UNIFIL FORCE GENERATION UPDATE: MEMBER STATES

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 001570 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL KPKO UNSC IS LE SUBJECT: UNIFIL FORCE GENERATION UPDATE: MEMBER STATES PROMISE SHIPS, BUT FEW CAPABLE TROOPS REF: USUN 1560 USUN NEW Y 00001570 001.2 OF 004 ¶1. (U) Summary. During a meeting with current and potential troop contributing countries (TCCs) to an expanded UNIFIL force in south Lebanon on August 17, UN Deputy Secretary-General Mark Malloch Brown made an impassioned SIPDIS appeal to member states to help secure a lasting peace by committing forces to the mission now. He outlined the mission's concept of operations (CONOPS) and rules of engagement (ROE) -- and promised to distribute the draft documents on August 18 -- and urged member states to review the guidelines and make firm commitments within the next few days. (Note: The CONOPS and ROE briefings were almost identical to those described in reftel. End Note.) At the end of the meeting, concrete offers for ground assets totaled five mechanized infantry battalions (2 from Bangladesh, 1 each from Indonesia, Malaysia and Nepal),one engineer company (Indonesia),an additional engineer company-plus sized unit from France, and some border patrol units from Germany. Several countries -- including Germany, UK, Greece, Norway, Denmark -- offered naval assets as well. ¶2. (U) Summary cont'd. In response to pointed and repeated questioning from the Egyptian and Indian PermReps on the conditions under which UNIFIL would use force, Malloch Brown observed that the Secretariat had crafted ROEs that are designed to be "prudent and non-offensive, but robust." But Malloch Brown emphasized that UNIFIL would not undertake a large-scale disarmament of Hizballah. UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Assistant Secretary-General Annabi added that the UN expects "no arms in sight" in its Area of Responsibility (AOR). USUN Ambassador Wolff praised UNIFIL, GOL, and GOI efforts to implement UNSCR 1701 and noted the USG would provide logistics, planning, and intelligence support to the expanded force. ¶3. (U) Summary cont,d. During a bilateral meeting on August 17 with PM A/S Hillen and Ambassador Wolff before the TCC meeting, Malloch Brown and DPA Director Michael Williams noted that Israel's stated unwillingness to accept contributions from countries with which they do not have diplomatic relations was a serious problem. Malloch Brown acknowledged that controversial Malaysian statements had probably ruled out their participation in an expanded UNIFIL, but argued that "we need to hold the line" with Indonesia. In a separate meeting August 17 with an Israeli delegation, Annabi also urged the GOI to reconsider Indonesia,s participation, promising that Indonesian troops would be under firm blue helmet command and control and assuring Israel that the UN would take swift action in the event a problem arises. End Summary. Malloch Brown Appeals for Troops -------------- ¶4. (U) Malloch Brown began the meeting with an impassioned appeal to potential troop contributors to help secure a lasting cease-fire by committing forces to an expanded UNIFIL. The UN officials then outlined the force's concept of operations (CONOPS) and rules of engagement (ROE),and promised to provide drafts of the actual documents to TCCs on August 18. (Note: USUN will forward these documents to the Department when received. End Note.) He asked member states to review these guidelines and provide firm commitments of forces to the UN in the next few days. Describing the expanded UNIFIL as a truly multilateral force, Malloch Brown also noted it should be comprised of personnel from a "core group" of countries with supplementary contributions by other TCCs as appropriate. ¶5. (U) Malloch Brown also made clear that UNIFIL should only be expected to "keep the peace while longer-term solutions are put in place." These solutions would have to be political in nature, he emphasized, which is why SYG Annan had dispatched a team to Lebanon and Israel and would soon travel to the region himself. Malloch Brown argued that the parties to the conflict "owe it to the member states" who will contribute troops to reach a political solution. Outline of CONOPS and ROE -------------- ¶6. (U) Malloch Brown, Annabi, and DPKO military advisor Mehta continually referred to the need to create a "strong and robust" force that could help ensure LAF control over the USUN NEW Y 00001570 002.2 OF 004 south, address the humanitarian situation, prevent a resumption of hostilities, and create a zone between the Blue Line and the Litani River free of unauthorized armed elements. Malloch Brown also noted that OP 14 of UNSCR 1701 calls on UNIFIL to assist the GOL, at its request, in securing Lebanon's borders and prevent arms smuggling. Annabi and Mehta then offered an outline of the CONOPS and ROE of the force that was virtually identical to the briefings they gave A/S Hillen on August 16 (reftel). Although Mehta said he expects more comments on the draft ROE and CONOPS from the UNIFIL Force Commander as well as from certain departments within the Secretariat, Malloch Brown suggested the drafts would not change considerably unless member states demand changes. ¶7. (U) In response to pointed and repeated questioning from the Egyptian and Indian PRs on the interpretation of OP12 and the conditions under which UNIFIL would use force (whether it would have to "enforce" the provisions of UNSCR 1701), Malloch Brown observed that the Secretariat had crafted ROEs that are designed to be "prudent and non-offensive, but robust." He said the UN assumes that the political agreement to which the GOL had committed itself -- that no arms would be carried south of the Litani River -- would be respected. Predicting that UNIFIL would not be confronted by "major challenges" to this commitment, Malloch Brown suggested it might have to deal with small groups that would attempt to carry arms or smuggle them into the AOR. In this case, UNIFIL would ask these groups to hand over