UNSC/SUDAN: PROPOSED WAY FORWARD IN SECURING

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 001349 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/29/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL SU UNSC KPKO SUBJECT: UNSC/SUDAN: PROPOSED WAY FORWARD IN SECURING RESOLUTION FOR UN PKO IN DARFUR REF: USUN NEW YORK 01149 Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN R. BOLTON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B,D) ¶1. (C) In the wake of Sudanese President Al-Bashir's public expressions of categorical opposition to a United Nations (UN) peacekeeping force in Darfur, we face considerable challenges in securing a resolution to mandate such a presence. While the majority of UN Security Council (SC) Members favor expeditious action in transitioning the African Union (AU) Mission in Sudan (AMIS),following the AU's pronouncements and the SC Mission to Sudan, there is a powerful minority - China, Russia and Qatar - that insist now on not only securing the consent of the Sudanese Government of National Unity (GNU) for the re-hat, but also, in a new twist, the 'cooperation' of the GNU as well. In USUN's view, delivering generic points to the wider Council membership or entrusting specific Members to do so would be unproductive, as each dissenting delegation has its own interests and pre-conditions associated with establishing a UN presence in Darfur. ¶2. (C) It would make more sense to focus our efforts on China, the Council country that seems both willing and able to wield its considerable influence over Sudan (see reftel). Enlisting China's acceptance of an effective resolution would also work to undermine likely resistance from Russia and Qatar. ¶3. (C) Outreach to the AU is also helpful, including securing an African SC delegation to join in a combined effort on the forthcoming resolution on AMIS transition. We 'co-chaired' negotiations with the Congolese delegation during our discussions of UNSCR 1679 (2006),strengthening our position with the more intransigent Members who were not as willing to contradict an African delegation on Sudan. As far as weighing in with Bashir, it might be useful to approach individual AU members, namely Nigerian President Obasanjo and Ethiopian PM Meles, both of whom seem to have Bashir's confidence. ¶4. (C) However, Bashir seems to vacillate between playing up Sudan's African character and its Arab character, depending on the audience. Therefore, focusing our lobbying efforts on AU countries alone is too limited in scope. Bashir responds to Egyptian President Mubarak and Arab League SYG Amre Moussa. Guidance from NEA on this would be useful, and we could consider demarches in Arab League capitals, especially Cairo. The Egyptian Mission in New York has asked USUN several times about ways it might be of help in changing Bashir's mind and noted that Cairo would be receptive to a demarche request from Washington to weigh in with Khartoum. Given the religious justification for some of Bashir's press comments about the motivations for a UN presence in Darfur, it seems he is now attempting to play the Muslim card to his advantage. It would make sense to call upon our Arab and Islamic allies for assistance. ¶5. (C) Based on all discussions, including briefings from DPKO, Bashir requires and is expecting high-level, high-profile entreaties to 'convince' him of the need for transition to a UN operation in Darfur, and he is claiming ignorance on all issues related to the re-hat. For example, according to Egyptian counterparts, Bashir still maintains 'no one' has to date approached him to say that a mandate for the UN force could be modeled after that of UNSCR 1590 (2005),which contained a combination of Chapter VI and Chapter VII elements (NOTE. We can name at least five individuals who have personally conveyed this message, including Brahimi, Annabi and Guehenno, all of whom had personal audiences with Bashir in Khartoum. END NOTE). ¶6. (C) Part of 'convincing' Bashir will involve taking into consideration the pervading fear among the senior Sudanese leadership of arrests by the ICC. This issue has been raised in consultations repeatedly by Annabi and Guehenno. In its proposed draft of a resolution, UKUN included substantial ICC language, and we pushed back against its inclusion, arguing its inclusion in this resolution will complicate the effort to get Bashir to accept a UN Darfur operation. If our strategy is to model our procedure on UNSCR 1590, then we should do so not only in substance but in sequence, by adopting one resolution addressing the peacekeeping operation, one resolution addressing sanctions (a la UNSCR 1591) and another addressing impunity/the ICC (a la UNSCR 1593). UKUN was flexible on this point, predicting that ICC language could be 'conceded' during P-5 discussions on the text and deferred to a subsequent resolution. ¶7. (C) We have made a similar case on UKUN's insistence on including language on the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in the resolution for Darfur. The Russian delegation and DPKO oppose amending UNMIS' mandate to provide for apprehending LRA members in southern Sudan, but UKUN does not believe that such opposition from Russia would ultimately block its support for a resolution on a transition including such a provision. We argued for consideration of the new LRA mandate element to be included when UNMIS' mandate is renewed in September. If London insists on retaining LRA language in the current resolution, we would appreciate guidance on how to respond. ¶8. (C) Timing of the transition is still contentious, with DPKO consistently citing January 1, 2007, as the earliest possible date for UN forces to arrive in Darfur. However, Guehenno, in June 27 UNSC consultations, made a point to highlight the 'unprecedented' step the UN was taking in establishing UN staff offices in Darfur dedicated entirely to strengthening AMIS. Bashir has proclaimed himself agnostic on the issue of AMIS 'strenghtening,' according to Guehenno. When asked to elaborate on plans for these offices, Guehenno demurred, but we anticipate that a portion of the forthcoming SYG Report (expected o/a July 10) will contain recommendations on how these offices can be used to begin preliminary steps toward transition under the aegis of 'AMIS strengthening.' It seems that this mechanism could be used to expedite deployment of UN personnel into Darfur, albeit slowly, as the duties under 'strengthening AMIS' could be more widely interpreted. In this way, the UN could begin a steady move into Darfur, especially as AMIS' mandate expiration date of September 30 approaches, so that a sizeable force might be on the ground by the time final 'transition' occurs on January 1. ¶9. (C) COMMENT. While Sudan should recognize its sovereign responsibility to protect its own population against the atrocities occurring in Darfur, it is failing to do so, and we need non-Western help to ensure that protection is provided. We should also begin thinking of a response to the worst-case scenario should Arab and Chinese intervention fail to persuade Bashir and if the idea of using UN staff offices to strengthen AMIS proves untenable. END COMMENT. BOLTON