON KINSHASA VIOLENCE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 001613 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV UNSC KPKO CG SUBJECT: UNSC CONSULTATIONS: BRIEFING ON KINSHASA VIOLENCE REF: KINSHASA 1334 AND PREVIOUS ¶1. Summary: On August 22, Assistant SYG for Peacekeeping Operations Hedi Annabi briefed the Security Council on the violent clashes of feuding forces in Kinshasa on August 21 and 22 and on efforts by UN officials and CIAT ambassadors to restore calm. Annabi confirmed that representatives of the government and Vice President Bemba's militia had agreed to withdraw their troops from Kinshasa's streets and to leave Congolese police, assisted by MONUC and EUFOR police, in charge of public order. Annabi said President Kabila had agreed in his meeting with CIAT on August 22 to disengage his forces but that he had not committed to a meeting with Bemba. Annabi also noted that Kabila had alluded to the proposal to move up the date for the runoff election. In response to a question, Annabi said that the runoff could not be moved up from October 29 for technical, logistical and financial reasons. In their interventions, Security Council delegations expressed concern about the violence and some relief that the situation had not deteriorated further. They approved a press statement that demanded that the Congolese political leadership exercise restraint and refrain from any threats or use of force or intimidation against political opponents. End Summary. ¶2. A/SYG Annabi's briefing to the Council on August 22 in informal consultations on the latest violence in Kinshasa generally corroborated the outline of events as reported in reftels. Annabi suggested wryly that the Presidential guard had displayed "an acute sense of timing" by firing upon Bemba's compound on August 21 while SRSG Swing and CIAT ambassadors were inside encouraging Bemba to participate peacefully in the second round of elections. Despite promises by President Kabila's to Swing that the guards would be withdrawn, firing by heavy and light weapons had lasted for several hours. In follow on phone calls, SYG Annan had urged Kabila and Bemba to withdraw their forces and to meet to resolve the situation. After MONUC troops had evacuated the CIAT dignitaries from Bemba's residence, three MONUC platoons were assigned to the compound and a EUFOR company was deployed in the area of a major boulevard where security was problematic. ¶3. Following an overnight lull, the fighting between the Presidential guard and Bemba's forces recommenced early the next morning. MONUC forces subsequently had replaced EUFOR forces on the boulevard. During the day, MONUC reinforcements were flown in from Lumumbashi and EUFOR reinforcements arrived from Libreville. ¶4. Meeting with SRSG Swing and CIAT ambassadors on August 22, President Kabila had agreed to the immediate cessation of hostilities, the disengagement of forces, the policing of streets by Congolese police, and the broadcasting of this information through the media. Annabi added that Kabila had agreed specifically to the deployment of MONUC forces to protect Bemba. Kabila also had reiterated his commitment to participating in the second of elections but had alluded to the proposal of his supporters to move up the October 29 runoff date. SRSG Swing had encouraged Kabila to meet with Bemba, but Kabila made no commitment to do so. ¶5. Annabi said that security officials representing both of the feuding camps had met that afternoon at MONUC headquarters. He reported that they had agreed to order all Congolese troops in Kinshasa to return to their positions before the fighting, to establish mixed verification teams, and to accept the fact that the Congolese police, with the assistance of MONUC and EUFOR police elements, would have sole responsibility for maintaining public order. Annabi said MONUC's assessment of the overall security situation in Kinshasa was that the situation seemed to be calming down. Reports of looting by youth gangs however were a concern. ¶6. Annabi noted that the SYG Annan had issued a public statement on the situation and suggested that the Council might also wish to send a strong message to the parties. ¶7. In their interventions, Security Council delgations expressed concern about the flare up of violence and the need to ensure satisfactory completion of the election process. The US deplored the fighting and called on all military forces to return to their barracks, sentiments echoed by most other members. The UK suggested ruefully that the period of relative calm after elections perhaps had been too good to be true. The Congo pointed out the irony that it was the winners of the election and not, as feared, the losers who were turning out to the initial spoilers. Denmark emphasized the importance of sending a message to Kabila and Bemba that they must not allow their forces to intimidate each other. USUN NEW Y 00001613 002 OF 002 Many delegations, including the US, expressed appreciation for MONUC's actions in evacuating the CIAT ambassadors from Bemba's residence. ¶8. Several members stressed the importance of adhering to the scheduled October 29 runoff date. Ghana and Congo suggested that President Kabila was pursuing an earlier date for his own political advantage. Annabi made clear that the election date was an issue solely for the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) to determine and that he believed this date had been set appropriately. ¶9. The UK recounted speculation that Kabila's forces may have acted to preempt claims of electoral fraud by Bemba's supporters and asked Annabi for his assessment of the accuracy of the provisional election results. Annabi acknowledged some reports of discontent with the results but said he believed the IEC had done an honest job. The UK also asked for Annabi's assessment of the pros and cons of moving the runoff election date forward. Annabi said proponents on both sides of the issue had put forward legal arguments on the issue. As a practical matter, he remarked that the second round could not be held before the October 29 date set by the IEC because of technical, logistical and financial reasons. Annabi added that both SRSG Swing and President Chissano (in his role as chairman of the Commission of the Wise) had discussed the issue with Kabila to try to persuade him on the importance of not meddling with the electoral timetable. ¶10. Members concluded the session by agreeing to following statement to the press: BEGIN TEXT: The members of the Security Council took note of the official announcement, on 20 August 2006, of the provisional results of the first round of the presidential election in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. They reiterated their appreciation to the Independent Electoral Commission for its remarkable work that enabled the holding of that poll in the best possible conditions, and commended the people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for their commitment to the democratic process, as demonstrated by the high voter turnout. They appealed to the political leaders to respect the electoral calendar as established by the Independent Electoral Commission. They expressed their serious concern about the violent clashes between armed elements that have taken place n Kinshasa on 20 and 21 August 2006, and that continue today, and about the looting that has occurred. They demanded that the Congolese political leadership exercise restraint and immediately implement the cease-fire agreed between their forces and henceforth refrain from any threats or use of force or intimidation against political opponents or their supporters. They emphasised that there can be no military solution to political issues in the DRC and urged all parties to take immediate steps to support the democratic process that is underway. They called on the Congolese leadership not to allow the progress made by the people of the DRC to be jeopardised at this stage, and to this end expressed the hope that the proposed meeting between President Joseph Kabila and Vice President Jean-Pierre Bemba would be held as soon as possible to defuse the current political tension. They expressed appreciation for the effective operation of EUFOR R.D. Congo in support of the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). They renewed their support for the International Committee in Support of the Transition (CIAT) and for MONUC and condemned any action threatening their security. END TEXT BOLTON