their arms, and if they refuse, would be authorized to use force to disarm them. But Malloch Brown emphasized that UNIFIL would not undertake a large-scale disarmament of Hizballah. Further clarifying that the UN expects "no arms in sight" in the AOR, Annabi also said the UN does not plan to actively search for arms caches. USG Offers General Support -------------- ¶8. (U) During his intervention, USUN Ambassador Wolff commended UNIFIL, the Secretariat, as well as the GOL and GOI for their efforts to support the cessation of hostilities and begin the LAF deployment to the south. Noting that the situation remains fragile, he underscored that member states should seize this historic opportunity for long-term peace by ensuring that UNIFIL is able to fulfill its enhanced mandate quickly and capably. Ambassador Wolff said the USG is prepared to provide logistics, planning, and intelligence support to the expanded UNIFIL mission. TCCs Offer Many Ships But Few Capable Troops -------------- ¶9. (U) Several delegates expressed interest in supporting an expanded UNIFIL force, although only a few offered specific commitments. Most said they wanted the opportunity to sift through the CONOPs and the ROE before committing to particular forms of support, particularly with regard ground troops. Specific commitments are listed below: Germany: -- a maritime &task force8 (NFI) for surveillance and possibly a larger naval force big enough to patrol the entire coast of Lebanon (pending Parliamentary approval). Also they may provide some border patrol units, apparently to be provided on a bilateral basis. France: -- air and maritime support and an additional 200 troops, possibly engineers. Also offered to provide another general officer to assist with command and control. Italy: -- will join the effort but offered nothing specific during this meeting. The Israeli Mission in New York told USUN that the Italian mission in New York had privately committed to providing a brigade during an August 17 meeting. Bangladesh: -- up to two mechanized infantry battalions. USUN NEW Y 00001570 003.2 OF 004 Indonesia: -- one mechanized infantry battalion and one Engineer Company. Denmark: -- two coastal patrol vessels and one corvette (pending Parliamentary approval). Belgium: -- will likely join the effort but the need to study the CONOPS and ROE first. Morocco: -- assistance currently being considered in Rabat, also need to study the CONOPs and ROE. Malaysia: -- one mechanized infantry battalion. United Kingdom: -- air reconnaissance support and one frigate for coastal patrol. Also, the UK base in Cyprus will be made available for UN use. Poland: -- will maintain current UNIFIL level of up to 250 troops and may do more after looking at CONOPs and ROE. Nepal: -- one mechanized infantry battalion. Spain: -- will likely participate, need to study the CONOPS and ROE first. Norway: -- maritime support no earlier than late Sep or Oct. New Zealand: -- not decided yet but may provide some &modest niche capability.8 India: -- undecided. Need to look at the CONOPs and ROE. Turkey: -- use of an airport and a seaport. May do more but need to look at the CONOPs and ROE. The Turks also told the Israeli Mission in New York August 17 that they would provide troops to focus on humanitarian, reconstruction, medical, communications, and logistics needs. Greece: -- not certain but will likely offer one frigate and one naval helicopter. Portugal: -- undecided. Need to look at the CONOPs and ROE. Cyprus: -- port and basing facilities. Malloch Brown Previews Force Generation Effort in Prior Bilateral Meeting -------------- ¶10. (SBU) During a bilateral meeting with A/S Hillen and Ambassador Wolff before the session with TCCs, Malloch Brown previewed his statement for the TCCs, noting that he was determined to counter the growing press reports that the UN USUN NEW Y 00001570 004.2 OF 004 had only a "fuzzy" idea of UNIFIL's new mandate and concept of operations. He said that Annan wanted to move quickly to establish "three or four" pillars to replace the French at the core of an expanded UNIFIL. Malloch Brown suggested that Italy, Turkey and India were key to maintaining positive momentum in the force generation process and noted that he had spoken to all of them - and the Germans - to "warm them up" for the TCC meeting. He asked USUN to reach out to New York delegations to encourage forward-leaning statements. (USUN Ambassador Wolff subsequently made a series of calls prior to the afternoon meeting to these key country delegations. All stated they needed to review the CONOPS and ROEs prior to making a commitment.) ¶11. (SBU) DPA Director Michael Williams noted that Israel's stated unwillingness to accept contributions from countries with which they do not have diplomatic relations (i.e., Muslim countries) is a serious problem. Malloch Brown said that the Israeli statements had probably eliminated the possibility of contributions from Malaysia (following the statement by the Malaysian Foreign Minister suggesting Hizballah needed to be re-armed),but Malloch Brown continued "we need to hold the line" with Indonesia. "Beggars can't be choosers." In a separate meeting August 17 between Annabi and an Israeli delegation, Annabi also urged the Israelis to reconsider the Indonesian offer, promising close UN supervision of the Indonesian contingent. ¶12. (SBU) In his discussion with Malloch Brown, A/S Hillen stressed that the expanded UNIFIL needed to be deployed quickly, and represent a robust, capable force, in order to effectively bolster the LAF. Hillen emphasized the importance of a quick deployment, a comprehensive approach to the mission, and a muscular interpretation of the mandate in Resolution 1701. In response, Malloch Brown urged the U.S. to play a lead role in providing assistance to the LAF, and he repeated the plea for a "price break" on U.S. military lift to potential troop contributors. "I've waived a number of procurement rules to speed up the deployment," he said, "but I can't pay you three-and-a-half times the commercial rate for lift." BOLTON