C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000639

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2016
TAGS: NATO PREL MARR FR
SUBJECT: FRENCH MANEUVERS TO PUT BRAKES ON ALLIED-PARTNER
DIALOGUE PARRIED

REF: A. USNATO 591

B. SECSTATE 171907

Classified By: AMB VICTORIA NULAND FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) Summary: In the past few weeks, France tried to
launch a campaign to deny NATO partners formal 26 plus one
consultations with Allies, substituting "informal" meetings.
The French move began with Georgia (ref. A) and initially
looked like a "one-off" move designed to assuage the Russians
at a tense time in Georgian-Russian relations. Then the
French extended the effort, seeking to deny 26 plus one
formal consultations to Moldova. This campaign clearly was
designed to weaken partnership structures just when we are
seeking to expand them in the context of the Global
Partnership initiative. With the help of several other
Allies and some horse-trading with Paris, the French
ultimately backed down, but they may arise again in the Riga
run-up. End Summary.

FRANCE: Only informal meetings after consensus...
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2. (C) In a 10/18 NATO Political Committee (PC) discussion
of how to reply to a Moldovan request to brief Allies in the
Political Committee on the recent Transnistrian elections,
France built on procedural tactical delays from earlier
deliberations regarding Allied meetings with Georgia (ref.
A). Rebutting both the Chair and the U.S. position, which
was supported by many newer Allies (Poland, Latvia, Lithuania
and the Czech Republic), France asserted that Washington
Treaty consensus rules trump the 1997 EAPC Basic Document
Partner dialogue guidelines and added that Paris will only
accept "informal" meetings with Chisinau (REF. B). France
later said Allies should reject attempts by partners to
associate NATO with any issue as long as even one Ally does
not agree.

3.(C) The U.S. and the Netherlands, drawing on the EAPC
Basic Document and PfP Framework Document, said there is no
such partner format as an "informal meeting." Newer Allies
agreed, as did the Chair at a later point (while granting

that, again in reaction to a Spring 2006 French assertion,
sub-NAC level meetings with contact countries, were
considered "informal."). Several newer Allies said that the
French assertions went beyond a discussion of one partner
meeting and went to the core of Allied-Partner dialogue.
(Comment: we agree. End Comment.)

...and only with some partners
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4.(C) France then asserted that "Paris actually prefers that
the Political Committee see no Partners but those with
"privileged status," (note: this means those in Intensified
Dialogue or the Membership Action Plan - Ukraine, Georgia,
Albania, Croatia or Macedonia) and all others should go to
the Political Military Steering Committee (PMSC). Italy
supported this line, but less stridently. The UK commented
that this reasoning was "odd" since it would have the effect
of placing those partners on a membership track in a more
restrictive partner format than other EAPC Partners. The
U.S. also said that it would be unwise to suggest to a
Partner political consultations be directed to a committee
that focuses chiefly on political-military and
military-oriented issues, like the PMSC.

The plot thickens...
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5.(C) When French PermRep Duque recently approached
Ambassador Nuland for help in meeting French needs in the
Kosovo Contact Group, on instructions from French Political
Director Araud, Ambassador Nuland offered to help if Araud
would stop the idiocy on partnership. This deal appears to
have stuck -- at least for now, if reluctantly on the part of
the French delegation.

And resolves itself, for now
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6.(C) In a continuation of the dispute in the 10/23 PC, and
following the U.S. 10/20 letter asserting formal status for
partner meetings, all Allies gradually rallied around formal
status for Partner meetings and France agreed to the meeting
as a formal gathering, albeit with a slightly revised name.

7.(C) Comment: The French were clearly seeking to develop
braking levers over Allied-Partner dialogue in advance of the
Global Partnership decisions at the Riga Summit. Had the
French assertions remained unchallenged, they would have

allowed Paris, in advance of Riga, to have set the precedent
that it could control many of the levers controlling 26 plus
N meetings with partners. Aided by the Poles, Baltic Allies,
Czech Republic, Dutch and occasionally the UK, plus some
horsetrading, we, to date, have deflected these French
procedural parries, winning the argument that partner
meetings are formal by rule. These discussions also have
demonstrated a clear older Ally preference (FR/IT/UK/GM/SP)
to avoid discussion of the Frozen Conflicts or other issues
where NATO involvement might antagonize Russia. End Comment.
NULAND