GAMBARI, KALOMOH, GUEHENNO, EGELAND ATTEND CORE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 001404 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: IV SU UG UNSC XA XW SUBJECT: GAMBARI, KALOMOH, GUEHENNO, EGELAND ATTEND CORE GROUP MEETING ON NORTHERN UGANDA ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: On July 20, the Under Secretary-General (U/SYG) for the Office of the Special Adviser on Africa, Ibrahim Gambari, hosted a meeting of members of the Core Group for Northern Uganda, composed of the U.S., UK, Norway, and Netherlands, with Canada also in attendance, to discuss the July 12 talks held in Juba between the National Resistance Movement (NRM) and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). Gambari reported that Secretary-General (SYG) Annan supports the idea of deploying a Special Envoy to monitor future talks and has suggested that former President of Mozambique, Joaquin Chissano, be considered for the position. Core Group members discussed the impact of the International Criminal Court's (ICC) LRA indictments, the possibility of amnesty for LRA leaders involved in the talks, and whether to expand UN missions in the region to tackle the LRA. Less than 24 hours after the meeting convened, UKUN circulated elements of a draft resolution to Core Group Members for consideration, in advance of July 28 Security Council consultations on the LRA threat (text in Paragraph 10). Guidance request in Paragraph 9. END SUMMARY. HIGH LEVEL ATTENDANCE FOR DISCUSSION OF SPECIAL ENVOY -------------- -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Under-SYG Guehenno, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) U/SYG Egeland, and Department of Political Affairs (DPA) Assistant-Secretary-General (A/SYG) Kalomoh were also in attendance. Gambari emphasized that Uganda's priorities should be to protect its citizens and deter threats from the LRA. He went on to say that current UN mandates for peacekeeping operations in the region do not provide sufficient support for these priorities and that the UN Security Council (UNSC) should consider the deployment of a Special Envoy. According to Gambari, SYG Annan wants to encourage the apparent progress made during the talks in Juba by deploying an Envoy who would monitor and facilitate the talks between the LRA and Government of Uganda (GOU). Gambari stressed that the GOU is receptive to allowing an Envoy to participate in addressing the root causes of the LRA insurgency and promoting Uganda's national dialogue as well as regional security. According to Gambari, the GOU would thus allow the Envoy to engage in national reconciliation efforts and internal disarmament of ex-combatants. However, he cautioned that this initiative would require support from the UNSC, regional counties, donors, and NGOs. Gambari also noted that leaders from Sudan, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo support SYG Annan in this initiative. SYG SUPPORTS CHISSANO AS SPECIAL ENVOY -------------- ¶3. (SBU) According to Gambari, SYG Annan has suggested that Joaquin Chissano, former President of Mozambique and former Chairman of the African Union, take on the role of Special Envoy because of his positive relationships with the parties involved. Chissano, who has signaled his availability, has the confidence of the Ugandans. U/SYG Egeland expressed his support of the initiative, saying that UN/DPA should lead the response. He went on to say that the progress made during the talks in Juba presents a unique opportunity to finally end violence in the region. OPINIONS DIFFER ON GRANTING AMNESTY TO LRA LEADERS -------------- -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Gambari also brought up the issue of the ICC, noting that the Ugandan Minister for Security, Amama Mbabazi, was unsuccessful in his recent attempts to persuade the ICC Chief Prosecutor to grant amnesty to indicted LRA leaders. When U/SYG Guehenno was asked to comment on the role of the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC),he noted that the limits of UNMIS' current mandate could lead to an awkward situation if they were presented with the opportunity to arrest an LRA leader. He explained that if LRA leaders were arrested, they would have to be turned over to the Sudanese government for further action. Guehenno also noted that he is currently consulting with the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) to determine what actions would be allowable within the mandate. The Dutch representative supported the possibility of MONUC and UNMIS USUN NEW Y 00001404 002 OF 003 playing a role in ICC arrests, but stressed that their role should be combined with more robust regional efforts. Kalomoh pointed out that the optimistic perceptions of the talks in Juba are based on the hope that indicted LRA leaders will not be arrested and urged the Core Group to consider the impact that amnesty could have on negotiations. SOME MEMBERS EXPRESS DOUBTS ABOUT TALKS IN JUBA -------------- -- ¶5. (SBU) The Dutch representative expressed doubts about the claims of positive outcomes from the Juba talks. However, he did point out that the level of conviction behind the UN's proposal of an Envoy was encouraging. The Dutch representative also noted that his delegation would consider making a financial contribution, especially if the funds were directed toward Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) efforts. POL Mins-Couns expressed skepticism about the possibility of successful negotiations with LRA leaders, but pointed out that there could be hope for those who might be persuaded to abandon their leadership posts. He also expressed doubts regarding the GOU's willingness to involve an Envoy in the national reconciliation efforts and noted that a largely regional focus for the Envoy's work could replicate existing mechanisms. ¶6. (SBU) In response to these comments, Gambari admitted that there had in fact been mixed reports on the progress of the Juba talks but stressed that an Envoy would provide the support needed for positive results. He also noted that the UN had no comparable figure in Juba to facilitate talks. POL Mins-Couns encouraged the adoption of both regional