CHINESE LOOK FOR INCREASED COOPERATION AS SC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 001149 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF PREL SU KPKO SUBJECT: CHINESE LOOK FOR INCREASED COOPERATION AS SC MISSION TO SUDAN DEPARTS REF: 02JUN2006 BRUNO-DEPARTMENT EMAIL USUN NEW Y 00001149 001.2 OF 003 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Assistant Secretary-General (A/SYG) Annabi gave the Security Council June 2 an overview of the current situation throughout Sudan in advance of the UNSC's Mission to Sudan, Addis Ababa and Chad. The most notable part of the meeting, however, came on its margins, when the Chinese delegation approached USUN privately to solicit our 'partnership' in convincing the Sudanese Government of National Unity (GNU) to accept the eventual UN operation in Darfur, building off the example provided by the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) in support of the Naivasha Agreement. END SUMMARY. BRAHIMI-ANNABI TRIP -------------- ¶2. (SBU) According to Annabi, President Bashir told Special Envoy Brahimi that the GNU was still concerned about international community's approach toward the eventual UN operation in Darfur, especially its failure to 'congratulate' the GNU on signing the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA),instead 'punishing' the GNU by invoking Chapter VII in UNSCR 1679 (2006). Bashir complained the GNU had not been consulted in the transition process leading up to 1679 and made comparisons to similar UNSC action on Iraq and Afghanistan. Bashir told Brahimi that resolution 1679 took pressure off non-signatories to DPA. Brahimi assured Bashir that the UN operation in Darfur would be built on the work the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) had already done and that it would be an 'extension' of the operation in southern Sudan, which was a peacekeeping mission conducted with GNU consent. ¶3. (SBU) Annabi described the general itinerary of the SC Mission, which, as he and Brahimi had assured Bashir, would be undertaken without prejudice to future UN, AU, UNSC decisions. Some UN participants would depart the weekend of June 3, with most (including DPKO U/SYG Guehenno) departing June 5, for initial consultations in Addis Ababa, where the UN team would be joined by the AU group headed by Ambassador Djinnit. From Addis the team would go to Khartoum before proceeding to Darfur to consult with local authorities and parties on the ground to assess immediate AMIS needs and to work on a concept of operations for, in Annabi's words, the 'possible' transition. Finally, the team would revert to Khartoum for exit consultations before returning to New York during last week of June, when it would prepare its report for UNSC consideration. The overall transition, Annabi said, once the UNSC adopts a resolution, would take between six and nine months to complete. ¶4. (SBU) Noting the 'deep ambivalence' felt by the GNU toward an eventual UN operation in Darfur, Annabi said that the GNU had agreed only to the joint assessment team but not to the transition itself. He recommended the UNSC use its upcoming Mission to Sudan to assure the GNU that the UN Darfur operation would be a 'peace operation' for DPA implementation, which would require GNU partnership. The GNU does not want to be seen as a 'spoiler' or 'failed state,' but rather as a 'partner' with the rest of the international community. ¶5. (SBU) Following up on a question posed by Ambassador Sanders on a possible Chapter VII mandate for the eventual UN Darfur force, Annabi recounted 'lots of emotion, confusion and hostility on the part of the GNU toward any mention of Chapter VII, which Sudan regards as equivalent to invasion and occupation, despite Brahimi's efforts to convince otherwise. Brahimi and Annabi told Bashir that the USUN NEW Y 00001149 002.2 OF 003 forthcoming mandate for UN Darfur operation would have both Chapter VI and Chapter VII elements, like UNSCR 1590 (2005) because of nature of Darfur conflict. PEACE AGREEMENT IMPLEMENTATION -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Annabi expressed the SYG's regret over the passing of the May 31 deadline for non-signatories to sign the DPA. He added that at least 10 ceasefire violations had occurred over the past week, resulting in several casualties. Such violations, Annabi insisted, could not be left unaddressed if the parties were to believe that the DPA were truly 'different' from its predecessors. He went on to express how struck he had been in his recent travel to Sudan by the disturbingly high level of ignorance among the general population about the DPA, citing continued delays in UNMIS' ability to transmit via radio as part of the problem. Annabi urged the SC on its Mission to Sudan to address the 'acute need' to explain the content of the text to the local population, predominantly members of the Fur tribe, who remained opposed to the DPA largely because of 'active misinformation campaign' led by non-signatories. The observed level of cooperation with DPA implementation, in Annabi's assessment, should determine how the UNSC dealt with non-signatories. ¶7. (SBU) Turning to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), Annabi reported that implementations was proceeding slowly because of a lack of capacity and political will, 'distractions' from the Darfur crisis, and an absence of 