Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06USUNNEWYORK1248
2006-06-21 16:56:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
USUN New York
Cable title:
UNSC/SOMALIA: MOST MEMBERS ANXIOUS FOR ACTION ON
VZCZCXRO6444 PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHKUK RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHROV DE RUCNDT #1248/01 1721656 ZNR UUUUU ZZH P 211656Z JUN 06 FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9392 INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHZO/OAU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 0893 RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA PRIORITY 0728 RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0686 RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI PRIORITY 0066 RUEHMV/AMEMBASSY MONROVIA PRIORITY 0585 RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY 0457 RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 0643 RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0846 RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY 0471 RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY 0442 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 001248
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER SO UNSC IGAD
SUBJECT: UNSC/SOMALIA: MOST MEMBERS ANXIOUS FOR ACTION ON
ARMS EMBARGO EXEMPTION
REF: SECSTATE 99561
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 001248
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER SO UNSC IGAD
SUBJECT: UNSC/SOMALIA: MOST MEMBERS ANXIOUS FOR ACTION ON
ARMS EMBARGO EXEMPTION
REF: SECSTATE 99561
1. (SBU) SUMMARY. At June 19 United Nations Security Council
(UNSC) consultations on Somalia, Special Representative of
the Secretary-General (SRSG) Fall discussed humanitarian,
political and security aspects of the current crisis,
outlining five possible scenarios that could result from the
power struggle between the Transitional Federal Government
(TFG) and the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC). The first such
scenario foresaw an undermined TFG; the second assumed no
unified UIC leadership; the third envisaged TFG President
Yusuf's assertion of authority in Baidoa; the fourth supposed
UIC control of Baidoa; and the fifth imagined outside
intervention. Fall reported on the Transitional Parliament's
June 14 adoption of a National Security and Stabilization
Plan (NSSP),which recognized deployment of an
Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) peace
support operation. According to Fall, preparations for this
deployment continue apace, including a request for an
exemption of the arms embargo imposed under resolution 733
(1992),and will be presented to the UNSC in July by the
African Union (AU) and IGAD. Most Members spoke in favor of
a waiver of the embargo to support the TFG in its bid to
counter the UIC political (and possibly military) offensive,
but there were several hold-outs (including the UK, which had
previously been a major proponent of the idea) who went along
with Qatari PermRep al-Nassar in his urging the Council
against 'short-sightedness' in opting for too hasty a
solution to Somalia's complex problems. Chinese efforts to
launch a Press Statement at the end of the session were
deferred. END SUMMARY.
UIC INTERNAL DIVISIONS CREATE UNCERTAIN FUTURE
-------------- -
2. (SBU) At June 19 UNSC consultations on Somalia, SRSG Fall
discussed humanitarian, political and security aspects of the
current crisis in the wake of the UIC victory in Mogadishu
over forces of the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and
Combat Against Terrorism, two of whose leaders had just left
Mogadishu the weekend of June 16. Despite the spread of UIC
influence to Jowhar and toward Baidoa, Fall noted that the
Union was not monolithic and had no clear internal dynamics,
divided as the movement was along sub-clan lines, each with
differing ideologies and with no precise information on
exactly who was in overall charge and prepared to address
such internal divisions. Fall acknowledged the presence of
extremist elements within the UIC which might harbor
terrorists sympathetic to al-Qaida among their ranks and
which seek to seize power and disrupt the Transitional
Federal Institutions (TFIs),in turn creating a re-emergence
of the sub-clan rivalries so entrenched in Somali politics.
In response to a question from USUN, SRSG Fall said that in
his visit during the week of June 12 to Somaliland, President
Dahir Rayale Kahin expressed deep concern with the current
developments in Somalia, which he feared would disrupt the
peace in Somaliland and make Puntland the next UIC target.
3. (SBU) Fall predicted that the UIC's next step would be to
consolidate control and impose Sharia law in some areas of
Somalia, but he presented five alternative scenarios that
could also result from the power struggle between the UIC and
the TFG. First, if moderate UIC members asserted control, it
would undermine the leadership of the TFG and create sub-clan
friction. Fall noted that dialogue between the sides might
nonetheless be possible. Second, if no united leadership
emerged, the UIC's 'union' would be threatened, allowing the
TFG to negotiate with divided elements of its composition.
Third, TFG President Yusuf could assert his authority in
Baidoa, imposing total military control if the UIC advanced
toward the city. However, if Yusuf failed to defend Baidoa,
his national credibility and authority would be jeopardized.
