Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06USUNNEWYORK1488
2006-08-04 21:23:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
USUN New York
Cable title:  

UNSC EXPANSION: GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEBATES PRODUCES

Tags:  PREL KUNR UNSC UN 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 001488 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
NOFORN

BERN ALSO FOR LIECHTENSTEIN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/01/2011
TAGS: PREL KUNR UNSC UN
SUBJECT: UNSC EXPANSION: GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEBATES PRODUCES
MORE OF THE SAME, BUT WITH LESS FEELING THAN BEFORE

REF: A. STATE 118619

B. 2005 USUN 2677

C. 2005 USUN 2635

Classified By: Ambassador John R. Bolton, Permanent Representative, for
reasons 1.4 b,d.

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 001488 SIPDIS SIPDIS NOFORN BERN ALSO FOR LIECHTENSTEIN E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/01/2011 TAGS: PREL KUNR UNSC UN SUBJECT: UNSC EXPANSION: GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEBATES PRODUCES MORE OF THE SAME, BUT WITH LESS FEELING THAN BEFORE REF: A. STATE 118619 ¶B. 2005 USUN 2677 ¶C. 2005 USUN 2635 Classified By: Ambassador John R. Bolton, Permanent Representative, for reasons 1.4 b,d. ¶1. (U) Summary and Comment. During more than ten hours of speeches over July 20 and 21, eighty-six delegations spoke in the General Assembly on Security Council expansion and working methods reform. Proponents of expansion cited the large number of speakers as evidence of continued support for the reform effort, although the numbers may simply reflect the lack of consensus on the issue within the major groups. Ambassador Bolton delivered the U.S. statement (ref a), emphasizing our support for a modest expansion of the Council that would serve to increase the body's effectiveness. The Ambassador spoke positively of the progress made by the Security Council's Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions and confirmed U.S. support for Japan's candidacy for permanent membership. Most of the other delegations reiterated well-worn points from previous debates, including that of last November (ref b). While the sharp differences in positions have not changed, the overall tone was more restrained, reflecting the sense that some of the momentum behind the expansion effort in New York has dissipated. ¶2. (C) The most aggressive statements used the crisis in the Middle East (and by implication the recent U.S. veto) as the backdrop for their call for reform, claiming that only reform and expansion would cure the Council of its "inability to act effectively." Indian PR Sen gave the most confrontational statement of the two-day debate, focusing his criticism on the P-5 and claiming that the Council has been unable to fulfill its Charter role while it continues to encroach on the work and authority of the GA. Expansion's supporters, particularly the G-4 and some in the AU, sought the session as a means to keep the issue "alive" and expressed a willingness to compromise. Uniting for Consensus countries called for "the negotiations we never had" to work out a consensus text. Dutch PR Majoor, who co-chairs the current version of the GA's working group on Security Council reform, has become an active proponent of an "interim" solution. While many delegatio
ns rhetorically support a "compromise," there is no underlying agreement on what it would look like. ¶3. (C) The "S-5" resolution on working methods reform was also widely addressed by delegations. The effort to put the S-5 resolution to a vote received a lukewarm reception, reflecting concern among many that action on working methods would undermine support for expansion. The sponsors, including the Swiss, therefore appeared to back off from earlier statements that they would seek a vote on the resolution "this summer," though they kept open the possibility. However, if the resolution were to come to a vote, it still would pass overwhelmingly, as there remains widespread support in the GA for improvements in the Council's working methods. From our point of view, the S-5 resolution contains many unhelpful elements. End Summary and Comment. Consensus and Transitional Solutions -------------- ¶4. (U) The General Assembly met on July 20 and 21 to hold its latest debate on the issue of Security Council expansion and working methods reform. Only the African and Eastern European regional groups have agreed positions on Council expansion. There was no statement on behalf of the NAM or G-77, and the EU remains deeply divided. Even within the African Group, a number of delegations took the floor and "expanded" on the group's statement (in both South Africa and Nigeria's cases coming very close to disagreeing with the group's position). As a result, eighty-six delegations took to the podium. Without exception, each