LORD CARLILE SEEKS U.S. VIEWS ON DEFINING TERRORISM

UNCLAS USUN NEW YORK 001441 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV UNSC KTFN UNGA UK SUBJECT: LORD CARLILE SEEKS U.S. VIEWS ON DEFINING TERRORISM ¶1. This is an action request; please see para 9. ¶2. In a videoteleconference with USUN LegalOff, Department attorneys, and UKUN legal advisers on July 31, Lord Alex Carlile of Berriew Q.C., the UK,s independent reviewer of the Terrorist Act, sought U.S. views on the negotiations of the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (CCIT),whether U.S. law treats as terrorists domestic groups that use violence to achieve political ends, and the efficacy and scope of the UN Security Council,s al Qa,ida/Taliban sanctions. Carlile is visiting New York to gather information for a report he is preparing on the definition of terrorism in UK law. Through meetings with legal advisers from UN missions and others, he said he hoped to discern whether the UN could achieve progress in reaching an internationally acceptable definition of terrorism. ¶3. As the independent reviewer of the UK,s terrorism legislation, Carlile provides annual reports on the &working and functionality8 of the UK,s counterterrorism law, and he is preparing a special report on how UK law defines terrorism. The UK has a broad definition of terrorism in section 1 of the Terrorist Act of 2000, as amended in 2006, and its law includes other definitions relating to terrorism financing and to the international counterterrorism conventions and protocols to which the UK is a party. He noted that he thought the reference to "criminal acts" from UN Security Council Resolution 1566 (2004) might help the OIC to overcome concerns about the perceived overbreadth of the CCIT provisions. ¶4. Carlile questioned whether language in UNSCR 1566 might provide the basis for the UN to define terrorism and thus conclude the negotiations of the CCIT. (Note: Operative paragraph 3 of UNSCR 1566 &(r)ecalls that criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature (8 End Note.) Citing his earlier meeting with the Pakistan Mission,s legal adviser, Carlile said he thought the key obstacle to concluding negotiations of the CCIT was the difference in how the OIC countries and others wanted to address self-determination. ¶5. Department lawyers responded that resolution 1566 had been negotiated in a different context, that Article 2 of the draft CCIT already referred to acts that are &unlawful and intentional,8 and that Article 18 of the draft CCIT reflected language the OIC had accepted in the Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, the amendments to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, and the Convention for the Suppression of Nuclear Terrorism. Department lawyers cautioned against proposing new language on self-determination that would have the effect of undermining the object and purpose of the treaty. Carlile seemed to understand the point, but expressed skepticism that, on this view, there was any chance of concluding the CCIT negotiations. ¶6. Carlile also asked whether the United States had concerns about using U.S. terrorism laws to prosecute domestic groups that use violence for political ends. In the UK, some are concerned that using anti-terrorism laws to prosecute violent animal rights activists lends those groups credibility. Department lawyers explained that the State Department's principal focus in terrorism is international terrorism rather than domestic environmental terrorism, indicating that the relevant legal regimes are largely separate. ¶7. Carlile then expressed some skepticism about the 1267 sanctions regime, asking why the 1267 Committee's sanctions list was not broader and asking for statistics to quantify the impact of freezing terrorists, assets. He questioned whether concerns about sharing intelligence prevented the United States or other states from proposing more names for designation. Department lawyers explained U.S. domestic procedures for designating terrorists, stressing the U.S. aim to add as many individuals and entities designated under U.S. procedures to the 1267 Committee's sanctions list as possible, notwithstanding information sharing issues that arise from time to time. Carlile also argued that because terrorist acts required little financing, freezing assets would not counter terrorism. ¶8. Department lawyers stressed the importance of having a legal regime that worked to prevent terrorist acts before they happened, and pointed out the preventive value of financial and other sanctions. On the margins of the meeting USUN agreed to try to provide relevant data, including a copy of the Treasury Department Office of Foreign Assets Control's annual report to Congress on assets freezes, if available, and noted that because freezing assets and bank accounts helps prevent terrorists from transferring funds, focusing on amounts frozen does not necessarily illustrate the impact of such sanctions. Citing high rates of remittances from the UK to Bangladesh, Carlile expressed skepticism, arguing that the energy expended on freezing assets could be better sent tracking remittances to ensure that they are not provided to front companies or others who finance terrorists. ¶9. USUN requests that Department provide any additional data that USUN or EmbLondon could provide to Carlile. BOLTON