DPKO BRIEFS A/S HILLEN ON EXPANDED UNIFIL FORCE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 USUN NEW YORK 001550 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/2016 TAGS: PREL KPKO UNSC IS LE SUBJECT: DPKO BRIEFS A/S HILLEN ON EXPANDED UNIFIL FORCE GENERATION EFFORTS Classified By: Ambassador Alejandro D. Wolff, per 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. During a meeting with PM A/S Hillen on August 16 in New York, UN DPKO A/SYG Hedi Annabi expressed deep concern that potential unwillingness by France to commit substantial forces to an expanded UNIFIL might have a "chilling effect" on other potential troop contributing countries (TCCs) and imperil the broader force generation effort. Annabi warned of serious problems unless France commits to a "major contribution that would constitute the backbone of the force," and urged the USG to weigh in with French President Chirac, as SYG Annan was currently doing, at the highest possible level to secure this commitment. Annabi emphasized that France must make such an announcement either before or during an August 17 meeting with over 50 current and potential TCCs, during which D/SYG Mark Malloch Brown plans to preview the Secretariat's concept of operations, rules of engagement, and force requirements. Outlining DPKO's plans for an initial advance force of 3,500 to 4,000 troops that would supplement the existing UNIFIL contingent and help the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) deploy to the south, Annabi suggested that Italy, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and possibly Spain would be willing to contribute troops to such a force. He said other TCCs such as Turkey and Morocco remain noncommittal, while possible Muslim contributors like Indonesia and Malaysia may be dissuaded by Israel's announced refusal to countenance soldiers from countries with which it does not have diplomatic relations. Annabi said SYG Annan had asked Israeli FM for greater flexibility on this point. ¶2. (C) Summary, cont,d. Annabi presented A/S Hillen with a comprehensive "shopping list" of USG assistance to support the training and equipping of the LAF as well as UNIFIL deployment logistics, and asked that the USG provide as much of this assistance as possible on a voluntary (non-reimbursable) basis. Recounting USG efforts to support DPKO's force generation work, A/S Hillen conveyed a message from Secretary Rice that the Secretariat ought to move as rapidly as possible to set up the new force and define its concept of operations and rules of engagement in accordance with the spirit of UNSCR 1701. This would mean ensuring the rules of engagement (ROE) are sufficiently strong and muscular to permit the force to operate in a semi-permissive environment and help ensure the LAF deployment is a success. The USG, A/S Hillen underscored, wanted to ensure that the expanded UNIFIL force helps implements all the provisions of UNSCR 1701 -- including the arms embargo, humanitarian reconstruction, and a buffer zone in south Lebanon free from unauthorized armed elements. End Summary. ¶3. (U) Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs John Hillen met UN Department of Peackeeping Operations (DPKO) Assistant Secretary-General Hedi Annabi on August 16 to review force generation efforts for the expanded UNIFIL mission. Annabi was accompanied by DPKO Military Advisor Lieutenant General Randhir Kumar Mehta, DPKO Asia Director Lisa Buttenheim, as well as several other DPKO officials. USUN Ambassador Wolff and IO DAS Gerry Anderson accompanied A/S Hillen, as did representatives from NEA/IPA, IO/PSC, L/PM, and PM. UNIFIL-IDF-LAF Meetings Going Well -------------- ¶4. (C) Annabi expressed "guarded optimism" that the current cessation of hostilities would continue to hold and described recent meetings between UNIFIL, LAF, and IDF representatives as "historic" and highly positive developments. He noted that the August 12 trilateral meeting at Naqoura had helped operationalize the cessation of hostilities and had set a constructive and professional tone for future discussions. The second trilateral meeting, held on August 16, focused on planning for IDF withdrawal from south Lebanon. According to Annabi, the LAF argued on August 18 for a plan for full IDF withdrawal from Lebanon, whereas the IDF instead offered a blueprint for staged Israeli withdrawals that would be conditioned on UNIFIL/LAF deployments. The two sides reportedly