Fourth, Fall suggested that the UIC could assume control of
Baidoa, which would frustrate regional security interests and
effectively bring to an end the TFIs. Finally, Fall raised
the possibility of interference by regional, sub-regional and
USUN NEW Y 00001248 002 OF 003
international players to challenge the UIC, in the middle of
which scenario the TFIs would inevitably be caught. In this
regard, Fall cautioned specifically against the intentions of
Ethiopia and acknowledged its troop movements to the Somali
border in what he considered a 'show of strength' against UIC
advances.
4. (SBU) Fall's recommendation was for the Council to
continue its close scrutiny of the situation, as the AU was
currently doing by featuring Somalia prominently on its
agenda, including for an upcoming Peace and Security Council
meeting. He pointed out that under the fourth scenario, the
TFG would be forced to vacate Baidoa and likely to leave the
country, representing a regression in Somali politics to a
time when the ruling power could not even reside in-country.
To prevent this, Fall recommended the Council adopt a united
approach to protect the 'fragile' TFG and TFIs, give the TFG
the means to establish a constructive dialogue within the
framework of the Transitional Federal Charter and strengthen
the TFIs' negotiating position with the UIC. On these three
points, the Council was unanimous in its support.
EMBARGO EXEMPTION AS MEANS OF ASSISTING TFG
--------------
5. (SBU) Council unanimity evaporated when SRSG Fall reported
on the Transitional Parliament's June 14 adoption of a
National Security and Stabilization Plan (NSSP),which inter
alia recognized deployment of an IGAD peace support
operation. According to Fall, preparations for this
deployment had begun April 18 and now continued apace,
including a request for an exemption of the arms embargo
imposed under resolution 733 (1992),and will be presented to
the UNSC in July by the AU and IGAD, per a request from the
Council in its March 2006 Presidential Statement
(S/PRST/2006/11). Fall noted that the AU and IGAD were
meeting June 19 on this topic. Fall identified the issue as
two-fold: one problem was the embargo exemption, and the
other problem was deployment of forces, against which the UIC
was vehemently opposed, insisting instead that Somalis
resolve their own security problems and threatening to
withdraw its commitment to dialogue with the TFG if such an
operation were to deploy. Deployment also brought to bear
divisions within the TFIs, some of whom opposed border
states' sending troops to Somalia, as well as within IGAD on
the nationality of participating troops.
6. (SBU) Most UNSC Members were willing to accept a partial
lifting of the embargo to accommodate military assistance to
the TFG, including some P-5 members. Chinese PR Wang cited
the Liberia sanctions case as a model for the legal
channeling of weapons to allow for law enforcement. French
PR de La Sabliere argued that a waiver was critical for the
international community to ensure integration of militias
into the national army and to provide for the creation and
training of police forces. The Russian representative urged
Council support for the IGAD operation, which would
nonetheless require a detailed plan supported by the Somali
people. Representatives of Ghana, Argentina and Slovakia
expressed moderate support for IGAD's peace support
operation. Danish PR and present UNSC President Loj raised
the possibility that the operation might not in fact lead to
reconciliation, and Tanzanian PR Mahiga inquired about
possible repercussions on such a deployment by the reported
build-up of Ethiopian troops around Baidoa.
7. (SBU) The UK Deputy PR, however, was more cautious than
her delegation has been in the past, now saying that the UK
supports 'in principle' deployment of a peace support
operation but only on the basis of a clear request for it by
the TFG and of concrete planning by IGAD and the AU. She
argued for a strengthening of UNSCR 733, including
consideration of targeted sanctions (NOTE. The UK
representative at the June 15 Somalia Contact Group meeting
made the same call for targeted sanctions. END NOTE). USUN
PolMinsCouns, drawing from reftel points, pointed out that
USUN NEW Y 00001248 003 OF 003
divisions within the UIC, TFIs and IGAD itself made it
premature to consider a waiver but agreed with the UK on
enforcing the existing embargo provisions. Qatari PR
al-Nasser advised the Council against 'short-sightedness' in
opting for too hasty a solution to Somalia's complex
problems. Tanzanian PR Mahiga reiterated a question he
raised in the June 15 Somalia Contact Group meeting about the
fate of the Alliance warlords who had left Mogadishu and who
had been subsequently banned from Kenyan territory, warning
that they, with their deep clan links, could still pose a
threat.
HUMANITARIAN SITUATION WORSE
--------------
8. (SBU) SRSG Fall reported that the UN would dispatch later
this week an initial mission to Jowhar to meet with the UIC
on allowing humanitarian access in areas of greatest need,
which had been further exacerbated by the recent fighting and
the drought. This mission, he added, would be followed by
deployment of humanitarian organizations to Somalia. Members
echoed his concerns, calling for increased levels of
humanitarian assistance, respect for human rights and
involvement by all relevant parties (including the Contact
Group, the AU, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and
IGAD).
