UNSC/SUDAN: PROPOSED WAY FORWARD IN SECURING

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 001349

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/29/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL SU UNSC KPKO
SUBJECT: UNSC/SUDAN: PROPOSED WAY FORWARD IN SECURING
RESOLUTION FOR UN PKO IN DARFUR

REF: USUN NEW YORK 01149

Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN R. BOLTON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B,D)


1. (C) In the wake of Sudanese President Al-Bashir's public
expressions of categorical opposition to a United Nations
(UN) peacekeeping force in Darfur, we face considerable
challenges in securing a resolution to mandate such a
presence. While the majority of UN SECURITY COUNCIL (SC)
Members favor expeditious action in transitioning the African
Union (AU) Mission in Sudan (AMIS),following the AU's
pronouncements and the SC Mission to Sudan, there is a
powerful minority - China, Russia and Qatar - that insist now
on not only securing the consent of the Sudanese Government
of NATIONAL Unity (GNU) for the re-hat, but also, in a new
twist, the 'cooperation' of the GNU as well. In USUN's view,
delivering generic points to the wider COUNCIL membership or
entrusting specific Members to do so would be unproductive,
as each dissenting delegation has its own interests and
pre-conditions associated with establishing a UN presence in
Darfur.


2. (C) It would make more sense to focus our efforts on
China, the COUNCIL country that seems both willing and able
to wield its considerable influence over Sudan (see reftel).
Enlisting China's acceptance of an effective resolution would
also work to undermine likely resistance from Russia and
Qatar.


3. (C) Outreach to the AU is also helpful, including securing
an African SC delegation to join in a combined effort on the
forthcoming resolution on AMIS transition. We 'co-chaired'
negotiations with the Congolese delegation during our
discussions of UNSCR 1679 (2006),strengthening our position
with the more intransigent Members who were not as willing to
contradict an African delegation on Sudan. As far as
weighing in with Bashir, it might be useful to approach
individual AU members, namely Nigerian President Obasanjo and
Ethiopian PM Meles, both of whom seem to have Bashir's
confidence.


4. (C) However, Bashir seems to vacillate between playing up
Sudan's African character and its Arab character, depending
on the audience. Therefore, focusing our lobbying efforts on
AU countries alone is too limited in scope. Bashir responds
to Egyptian President Mubarak and Arab League SYG Amre
Moussa. Guidance from NEA on this would be useful, and we
could consider demarches in Arab League capitals, especially
Cairo. The Egyptian Mission in New York has asked USUN
several times about ways it might be of help in changing
Bashir's mind and noted that Cairo would be receptive to a
demarche request from Washington to weigh in with Khartoum.
Given the religious justification for some of Bashir's press
comments about the motivations for a UN presence in Darfur,
it seems he is now attempting to play the Muslim card to his
advantage. It would make sense to call upon our Arab and
Islamic allies for assistance.


5. (C) Based on all discussions, including briefings from
DPKO, Bashir requires and is expecting high-level,
high-profile entreaties to 'convince' him of the need for
transition to a UN operation in Darfur, and he is claiming
ignorance on all issues related to the re-hat. For example,
according to Egyptian counterparts, Bashir still maintains
'no one' has to date approached him to say that a mandate for
the UN force could be modeled after that of UNSCR 1590
(2005),which contained a combination of Chapter VI and
Chapter VII elements (NOTE. We can name at least five
individuals who have personally conveyed this message,
including Brahimi, Annabi and Guehenno, all of whom had
personal audiences with Bashir in Khartoum. END NOTE).


6. (C) Part of 'convincing' Bashir will involve taking into
consideration the pervading fear among the senior Sudanese
leadership of arrests by the ICC. This issue has been raised
in consultations repeatedly by Annabi and Guehenno. In its
proposed draft of a resolution, UKUN included substantial ICC
language, and we pushed back against its inclusion, arguing
its inclusion in this resolution will complicate the effort
to get Bashir to accept a UN Darfur operation. If our
strategy is to model our procedure on UNSCR 1590, then we
should do so not only in substance but in sequence, by
adopting one resolution addressing the peacekeeping
operation, one resolution addressing sanctions (a la UNSCR
1591) and another addressing impunity/the ICC (a la UNSCR
1593). UKUN was flexible on this point, predicting that ICC
language could be 'conceded' during P-5 discussions on the
text and deferred to a subsequent resolution.


7. (C) We have made a similar case on UKUN's insistence on
including language on the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in the
resolution for Darfur. The Russian delegation and DPKO
oppose amending UNMIS' mandate to provide for apprehending
LRA members in southern Sudan, but UKUN does not believe that
such opposition from Russia would ultimately block its
support for a resolution on a transition including such a
provision. We argued for consideration of the new LRA
mandate element to be included when UNMIS' mandate is renewed
in September. If London insists on retaining LRA language in
the current resolution, we would appreciate guidance on how
to respond.


8. (C) Timing of the transition is still contentious, with
DPKO consistently citing January 1, 2007, as the earliest
possible date for UN forces to arrive in Darfur. However,
Guehenno, in June 27 UNSC consultations, made a point to
highlight the 'unprecedented' step the UN was taking in
establishing UN STAFF offices in Darfur dedicated entirely to
strengthening AMIS. Bashir has proclaimed himself agnostic
on the issue of AMIS 'strenghtening,' according to Guehenno.
When asked to elaborate on plans for these offices, Guehenno
demurred, but we anticipate that a portion of the forthcoming
SYG Report (expected o/a July 10) will contain
recommendations on how these offices can be used to begin
preliminary steps toward transition under the aegis of 'AMIS
strengthening.' It seems that this mechanism could be used
to expedite deployment of UN personnel into Darfur, albeit
slowly, as the duties under 'strengthening AMIS' could be
more widely interpreted. In this way, the UN could begin a
steady move into Darfur, especially as AMIS' mandate
expiration date of September 30 approaches, so that a
sizeable force might be on the ground by the time final
'transition' occurs on January 1.


9. (C) COMMENT. While Sudan should recognize its sovereign
responsibility to protect its own population against the
atrocities occurring in Darfur, it is failing to do so, and
we need non-Western help to ensure that protection is
provided. We should also begin thinking of a response to the
worst-case scenario should Arab and Chinese intervention fail
to persuade Bashir and if the idea of using UN STAFF offices
to strengthen AMIS proves untenable. END COMMENT.

BOLTON