agreed ultimately that Israel would start withdrawing from its positions in stages. General Force Generation Efforts -------------- ¶5. (C) Annabi noted that the Secretariat had been actively engaging current and potential TCCs on contributions to the USUN NEW Y 00001550 002 OF 005 expanded UNIFIL force since August 12, one day after UNSCR 1701 was adopted. The UN, he said, has emphasized the need for firm commitments and fixed dates by which deployments to the region would begin -- he added that DPKO has cautioned TCCs that this is no time for mere expressions of interest. Annabi confirmed that Deputy Secretary-General Mark Malloch Brown would chair a meeting with more than 50 current and potential TCCs on August 17 to underscore the urgency of the UN's appeal. During this meeting, Malloch Brown would preview the UN's thoughts on the mission's concept of operations, rules of engagement, and force requirements. ¶6. (C) Outlining the UN's current thoughts on force requirements, Annabi said DPKO wanted to send an initial advance force of 3,500 to 4,000 troops -- consisting of three mechanized battalions and one infantry battalion -- to Lebanon within 10-15 days. This force would link up with the 2,000 existing UNIFIL troops on the ground and position themselves in the zone a few kilometers deep along the Blue Line. As the initial UN force is deploying, the LAF would position itself in three large Assembly Areas just north of the Litani River. Then, as the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) move back over the Blue Line, the LAF would cross the Litani and fill in between the river and the Blue Line. These movements would all be orchestrated by UNIFIL. ¶7. (C) Annabi said DPKO had called on TCCs to self-deploy and self-sustain their forces for up to 60 days, after which the UN would reimburse them for expenses previously incurred at standard UN rates. Annabi said the UN is asking European TCCs to cover the difference between UN rates and the full cost of self-deployment. Annabi confirmed that DPKO had received approval from the Under Secretary-General for Management to waive many standard UN budgetary regulations in order to deploy the expanded force as quickly as possible. Mehta said movements into the sector could come via air into Beirut and Tel Aviv. Port landings could come through Tyre and Haifa. Additionally, DPKO plans to utilize a site on Cyprus as a &Forward Mounting Base8 from which units and supplies may be moved into Lebanon. Forces and equipment could be flown with strategic lift to Cyprus and then via air or sea into the Area of Operations. Preliminary French Reaction Worrying -------------- ¶8. (C) Annabi reported "intensive" Secretariat efforts to urge the French to announce a major commitment to the expanded force, but cautioned that preliminary indications from French military planners currently in New York had been worrying. Asking that the USG protect this information and its source, he said the French delegation had told DPKO on August 16 that France would be willing to commit staff officers, an engineering company, and a quick-reaction force to south Lebanon -- but that these forces would operate outside of UNIFIL. The French were reportedly planned to make an announcement along these lines on August 16, which Annabi said would have had a "chilling effect" on other TCCs, but after Secretariat intervention they instead released a general statement noting their intention to continue to lead UNIFIL until February 2007. ¶9. (C) Annabi warned of a serious problem unless France announces on August 17 "a major contribution that would constitute the backbone of the force." He reported that SYG Annan was calling French President Chirac at 1700 New York time on August 16 to emphasize this point. But Annabi emphasized that intervention by the USG at the highest level -- he specifically suggested a POTUS to Chirac call -- would also be crucial to persuade the French to "stop dancing" and commit. Annabi characterized the August 17 TCC meeting as a "key moment" for France that would either lead other TCCs to support the force or to walk away. In addition to the contributions the French had previewed for DPKO on August 16, Annabi said Paris would need to provide at least a strong battalion that would lead the initial 3,500 to 4,000-strong advance force. Good Signs from Italians and Other Europeans -------------- ¶10. (C) Annabi confirmed that Italian Prime Minister Prodi