military and diplomatic strategies for dealing with LRA. The UK and Canada welcomed an early discussion among the UNSC about the issue, and UNSC consultations were subsequently scheduled for July 28. The representative from the UK expressed her support for a UNSC Resolution on the deployment of a Special Envoy and a revision of UNMIS and MONUC mandates to tackle the LRA, which would first require that Uganda become an official item on the UNSC agenda. She stated that an "LRA-centric" resolution is needed and pointed out that the ICC incentives was a main driver behind the talks in Juba. ¶7. (SBU) In response to a Norwegian suggestion, A/SYG Kalomoh pointed out that Ugandans are adverse to the creation of a group of experts and suggested that, if the UNSC supports the deployment of an Envoy, they should consider delaying the formation of a group of experts. As a final note, Gambari pointed out that the Secretariat is 'inching towards a Special Envoy as a way of moving forward,' and that if the UNSC tries to simultaneously create a group of experts, they could end up losing the opportunity for both. UKUN DRAFTS BEGINNINGS OF A UNSCR -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Within 24 hours of this meeting, UKUN circulated elements of a draft Chapter VII resolution to Core Group Members for their consideration before sending it to the wider Council membership. The draft text incorporates suggestions made by Foreign Minister Kutesa during his recent meeting with the UK High Commissioner in Kampala. These suggestions included referencing the Juba talks to ensure that the LRA is aware of the deadline and stressing that the Special Envoy would be a 'regional' Special Envoy. The draft resolution also condemns LRA activity, welcomes the appointment and engagement of a Special Envoy to the Juba talks, and articulates a sanctions regime for LRA members. GUIDANCE REQUEST -------------- ¶9. (SBU) USUN requests Department guidance on how to respond to the UN's plan to proceed on appointing a Special Envoy for Uganda. In addition, USUN requests Department guidance on how to respond to UKUN's plan to introduce a resolution on the LRA, something about which we have been agnostic in the past and which may now have implications (including on the ICC issue) for the mandate we are pursuing to get a UN operation into Darfur, Sudan. END GUIDANCE REQUEST. USUN NEW Y 00001404 003 OF 003 DRAFT RESOLUTION ELEMENTS -------------- ¶10. (U) Begin draft resolution elements: Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, ¶1. Condemn the activities of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA); ¶2. Demand that illegal armed groups in the region, including the LRA, lay down their arms; ¶3. Condemn violence inflicted by any party on civilians; ¶4. Call on all states to end impunity for the perpetrators of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes; ¶5. Underscore that governments in the region have primary responsibility to protect their populations; ¶6. Welcome the appointment of a senior level envoy to: facilitate regional cooperation to address the security issues caused by the activities of the LRA; promote a lasting and peaceful settlement to the conflict; and support efforts to address humanitarian concerns; ¶7. Request the senior level envoy to provide to the Security Council briefings every three months and written reports on the situation; ¶8. Call upon all governments in the region to deepen their cooperation with a view to ending the activities of the LRA, and stresses that these States must respect the territorial integrity and political independence of their neighbors; ¶9. Authorise the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) to work closely with States and other UN missions in the region, and to make full use of its mandate and capabilities to disarm and demobilize the LRA and to ensure that those members of the LRA responsible for serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law are brought to justice; ¶10. Decide that UNMIS' mandate in Southern Sudan, as outlined in Resolutions 1590 (2005) and 1663 (2006),shall be amended to allow UNMIS, within its area of deployment and capability, to cooperate with efforts, and use all necessary means, to disarm and demobilize the LRA and to ensure that those members of the LRA responsible for serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law are brought to justice; ¶11. Call upon MONUC and UNMIS (south Sudan) to establish the necessary operational links with the relevant governments armed forces in order to assist attempts to disarm and demobilize the LRA and ensure that those members of the LRA responsible for serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law are brought to justice; ¶12. Stress the need for States in the region to work together to disarm, demobilize and cooperate in the voluntary repatriation and resettlement of those LRA members that have sought amnesty and reintegration into their commitments; ¶13. Sanctions: -- Arms embargo on LRA, including ban on financial assistance (related to military activities); -- Assets freeze on five LRA commanders (ICC indictees), including ban on making funds available to them; -- Review of the above measures in the light of progress on reintegration of LRA combatants and bringing to justice of ICC indictees; -- Establishment of a sanctions committee to monitor the above measures; -- Establishment of a group of experts to investigate and expose the sources of material and financial support to the LRA, and to make recommendations; ¶14. Welcome the establishment of the Joint Monitoring Committee and urge the Government of Uganda to ensure that clear progress is made on the finalisation and delivery of the Emergency Action Plan and look forward to an update on progress towards improvements in the living conditions for civilians in northern Uganda against clear and measurable benchmarks; ¶15. Encourage the Government of Uganda to reach a clear understanding with the international community, UN agencies and missions, NGOs and local leaders on the best approach to returning people to, or nearer to, their homes. ¶11. (U) End draft resolution elements. BOLTON