COUNCIL APPEARS READY TO DOWNSIZE UNMEE, BUT SOME

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 001039 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ER ET PGOV PREL UNSC KPKO SUBJECT: COUNCIL APPEARS READY TO DOWNSIZE UNMEE, BUT SOME MEMBERS URGE CAUTION REF: 05/2202006 SCHOFIELD-BRUNO E-MAIL ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. Acknowledging the failure of the May 17 meeting of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) to produce a breakthrough in the border standoff between Ethiopia and Eritrea, United Nations Security Council (UNSC) members finally expressed their readiness to downsize the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE). Members were not fooled by the last-minute ploy by the Government of the State of Eritrea (GSE) to stave off the prospect of downsizing by submitting a letter of its intention to lift restrictions imposed on UNMEE (refmail). The Greek delegation will circulate a draft resolution reflecting the views expressed by Members, with an Experts Meeting on the text scheduled for May 25. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (SBU) UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Under-Secretary-General (U/SYG) Guehenno reported that UNMEE observed no major developments since May 8, with both Ethiopian and Eritrean troops deployed in defensive postures and engaged in training exercises where deployed around the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ). Guehenno's read-out of the May 17 EEBC meeting (which he said would be followed by another on June 15) highlighted the Government of Ethiopia's (GOE) imposing of four preconditions on its commitment to implement the delimitation decision: one, that the GSE renounce the use of force; two, that the GSE respect the integrity of the TSZ; three, that the GSE reinstate the full capacity of UNMEE; and four, that the GSE agree to direct negotiation on disputed border areas - all of which, according to Guehenno, the GSE dismissed as further pretext for delay by the Ethiopians. Demarcation could resume, Guehenno declared, when UNMEE force size reached a sufficient level; when both parties could ensure security for the process (noting that Ethiopia had missed its May 19 deadline for submission of a security plan); when surveys were completed; and when both parties cooperated with commissioners in the field. Guehenno noted that funds were also in short supply, with only $3.3 million of the requisite $10 million currently in the UN Trust Fund. Guehenno added that even if expedited, the process of identifying and deploying surveying contractors would take 12 weeks and would be further hindered by the lack of funds. ¶3. (SBU) Noting the 'interesting timing' of its dispatch, U/SYG Guehenno went on to describe a letter he had received less than an hour before the commencement of consultations from EEBC Commissioner Sir Elihu Lauterpacht, informing that the GSE, through a letter from its U.S. attorney, had indicated it was prepared to lift restrictions on UNMEE on two conditions: one, if the Government of Ethiopia (GOE) unambiguously accepted the 13 April 2002 decision and two, if the GOE 'did what was required of it to facilitate demarcation in accordance with the Algiers Agreement and the Commission's orders.' Guehenno added that Sir Elihu thought demarcation was foreseeable if UNMEE's mandate were extended and if its force size were not reduced. Guehenno advised that if the UNSC were to proceed with downsizing, it should take care not to undermine the Algiers Agreements or to impair UNMEE's ability to carry out its other mandated tasks, as well as to maintain the basic principles of peacekeeping, including assurance of peacekeepers' freedom of movement. Guehenno would not offer specific information on what a downsized UNMEE would look like, saying only that it was the dilemma of the Council to determine how to reconfigure UNMEE to provide for monitoring of the TSZ while simultaneously supporting demarcation. ¶4. (SBU) In a nearly complete reversal in tone from past UNSC discussions of UNMEE's mandate, Members were almost unanimous in their determination to downsize UNMEE, with some urging caution to avoid jeopardizing the ongoing peace process. Ambassador Bolton explained that in our estimation, the diplomatic initiative currently underway to resolve the border impasse would not be affected by downsizing UNMEE, and he stressed, given the lack of progress on May 17, the importance of Council recognition of the reality that UNMEE had become part of the problem. We would be prepared, Ambassador Bolton added, to support a force of 1,500 but not USUN NEW Y 00001039 002 OF 002 to maintain the current UNMEE level. Most other P-5 members followed suit. In a stark departure from his May 8 intervention, UK Permanent Representative (PR) Jones Parry expressed openness to the idea of downsizing and inquired about the minimum number of troops needed to monitor the TSZ and to conduct demarcation-related tasks. He also asked if a revised SOFA with Ethiopia would be required in such a case, which Guehenno did not see as necessary. Agreeing that a reconfigured UNMEE must nonetheless retain capacities to monitor the TSZ and to assist the EEBC, the Chinese representative said his delegation would be open to discussions of options for a reduced force. The French representative played down the GSE's letter, charging that it incorrectly tried to divert attention away from the responsibilities of the parties for resolution of the border crisis. Other delegations that added their voices to the need to downsize included Japan and Denmark. ¶5. (SBU) Those delegations more guarded in their support for downsizing (Argentina, Greece, Peru, Ghana) pointed to the need to study the letter just submitted by the GSE and urged caution in balancing troop level reduction against the ongoing peace initiative/EEBC process. The Ghanaian rep called for bilateral measures to accompany any downsizing, and the Peruvian rep recommended a gradual process of disengagement and downsizing. The Tanzanian rep reminded of the need for UNMEE to retain a capacity to respond to changes to the situation on the ground. Russian PR Churkin urged that in contemplating downsizing UNMEE, the UNSC must consider the potential impact on UNMEE's effectiveness, particularly in the area of command; the warning from Sir Elihu that the time might not be right to reduce force strength; and the implication that the Council was opting for a non-political solution to the stand-off. Greek PR Vassilakis announced the intention of his delegation to circulate a draft resolution to renew UNMEE's mandate that would incorporate Members' comments and to convene the first Experts Meeting on the text on May 25. ¶6. (SBU) COMMENT. While the May 17 EEBC meeting may have failed to move the demarcation process forward, it succeeded in illustrating the UN's 'hostage' status in the crisis and accordingly in turning the tide of Members' opinions toward reducing UNMEE's force size, even in the absence of explicit endorsement by DPKO. Further, the GSE's transparent ploy with the timing of its letter seemed only to add to Members' stalemate weariness and embolden them to consider taking a stronger stance on countering the impasse. END COMMENT. BOLTON