IAEA/DPRK/IRAN: JAPAN NIXES BOG DPRK RESOLUTION;

S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000815

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2021
TAGS: AORC IAEA IR KNNP
SUBJECT: IAEA/DPRK/IRAN: JAPAN NIXES BOG DPRK RESOLUTION;
LIKE-MINDED AGREES ON WAY-FORWARD TO BLOCK SUPPORT FOR ARAK
REACTOR PROJECT

REF: A. UNVIE 777

B. UNVIE 804

Classified By: DCM George A. Glass for reasons 1.4 (h)

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Summary
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1. (S) Like-minded countries, meeting at the US mission
November 2, agreed with Japan's view that, in light of the
October 31 announcement on Six-Party talks, the Board should
pursue a Chairman's Summary, but not a resolution unless the
DPRK reneges on this agreement. Country statements at the
Board should be very strong and clear to enable a stronger
Chairman's summary. On Iran, all parties agreed that it
would be inappropriate for the Board to approve technical
cooperation (TC) for the heavy water reactor at Arak.
Agreement was reached on questions to put to the Secretariat,
common talking points to be used with the Board Chair, and a
division of responsibilities in approaching key NAM
countries. Agreement was reached to consider deferring all
new TC cooperation with Iran until the Secretariat certifies
that this assistance would not enable Iran's enrichment,
reprocessing, or heavy water reactor projects. The
"like-minded" agreed to reconvene November 10. End Summary.

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No DPRK Resolution, For Now
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2. (S) Ambassador Schulte met with Germany, France, UK,
Finland, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Argentina, ROK, and
Japan on November 2 to discuss DPRK and Iran issues in the
run-up to the November Board. Ambassador Schulte raised the
issue of preliminary thinking on how to respond to the
October 9 nuclear test by the DPRK at the November BOG. At
the previous like-minded meeting (ref A) the group noted a
number of options that could be pursued: a resolution, a
Chairman's Statement, or a Chairman's Summary. The Canadian
chair of the "Core Group" agreed at that meeting to take the
lead in reviewing elements that could be included in a
resolution or Chairman's Statement and provided a readout of
the Core Group's initial efforts. She started by taking note
of the October 31 announcement that the DPRK has agreed to
return to the Six-Party Talks without condition as possibly
as soon as November or December, adding that with these new
developments she was looking to the group to decide whether a
resolution was an appropriate response or not. She reported
that the Core Group had only discussed essential elements of
a resolution if a decision were made to proceed. She said
that those elements included a condemnation of the October
test, strong support for UNSCR 1718, acknowledgment of the
essential verification role of the IAEA, as noted in the
resolution. She added that it welcomed the recent
developments on the announced intention to resume Six-Party
Talks. She emphasized that the resolution needed to be as
strong as UNSCR 1781, so as to not undermine it.


3. (S) The Japanese Ambassador, noting he had new
instructions from Tokyo following the October 31 announcement
of the resumption of the Six-Party talks, said Japan prefers
a Chairman's Summary and is opposed to a resolution; however,
the issue could be revisited if North Korea "withdrew" its
intention to resume the talks. The ROK ambassador said that
at this point his government is flexible. He noted that
UNSCR 1718 was a strong resolution and members were now
working to implement it. He emphasized that BOG member
statements should be strong and in no way weaken 1718.
Australia noted the potential "awkwardness" in holding
consultations in Vienna on a resolution during the APEC
Ministerial Conference in Hanoi. Norway questioned what the
objective of a resolution would be, cautioning that if it
went too far it might jeopardize the Six-Party Talks.
Ambassador Schulte summed up by noting that no country had
spoken in favor of a resolution. He echoed the ROK
sentiments that if there is n resolution, then members'
statements at the BOG needed to be strong, and in sync.
Former BOG Chairman Amano, noting that nuanced statements are
difficult to capure in the Chair's Summary, advocated that
the messages be strong, clear and simple.

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Agreement to Withhold TC on Arak And To Pressure the DG
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4. (S) Japan, reiterating points in ref A, recommended a
strategy that would emphasize the need for a consensus Board
view on Iran's requests for technical assistance (TC),while
stressing to the NAM that such consensus would not be
possible if the heavy water reactor at Arak is included.
Reinforcing the idea that the entire proposed TC program is
at stake might then galvanize the NAM to pressure Iran to
retract its Arak-related TC proposal. Japan prefers to cast
this in terms of previous Board resolutions, i.e., it would
not be appropriate for the Board to approve this TC proposal
since previous resolutions have called on Iran to
"reconsider" construction of Arak. Japan also recommended
that like-minded delegations lobby the Chair to head off this
project, as the Chair would relay these concerns both to the
Director General and to NAM members. Japan also handed out a
draft set of talking points on the need and reasoning for
withholding TC cooperation on Arak.


5. (S) Australia, referring to a list of TC-related proposals
for Iran, suggested that we may want to try to have all of
them deferred until the Secretariat can certify that none of
them would enable enrichment, reprocessing, or heavy
water-related projects. France agreed that all of the
proposals should be closely scrutinized. Canada, seeming to
agree, also noted that it is not clear who makes the
determination that projects are indeed intended for "safety"
purposes. The UK said that it might make sense to stop Arak,
while deferring cooperation on the other projects pending a
report from the Secretariat. The UK added that the UNSCR
would need to be specific on these issues, or else the
Secretariat would defer to the Board to make those

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determinations. Finland, noting that consults with the EU
will begin this week, cautioned that withholding TC on
projects beyond Arak might complicate things. Norway said
that we will need to have strong arguments to counter Iranian
claims that Arak will only produce medical isotopes.
Ambassador Schulte noted that UNVIE is moving forward with
DOE briefings on this topic.


6. (S) Ambassador Schulte provided a five-point summary of
the discussion: 1) starting at the November 2 TC technical
briefing by the Secretariat to member states, members need to
ask the Secretariat questions about the criteria it uses to
scrutinize TC proposals and whether any of Iran's TC projects
would have enrichment, reprocessing, or heavy water reactor
applications (France, Australia, Canada, Japan and German
agreed to ask questions); 2) the group should review Japan's
talking points and get back to them with feedback so they can
be finalized prior to consultations with the Chair the week
of November 6; 3) The groups should consider whether we want
to focus only on removing Arak from TC consideration, and/or
putting the other Iran project proposals on hold pending the
Secretariat's review; 4) the group needs to start lobbying

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the NAM to counter Iran's expected propaganda about Arak's
use to produce medical isotopes (the US, UK, Canada, Japan,
and Germany agreed to approach key NAM countries); and 5) the
Group will need to wait and see how the expected UNSCR on
Iran will affect us. Australia suggested that we should
review what happened historically with countries like DPRK,
Israel, India, and Pakistan in terms of TC issues.
Ambassador Schulte agreed that the US mission could undertake
this task.
SCHULTE