delegation expressed at least rhetorical support for expansion of the Security Council. ¶5. (U) The strongest supporters of expansion, including those in the G-4 (Germany, India, Brazil and Japan) and their supporters in the AU (South Africa, Nigeria) emphasized that reform of the Council was an integral part of overall UN reform. Germany claimed that, in light of the inauguration of the Peacebuilding Commission and the creation of the Human Rights Council, the lack of progress on Security Council reform "sticks out like a sore thumb." Delegations from Uniting For Consensus (UFC) noted that they had not retabled their own resolution this year, instead stressing the need to conduct negotiations among the differing groups in an effort to achieve a consensus outcome. Despite the continuing differences, there was less antagonism between delegations and a more conciliatory tone from most. Compared to previous discussions there was also less emphasis on the particulars of the different proposals. (Of all the UFC delegations that spoke, only one - Spain - directly referred to their previous idea of expansion through the addition of semi-permanent seats.) ¶6. (U) In addition to the more conciliatory tone, there were repeated references to an "interim" or "transitional" solution to the expansion issue. A number of speakers referred to recent calls for an interim solution by UK Prime Minister Tony Blair (during his May speech at Georgetown University) and Secretary-General Annan. (Annan told a group of Italian Parliamentarians in Rome on July 12 that he had advised those seeking a seat on the Council: "Find a way to reach a compromise to get you to the Council table and, from there, you continue your search for the permanent solution.") Dutch PR Majoor made the most detailed case for a transitional solution, based on his consultations as co-chair of the Open-Ended Working Group. Majoor said that he saw "a growing interest in the idea of pursuing a transitional solution... one which may last for, say, ten years." UK DPR Pierce, though strongly supporting the G-4 for permanent membership, called for "fresh thinking" and "renewed momentum" to find a way through the "current impasse." ¶7. (U) Ambassador Bolton delivered the U.S. statement on the afternoon of Friday, July 21, emphasizing our support for a modest expansion of the Council that would serve to increase the body's effectiveness. Ambassador Bolton spoke positively on the progress made by the Security Council's Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions and confirmed U.S. support for Japan's candidacy for permanent membership. India's Sen again attacks the Council and the P-5 -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) Indian PR Sen, who has established a reputation for extemporaneous remarks at these sessions, took the podium shortly after Ambassador Bolton and delivered the most confrontational of the two days' of speeches. (Note: More than one delegation told USUN officers that Sen ensured that he would speak after the U.S., to allow an opportunity for direct rebuttal, as he has done in the past (ref c). End Note.) Sen focused on the "encroachment" of the Security Council into the GA's affairs at a time when, he claimed, it is unable "to address effectively" the problems in the Middle East. The primary target of Sen's unhappiness is the P-5 (and by implication, the U.S.): "For some of the P-5, history ended in 1945. They oppose any dispersal of quotas in IMF... At the same time, they insisted on permanent membership for the P-5 in the Peacebuilding Commission and desired it greatly in the Human Rights Council. For them, history stopped in 1945. All subsequent changes: the vast expansion in membership, the anti-colonial and anti-apartheid triumphs, freedom, equality, have not happened and should not be taken into account." ¶9. (U) Sen also used the opportunity to express unhappiness with other U.S. positions in New York. Referring to the U.S.-led effort to seek reform through the imposition of a spending cap (which had been agreed upon by consensus last year and recently lifted),Sen asked: "Did we have a sense of ownership of the spending cap? Most regarded it as an unfortunate turnip ghost from an aborted Halloween party, a scarecrow that fortunately failed to scare and had to be given a decent burial." Sen suggested that the management reform proposals suggested by SYG Annan and supported by the U.S., which were defeated by the G-77 earlier this year, "would have fashioned the General Assembly in the image of the Security Council - dominance and decision making by a charmed circle." Sen too called for a dialogue among delegations to advance the process, though he did not offer an olive branch to the UFC. First, he suggested, the G-4, AU and S-5, whose proposals are "mutually compatible", should work to arrive at a common understanding. "Thereafter the process