DEFERRED PRESS STATEMENT
--------------
9. (SBU) Due to amendments from the Danish and UK
delegations, as well as opposition from USUN, the Chinese
delegation opted to defer consideration of its proposed draft
Press Statement.
BOLTON
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER SO UNSC IGAD
SUBJECT: UNSC/SOMALIA: MOST MEMBERS ANXIOUS FOR ACTION ON
ARMS EMBARGO EXEMPTION
REF: SECSTATE 99561
1. (SBU) SUMMARY. At June 19 United Nations Security Council
(UNSC) consultations on Somalia, Special Representative of
the Secretary-General (SRSG) Fall discussed humanitarian,
political and security aspects of the current crisis,
outlining five possible scenarios that could result from the
power struggle between the Transitional Federal Government
(TFG) and the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC). The first such
scenario foresaw an undermined TFG; the second assumed no
unified UIC leadership; the third envisaged TFG President
Yusuf's assertion of authority in Baidoa; the fourth supposed
UIC control of Baidoa; and the fifth imagined outside
intervention. Fall reported on the Transitional Parliament's
June 14 adoption of a National Security and Stabilization
Plan (NSSP),which recognized deployment of an
Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) peace
support operation. According to Fall, preparations for this
deployment continue apace, including a request for an
exemption of the arms embargo imposed under resolution 733
(1992),and will be presented to the UNSC in July by the
African Union (AU) and IGAD. Most Members spoke in favor of
a waiver of the embargo to support the TFG in its bid to
counter the UIC political (and possibly military) offensive,
but there were several hold-outs (including the UK, which had
previously been a major proponent of the idea) who went along
with Qatari PermRep al-Nassar in his urging the Council
against 'short-sightedness' in opting for too hasty a
solution to Somalia's complex problems. Chinese efforts to
launch a Press Statement at the end of the session were
deferred. END SUMMARY.
UIC INTERNAL DIVISIONS CREATE UNCERTAIN FUTURE
-------------- -
2. (SBU) At June 19 UNSC consultations on Somalia, SRSG Fall
discussed humanitarian, political and security aspects of the
current crisis in the wake of the UIC victory in Mogadishu
over forces of the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and
Combat Against Terrorism, two of whose leaders had just left
Mogadishu the weekend of June 16. Despite the spread of UIC
influence to Jowhar and toward Baidoa, Fall noted that the
Union was not monolithic and had no clear internal dynamics,
divided as the movement was along sub-clan lines, each with
differing ideologies and with no precise information on
exactly who was in overall charge and prepared to address
such internal divisions. Fall acknowledged the presence of
extremist elements within the UIC which might harbor
terrorists sympathetic to al-Qaida among their ranks and
which seek to seize power and disrupt the Transitional
Federal Institutions (TFIs),in turn creating a re-emergence
of the sub-clan rivalries so entrenched in Somali politics.
In response to a question from USUN, SRSG Fall said that in
his visit during the week of June 12 to Somaliland, President
Dahir Rayale Kahin expressed deep concern with the current
developments in Somalia, which he feared would disrupt the
peace in Somaliland and make Puntland the next UIC target.
3. (SBU) Fall predicted that the UIC's next step would be to
consolidate control and impose Sharia law in some areas of
Somalia, but he presented five alternative scenarios that
could also result from the power struggle between the UIC and
the TFG. First, if moderate UIC members asserted control, it
would undermine the leadership of the TFG and create sub-clan
friction. Fall noted that dialogue between the sides might
nonetheless be possible. Second, if no united leadership
emerged, the UIC's 'union' would be threatened, allowing the
TFG to negotiate with divided elements of its composition.
Third, TFG President Yusuf could assert his authority in
Baidoa, imposing total military control if the UIC advanced
toward the city. However, if Yusuf failed to defend Baidoa,
his national credibility and authority would be jeopardized.
Fourth, Fall suggested that the UIC could assume control of
Baidoa, which would frustrate regional security interests and
effectively bring to an end the TFIs. Finally, Fall raised
the possibility of interference by regional, sub-regional and
USUN NEW Y 00001248 002 OF 003
international players to challenge the UIC, in the middle of
which scenario the TFIs would inevitably be caught. In this
regard, Fall cautioned specifically against the intentions of
Ethiopia and acknowledged its troop movements to the Somali
border in what he considered a 'show of strength' against UIC
advances.
