LESSONS LEARNED FROM UNMEE'S 'RIGHTSIZING'

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 001142 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2016 TAGS: ER ET PGOV PREL UNSC KPKO SUBJECT: LESSONS LEARNED FROM UNMEE'S 'RIGHTSIZING' REF: A. 05/31/2006 BRUNO-DEPARTMENT E-MAIL ¶B. USUN NEW YORK 1017 Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN R. BOLTON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B,D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. On May 31, after almost seven hours of continuous, mostly ambassadorial-level negotiations, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) unanimously adopted as a Presidential text resolution 1681, which reduced the military component of the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) to 2,300 from 3,404 (text contained in ref A). The passage of this resolution marks an important milestone in mandate reform, as we lead the way in 'rightsizing' peacekeeping missions which have been dormant, inactive or unable to fulfill their mandates yet remain costly. Adoption of 1681 also revealed mixed messages in USUN's guidance that contributed to the obstacles USUN fought to overcome in playing the 'numbers game' to get agreement on our optimal force size for UNMEE. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) Since the end in 2000 of the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the UNSC has been debating ways of addressing one of the primary root causes of the conflict: unresolved border demarcation. However, since the end in 2000 of the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the UNSC has been unable to effect meaningful progress on this problem, opting instead to continually roll over UNMEE's mandate in the hopes that the very presence of this force would be enough to stave off any possible resumption of conflict. In essence, the UNSC contributed to the stalemate through its own willingness to accept that stalemate. By failing to take effective action, the UNSC has contributed to the predicament in which UNMEE has found itself: a hostage of the stalled political process between the two sides. The U.S. led the way on attempts to compel Ethiopia and Eritrea to implement fully the final and binding decision of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC),as they have agreed to do, and to remove restrictions on UNMEE operations, but these attempts have gone as far as they feasibly can. Since the parties refuse to acknowledge that they themselves bear the primary responsibility for implementation of the Algiers Agreements, it is up to the Council to hold them accountable for their failure, rather than to assume the responsibility to implement the agreements itself. ¶3. (C) In this sense, adoption of UNSCR 1681 was a genuine achievement. We led the effort to scale back UNMEE's force strength to send the unequivocal message to the parties that disregard for internationally mandated rules of procedure would not be rewarded, either politically or financially. The situation in Ethiopia and Eritrea is not like that in Cote D'Ivoire, for example, where nascent political progress led by Prime Minister Banny merits a temporary increase of UN troops to safeguard the process. Ethiopia and Eritrea are not the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where a UN request for additional peacekeepers had been originally refused but where subsequent electoral progress demonstrated a commitment on the part of the transitional government to live up to its promises and accordingly earned a plus-up of troops to keep this process on track. Ethiopia and Eritrea are not Liberia, where a country formerly in chaos not only lived up to the expectations of convening democratic elections but did so in the expected timeframe and successfully, justifying the international community's investment in the UN's forces. ¶4. (C) African countries are not the only culprits, and Greece is right to be concerned about the implications our 'rightsizing' policy would have for the similarly stagnant UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus. The simple truth of UN peacekeeping from a mandate reform perspective is that if parties to an agreement carry out their responsibilities (including the implicit agreement with the UNSC resulting in UN support) with the Security Council to honor its promises on peace and security, then we will honor our commitment to protect that country accordingly. This reality still escapes Ethiopia and Eritrea. The Council took a significant step in the right direction with UNSCR 1681, which we intend to use as the first of many subsequent manifestations of strong, substantive Council reprobations for parties' intransigence. There is simply no doubt that the UN is overstretched and overextended, both in tems of the total number of peacekeeping operations and in terms of the total number of deployed forces. This situation will onyl become more acute USUN NEW Y 00001142 002 OF 002 as we expand the UN presence in the DRC and the Sudan, absent compensating reductions in other PKOs. Failure to exert more control and oversight risks a bebacle in one or more operations, with all the attendant risks. ¶5. (C) Despite the progess we achieved in 'rightsizing' UNMEE with UNSCR 1681, we suffered throughout the negotiation process as a direct result of the communications gaps and mixed messages within our chain of command that contributed to our struggles to get agreement on the optimal level of UNMEE personnel. We were able to identify our opposition long before the negotiating process started: the UK has never agreed with us on Ethiopia/Eritrea policy in the Council and solidified its power base on this resolution to include not only Slovakia and Tanzania, but also the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO),whose representatives were present at every one of the three meetings among Experts (May 25, 26, 30) and at the final round of consultations (May 31) to refute every detail of our military analysis. Demarches to embassies in Washington and in capitals to counter support for the UK's resistance proved too little, too late. By the time we called for a vote on the text after seven hours of back-and-forth, UKUN PermRep Jones Parry smugly but correctly reminded us that the vote count around the table favored his (and DPKO's) 2,500 number, rather than our grudgingly conceded 2,200. In the end, UK's insistence on 2,500 did not prevail and the flexibility that USUN was provided by the Department was critical in closing the negotiations at the final, lower figure. ¶6. (C) We were aware of and had reported on divisions within DPKO regarding its positions in New York and in theater about numbers for a downsized UNMEE. When we were finally instructed in the third day of negotiations to cite UNMEE Force Commander Taisir's 'endorsement' of our 1,800 figure to the Council, inter-bureau divisions on the accuracy of this quotation rendered its effect on Members useless and our credibility on the effectiveness of that figure virtually nil. Lack of a bottom line and of clear voting instructions in the absence of such a bottom line similarly weakened our bargaining position, especially when it appeared that the mere possibility that we might veto an unacceptable number or a bid to roll over for a week might be enough to sway some Members (for example, Japan) in our favor. Greece, despite its accommodation of our diplomatic leadership on this issue, was more concerned with securing consensus on the resolution than it was with the particulars of the text's content and was thus only a fair-weather friend throughout the process. ¶7. (C) In the end, allies did emerge: Peru has been a consistent and unquestioning supporter of our Ethiopia/Eritrea policy; Denmark had told us repeatedly that it would back us on a low number, despite its concerns over our changing of UNMEE's mandate (NOTE. Such changes, which would have included a new mandate element for in extremis extraction of peacekeepers in case of emergency, were ultimately deleted, much to Russia's relief. END NOTE); France, primarily interested in maintaining our commitment to support its Cote D'Ivoire troop increase proposal, was content throughout negotiations to let us battle the UK and DPKO alone, but finally rose to the challenge of supporting our stance, though only in the last hour of negotiations and after we called them on their weak expressions of support; and, as it had done in negotiations on UNSCR 1679 on Sudan (ref B),China sought to enhance 'bilateral interests' by unexpectedly throwing its support to our position, despite the opposition of its Council bedfellows Russia and Qatar. For future resolutions our demarches and outreach should aim not simply to isolate our opponents but rather to consolidate our allies as well. As UNSCR 1681 showed, opposition comes not from a handful but rather from a tableful, and we need as many in our corner as possible. BOLTON