can extend to other member states." (The full text of Sen's statement has been emailed to IO/UNP and is also available on the website of the Indian Mission to the UN.) Egypt's Abdelaziz -------------- ¶10. (C) Egyptian PR Abdelaziz claimed that the lack of unanimity among the P-5 resulted in the Security Council's "failure to address" threats to international peace and security. Referring to the U.S. veto of a resolution on the Middle East, he argued that the "current impasses in the work of the Security Council" demonstrated the need for expanding the membership and improving the working methods of the Council. He also took the opportunity to criticize the process of Secretary-General selection, arguing that the selection of the SYG should not be subject to the veto. He further advocated holding straw polls in the General Assembly on candidates prior to the Security Council's recommendation, in order to ensure the appointment results from "a transparent and democratic process." (Comment: Egyptian anger over the U.S. refusal to give Boutros Ghali a second term in 1996 remains undiminished, and colors their approach to all issues related to SYG selection. End Comment) The G-4 and Africa -------------- ¶11. (C/NF) Japanese PR Oshima explicitly acknowledged that action was not going to be taken on expansion during the 60th Session and called for continued attention to the issue next year. He also noted that Japan, who did not join its G-4 partners in re-tabling their text earlier this year, wanted to develop a "concrete proposal" that was capable of garnering "more support" than the G-4 had previously received. Oshima said that "nothing new" had come out of the recent AU Summit, and he hoped that delegations with "important stakes" in this issue would work with "flexibility" to find a solution that could get the "broad support" of the membership. He noted, with appreciation, continued U.S. support for Japan's candidacy. German PR Matussek spoke of working with Africa and other regional groups to "consider possible amendments with a view to broadening the basis of support." Among the G-4's supporters, the French and UK gave explicit endorsement to the G-4's candidacies. One UFC Ambassador commented to USUN, "The French and the UK are more G-4 than the G-4." ¶12. (C) Although the Algerians reiterated the AU position (as reaffirmed at the Banjul Summit) on behalf of all African delegations, a number of the G-4's friends on the continent hinted (unsubtly) at their willingness to seek a compromise. The South Africans, after noting the Banjul statement, said, "However, we are also cognizant of the fact that the decision... will have to be taken by the general membership of the UN. It is for this reason that we welcome... an opportunity for all of us to find a common ground." Nigerian DPR Adekanye said delegations should maintain "some element of flexibility." In a clear signal that they are willing to do a deal with the G-4, Adekanye said that in the interest of securing permanent seats for Africa, "Nigeria, therefore, identifies with those Member States whose initiatives boldly and largely take into account Africa's primary interest and concerns." S-5 Proposal on Working Methods -------------- ¶13. (U) Many delegations addressed the draft resolution on Security Council working methods that has been tabled by the "S-5" (Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Jordan, Costa Rica and Singapore). The effort to put the S-5 resolution to a vote received a lukewarm reception, reflecting concern among the proponents of expansion that action on working methods would undermine the case for expansion. The sponsors appeared to back off from earlier statements that they would seek a vote on the resolution "this summer." The Swiss said only that they would "keep open the option" of putting the resolution to a vote. The strongest proponents of expansion argued that the two issues could not be separated. G-4 members, like India, noted that many of the S-5 proposals are incorporated in their expansion resolution. Although many countries have refrained from calling for a vote on the S-5 resolution for fear of losing support for expansion, if it were actually put to a vote in the GA, it would still pass overwhelmingly, as there remains widespread support in the GA for improvements in the Council's working methods and little desire to impede any progress on reform. ¶14. (U) The lukewarm reception for the S-5 was also partially due to the Security Council's July 19 decision to adopt a lengthy note on working methods based on the work of the Japanese-chaired Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions. Though most delegations argued that the Council's own reforms did not go far enough, many acknowledged and complimented the work of the working group, and the Japanese chair. BOLTON

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