UNMIK/KOSOVO: AHTISAARI BRIEFS CONTACT GROUP

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 001010 SIPDIS SIPDIS FOR EUR DAS ROSEMARY DICARLO, EUR/SCE E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/17/2016 TAGS: PREL UNSC PGOV UNMIK YI SUBJECT: UNMIK/KOSOVO: AHTISAARI BRIEFS CONTACT GROUP Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor William J. Brencick, Reason s: 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. The Secretary-General's Special Envoy for the Future Status Process for Kosovo, Martti Ahtisaari briefed the Coordinating and Drafting Group (Contact Group plus Greece, Slovakia and Denmark) May 12 on his upcoming consultations in June and his plans for the parties to meet in July or August. Most Contact Group members addressed the need to maintain pressure on Belgrade and hopefully to conclude final status talks in 2006. Russian PR Churkin took a tough line, questioning the rush forKosovo's independence and whether independence would better protect Serb human rights or encourage refugee return. Asked by Ambassador Wolff how the Contact Group or UNSC could help him, Ahtisaari said the more unified the Contact Group was and the more its members reinforce that point with the parties, the more helpful it would be. End Summary. ¶2. (C) In a May 12 briefing for the Cooordinating and Drafting Group, Martti Ahtisaari, the Secretary-General's Special Envoy for the Future Status Process for Kosovo, said he envisions intense consultations in the coming months. His busy travel schedule in early June will include key European capitals, Moscow, Beijing and the region. He hopes the consultations will conclude with some clarity on the process and a Contact Group meeting in Moscow late in the month. He intends to consult with the UNSC in early July and to explain next steps at that time. Ahtisaari plans on a July meeting of the parties on final status and hopes to make profitable use of the UNSC's August slowdown, but cautioned that any breakthrough would be unlikely in the first round of talks. He wants to conduct final status talks in a venue that allows for candid discussion and limited press. He noted that SRSG Jessen-Petersen's negotiations on continued international presence are separate from the final status negotiations. Finally, he said public speculation on final status arrangements would not be helpful. ¶3. (C) Most Contact Group members addressed the need to maintain pressure on the parties, particularly Belgrade. UK PR Jones Parry urged 2006 as the target for conclusion of final status talks and stressed the need to signal some toughness, for example by making clear to Belgrade that the process cannot be held hostage. German PR Pleuger queried Ahtisaari on how to bring Belgrade - both the government and public opinion - to support the negotiations and on the impact on Serbian views of a successful or failed Montenegro referendum. ¶4. (C) Ahtisaari answered that the Serbs are in denial. He criticized Serbian political leaders who have done nothing to influence public views and said that when those such as Draskovic say, "we should not be punished for Milosevic's actions," he answers "nor should you be rewarded." However, if the Serbs meet the criteria, the international community should be forthcoming. Ahtisaari said he recognizes that the Contact Group wants a solution in 2006, and agrees that is the timeframe, but cautioned it should also be acceptable if it takes a bit longer. Belgrade knows 2006 is the desired timeframe, but expects the Serbs will attempt delays. Montenegro's referendum has its own life and will be held independent of final status talks and the talks would then take into account the referendum results. ¶5. (C) In contrast, Russian PR Churkin questioned the rush for Kosovo's independence. He asked whether independence would better protect Serb human rights and encourage refugees to return. He objected to Pleuger's question about the Montenegro referendum and the reference to the "failure of the referendum" since the referendum would be an expression of the people's will. 2006 is an artificial target and only a hope. The process should create an agreement acceptable to both sides, not simply pressure on the Serbs. ¶6. (C) Ahtisaari answered Churkin that significant refugee returns are unlikely, and many refugees will instead go to Austria, Germany or elsewhere. But returns are desirable, and the goal is a multi-ethnic society. Therefore, property claims must be addressed and conditions for return created. There is an expectation of independence and that is the only way to guarantee the best life for all. After seven years of UN involvement, Kosovo is sui generis and must be treated as such. Furthermore, Kosovo's administration is weak, and an international presence - EU, OSCE, and NATO - is still required. The 2006 decision timeframe derives from the Contact Group, and the process can be flexible; however, it should not be artificially prolonged. ¶7. (C) Asked by U.S. Ambassador Wolff how the Contact Group or the UNSC could help, Atishaari said the more unified the Contact Group is, the more helpful it would be. He noted in particular the importance that Kostunica receive the same message from all capitals. BOLTON