had told SYG Annan that Italy would provide a "strong contingent" to the expanded UNIFIL force. Noting media reports in which the Italian FM had suggested the force might USUN NEW Y 00001550 003 OF 005 consist of up to 3,000 troops, Annabi said the exact nature of Italy's contribution remains to be discussed. He asked for USG help in countering a "strange" Italian proposal to create a second line of command, similar to NATO's geographic commands, between the UNIFIL Force Commander and UNHQ. While the Italians believe this arrangement might help ensure the mission has sufficient authority to use force, etc., Annabi said he had assured the Italians that the Force Commander would have all the flexibility he needs. Annabi categorically rejected comments in the press by an Italian General that UN peacekeeping operations require approval everyday from UNHQ to use force to carry out their mission. Emphasizing that "this is not the old DPKO," he added that "even if we wanted to micromanage this operation, we would not be able to" because of the difficult challenges involved and the fast-moving nature of the mission. ¶11. (C) Scandinavian countries, Annabi reported, had showed "a lot of interest" in contributing to the force and had even made some "quasi-commitments" of support. He said the Norwegian State Secretary for Defense, in particular, had told DPKO that Norway would most likely be able to provide maritime patrol units to help guard Lebanon's coast against arms smuggling operations. Annabi predicted that Norway, together with Denmark and Sweden, might agree to provide all four of the initial maritime patrols required for the advance force and eventually provide the 12 maritime patrols needed for the expanded force. He added that EU Foreign Policy Chief Javier Solana, whom he described as being very active and helpful in the force generation process, thought that Spain might also come forward with a contribution to an expanded UNIFIL. Few Commitments from Other TCCs and Concerns About Israeli Preconditions -------------- ¶12. (C) While acknowledging arguments that the force should strike a balance between European and Arab/Muslim soldiers, Annabi said he was not sure if that was an important principle or if it would even be possible to obtain such a balance of contributions. He reported that Egypt had flatly rejected participating in an expanded UNIFIL, whereas Morocco had only put forward expressions of interest. Annabi described Turkey as interested in possibly contributing to the force but thusfar unwilling to make a commitment. Indonesia had made a formal commitment to supply a mechanized infantry battalion of 850 troops, but it would need strategic lift to deploy this force to the region. ¶13. (C) Part of the problem in obtaining broad-based contributions, Annabi averred, was Israel's press statement that it would not agree to forces from countries with which it did not have diplomatic relations. Given potential contributions from Indonesia, Malaysia, and Pakistan, Annabi argued that Israel should show flexibility and warned against a blanket "no" to Muslim contributions. He said Israeli FM Livni had agreed to reconsider the GOI's position on this issue and provide DPKO by August 17 a list of those countries from which Israel could not accept troops and those countries which it would prefer to keep out of UNIFIL but would ultimately accept. Request for Assistance from USG -------------- ¶14. (C) Annabi and Mehta provided A/S Hillen with a comprehensive "shopping list" of USG assistance to help deploy the force and train and equip the LAF. (Note: Copies of the UN's request have been faxed to PM. End Note.) Focusing specifically on the request for strategic airlift assistance from the USG, Annabi urged the USG to provide this aid as a voluntary contribution. If, as in the past, the USG offered this assistance at its cost -- which he said is 3.5 to 4 times the commercial rate -- Annabi predicted the UN would have to decline the offer. If it is not possible to provide this assistance on a voluntary basis, he encouraged the USG to consider providing it at the UN reimbursement rate instead of the traditional USG rate. Hillen Briefs on USG Efforts -------------- ¶15. (C) A/S Hillen briefed Annabi on USG efforts to support the Secretariat's force generation work, including a demarche USUN NEW Y 00001550 004 OF 005 cable encouraging potential TCCs to consider contributions and engage DPKO quickly as