'critical' security arrangements, including Other Armed Groups Collaborative Committee, Joint Integrated Units and regular convening of the Joint Defense Board. Annabi recommended the UNSC Mission press for establishment of security arrangements. Peace in Sudan, according to Annabi, was 'indivisible,' and just as the international community's work on Darfur should not impeded DPA implementation, neither should it prevent international partners from ensuring resources for reconstruction and development needs in southern Sudan. ANNOUNCEMENT OF TALKS ON LRA AND EASTERN SUDAN -------------- - ¶8. (SBU) Annabi reported that during the course of talks between Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) Vice President Riak Machar and Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) leader Joseph Kony, Kony indicated he wanted to meet with Government of Uganda officials. GOSS leadership would mediate such discussions, an idea the GNU reportedly endorsed, and LRA leaders would be exempt from ICC prosecution during the talks. Annabi said the first round would take place during the week of June 5. ¶9. (SBU) In response to UNMIS' urging, the Eastern Front and the GNU will engage in peace talks as soon as possible (given the withdrawal of the Sudan People's Liberation Army),and Annabi confirmed that the Government of the State of Eritrea would host preparatory 'talks about talks' in Asmara June 13. Annabi urged that all parties fully participate and that the outcome be compatible with CPA. Annabi was concerned about the potential problem that could arise should the GNU ask UNMIS to leave once the SPLA completes its withdrawal, making the 'talks about talks' all the more critical for prevention of conflict. Annabi was also worried about continued GNU obstacles to UN work in Eastern Sudan, where such restrictions hampered UNMIS' ability to monitor CPA implementation. CONTINUED CHAD VIOLENCE AND HUMANITARIAN RESTRICTIONS USUN NEW Y 00001149 003.2 OF 003 -------------- -------------- ¶10. (SBU) While Annabi reported no new attacks on the Chadian side of the border, he acknowledged the situation was still tense, with sporadic acts of violence, reports of possible rebel activity, and spillover effects in CAR. Annabi urged a reduction of Chad-Sudan tensions whose negative effect on the already deteriorating humanitarian situation could become a 'genuine disaster.' Humanitarian assistance in Sudan remained restricted, especially in the north, with travel permits and prior notification still in effect, forcing suspension of some UN programs. MEMBERS' COMMENTS -------------- ¶11. (SBU) Chinese Counselor Li told PolMinCouns that the Chinese succeeded in 'calming the Sudanese down and correcting some misperceptions' about UN operation in Darfur. Li said the Sudanese now appeared to accept that a UN operation was inevitable and that they would best be served by fully cooperating and helping to guide the operation. Li noted that Sudanese suspicion remained strong as a result of continuing concern over the Chapter VII mandate in UNSCR 1590 (2005). Li said the Sudanese could be brought fully on board by using the 'Naivasha Model' for the Darfur operation. Li recognized and believed the Sudanese would accept that there were Chapter VII aspects to the proposed operation, especially in dealing with spoilers of the peace and the ceasefire. PolMinCouns added that ensuring protection of civilians and humanitarian access could also raise Chapter VII issues, and Li agreed. Li added the Chinese hoped to work closely with the U.S. and other P-5 Members in crafting an operational Darfur resolution which would keep the GNU 'fully on side.' In a separate intervention after Annabi's briefing, Chinese PR Wang noted that the Council should recognize Brahimi's visit and GNU acceptance of the joint assessment team, and that it should treat the GNU as a 'partner.' ¶12. UK PR Jones Parry proposed the SC Mission meet with Guehenno's assessment team June 7 in Addis. Jones Parry recommended the SC Mission endorse GNU and AU action taken so far and reassure the GNU about the UN's intentions for an eventual operation in Darfur, but 'coax, cajole or kick' Sudan to avoid any appearance of appeasement and to improve the chances of an effective UN Darfur operation. Russian DPR Dolgov agreed with all but the 'kicking' part of Jones Parry's intervention, stressing instead the need for the Council to maintain a 'partnership' with the GNU to secure AMIS transition. Without such cooperation, Dolgov warned, a UN Darfur operation would be 'impossible.' Dolgov urged the UNSC to seek a 'constructive relationship' with the GNU on all issues, not just transition. ¶13. (SBU) The Qatari rep seconded PR Wang's comments about the need for the UNSC to possibly acknowledge the GNU's efforts in the peace process, especially given the GNU's 'dissatisfaction' with the future deployment of UN forces on account of the Chapter VII reference in UNSCR 1679. Qatar stressed that everything related to the transition should be done with GNU consent. The real problem, according to Qatar, was the non-signatories to the DPA. In response to a question from Slovakian PR Burian, Annabi relayed that the pledging conference would be in Brussels but that no date was yet set; June 20 proved impossible but now rumors were circulating of a July 7 date, for which the AU would eventually issue invitations. BOLTON