4. (SBU) Fall's recommendation was for the Council to
continue its close scrutiny of the situation, as the AU was
currently doing by featuring Somalia prominently on its
agenda, including for an upcoming Peace and Security Council
meeting. He pointed out that under the fourth scenario, the
TFG would be forced to vacate Baidoa and likely to leave the
country, representing a regression in Somali politics to a
time when the ruling power could not even reside in-country.
To prevent this, Fall recommended the Council adopt a united
approach to protect the 'fragile' TFG and TFIs, give the TFG
the means to establish a constructive dialogue within the
framework of the Transitional Federal Charter and strengthen
the TFIs' negotiating position with the UIC. On these three
points, the Council was unanimous in its support.
EMBARGO EXEMPTION AS MEANS OF ASSISTING TFG
--------------
5. (SBU) Council unanimity evaporated when SRSG Fall reported
on the Transitional Parliament's June 14 adoption of a
National Security and Stabilization Plan (NSSP),which inter
alia recognized deployment of an IGAD peace support
operation. According to Fall, preparations for this
deployment had begun April 18 and now continued apace,
including a request for an exemption of the arms embargo
imposed under resolution 733 (1992),and will be presented to
the UNSC in July by the AU and IGAD, per a request from the
Council in its March 2006 Presidential Statement
(S/PRST/2006/11). Fall noted that the AU and IGAD were
meeting June 19 on this topic. Fall identified the issue as
two-fold: one problem was the embargo exemption, and the
other problem was deployment of forces, against which the UIC
was vehemently opposed, insisting instead that Somalis
resolve their own security problems and threatening to
withdraw its commitment to dialogue with the TFG if such an
operation were to deploy. Deployment also brought to bear
divisions within the TFIs, some of whom opposed border
states' sending troops to Somalia, as well as within IGAD on
the nationality of participating troops.
6. (SBU) Most UNSC Members were willing to accept a partial
lifting of the embargo to accommodate military assistance to
the TFG, including some P-5 members. Chinese PR Wang cited
the Liberia sanctions case as a model for the legal
channeling of weapons to allow for law enforcement. French
PR de La Sabliere argued that a waiver was critical for the
international community to ensure integration of militias
into the national army and to provide for the creation and
training of police forces. The Russian representative urged
Council support for the IGAD operation, which would
nonetheless require a detailed plan supported by the Somali
people. Representatives of Ghana, Argentina and Slovakia
expressed moderate support for IGAD's peace support
operation. Danish PR and present UNSC President Loj raised
the possibility that the operation might not in fact lead to
reconciliation, and Tanzanian PR Mahiga inquired about
possible repercussions on such a deployment by the reported
build-up of Ethiopian troops around Baidoa.
7. (SBU) The UK Deputy PR, however, was more cautious than
her delegation has been in the past, now saying that the UK
supports 'in principle' deployment of a peace support
operation but only on the basis of a clear request for it by
the TFG and of concrete planning by IGAD and the AU. She
argued for a strengthening of UNSCR 733, including
consideration of targeted sanctions (NOTE. The UK
representative at the June 15 Somalia Contact Group meeting
made the same call for targeted sanctions. END NOTE). USUN
PolMinsCouns, drawing from reftel points, pointed out that
USUN NEW Y 00001248 003 OF 003
divisions within the UIC, TFIs and IGAD itself made it
premature to consider a waiver but agreed with the UK on
enforcing the existing embargo provisions. Qatari PR
al-Nasser advised the Council against 'short-sightedness' in
opting for too hasty a solution to Somalia's complex
problems. Tanzanian PR Mahiga reiterated a question he
raised in the June 15 Somalia Contact Group meeting about the
fate of the Alliance warlords who had left Mogadishu and who
had been subsequently banned from Kenyan territory, warning
that they, with their deep clan links, could still pose a
threat.
HUMANITARIAN SITUATION WORSE
--------------
8. (SBU) SRSG Fall reported that the UN would dispatch later
this week an initial mission to Jowhar to meet with the UIC
on allowing humanitarian access in areas of greatest need,
which had been further exacerbated by the recent fighting and
the drought. This mission, he added, would be followed by
deployment of humanitarian organizations to Somalia. Members
echoed his concerns, calling for increased levels of
humanitarian assistance, respect for human rights and
involvement by all relevant parties (including the Contact
Group, the AU, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and
IGAD).
DEFERRED PRESS STATEMENT
--------------
9. (SBU) Due to amendments from the Danish and UK
delegations, as well as opposition from USUN, the Chinese
delegation opted to defer consideration of its proposed draft
Press Statement.
BOLTON