well as an August 16 meeting hosted by A/S Hillen and NEA A/S Welch with Washington-based Ambassadors of potential TCCs to relay the same message. A/S Hillen noted positive signals as a result of these meetings from the Italians and Germans and predicted Malaysia and other TCCs might announce commitments as soon as they become comfortable with the UN's concept of operations and rules of engagement. He also confirmed that the USG is looking for ways to train, equip, and modernize the LAF and to consider what kind of assistance it could provide in terms of force enablers, including lift capabilities and planning and intelligence efforts. ¶16. (C) Noting that Secretary Rice had asked him to convey this message to the Secretariat, A/S Hillen emphasized the need to move rapidly to set up the new force and to define the concept of operations and the mandate of the mission in accordance with the spirit of UNSCR 1701. This would mean ensuring the rules of engagement (ROE) were sufficiently strong and muscular to permit the force to operate in a semi-permissive environment and that the force ultimately reaches its authorized ceiling. While acknowledging that the force would not engage in offensive military operations such as disarming Hizballah, A/S Hillen argued that strong and muscular ROE would help ensure that the LAF deployment is a success. He noted that the USG would work with other UNSC members to ensure UNSCR 1701's provisions on the arms embargo, humanitarian reconstruction in south Lebanon, and the buffer zone free from unauthorized armed elements are implemented. The USG, A/S Hillen assured Annabi, stands ready to help the Secretariat in this regard. Timing of IDF Withdrawal / UNIFIL-LAF Deployment -------------- --- ¶17. (C) Annabi said Israeli FM Livni had served notice that the IDF plans to begin withdrawals from certain parts of south Lebanon on August 16 and complete most of the withdrawal by August 24. However, Livni also reportedly told DPKO that the IDF would hold onto a band of territory along the Blue Line until it sees a credible UNIFIL-LAF deployment in these areas. As the withdrawal process continues, General Mehta (please protect) asked the USG to urge Israel -- in accordance with customary military practice -- to remove all its booby traps and mines in south Lebanon and destroy all underground tunnels and weapons caches controlled by Hizballah that the IDF has identified. Mehta asked that the USG treat with extreme care the UN,s request that the IDF destroy Hizballah facilities, lest Hizballah retaliate against UNIFIL if word of the request leaks. ¶18. (C) Mehta also emphasized that the UN and other interested parties should urge the LAF to deploy tactically to south Lebanon rather than deploy to military camp sites. Deploying tactically throughout the area of operations, he said, would help sanitize the territory and ensure the LAF could monitor Hizballah movements and possible arms shipments. Mehta also underscored that Hizballah must never again be allowed to establish positions near UNIFIL positions, as had happened in the past. Details of Force Structure -------------- ¶19. (C) Annabi and Mehta presented DPKO,s current view of UNIFIL force requirements based on their &troops-to-task8 assessment derived from UNSCR 1701 (battalions consist of 650-850 soldiers each and companies typically consist of 125 personnel) -8x Mechanized Infantry battalions; -3x Light Armored Cavalry battalions; -2x Combat Engineer battalions (or as much as they can get); -1x Engineer battalion for reconstruction; 1x Logistics/transportation battalion (light/medium trucks); -4x Signal companies; -1 Aviation unit consisting of 5 helicopters for both Search and Rescue (SAR) and aerial reconnaissance; -2x Military Police companies; -1x Level II Hospital; 1-Cartography section; -3x Headquarter Companies (1 to bolster the existing HQ at Naqoura, and 1 each for the two operating sectors. USUN NEW Y 00001550 005 OF 005 (Note: This list totals approximately 15,000 personnel, including the existing 2,000-man UNIFIL contingent. End Note.) ¶20. (C) Mehta said the UNIFIL HQ in Naqoura would initially serve as the principal in-country logistical hub, but that DPKO would at some point plan to establish a base at the port of Tyre as well as another base near the boundary of the two sectors around Qabrikha. Supplies may also be brought into Cyprus via strategic lift and then brought into Lebanon by sea or air. BOLTON