IAEA/DPRK/IRAN: JAPAN NIXES BOG DPRK RESOLUTION;

S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000815 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2021 TAGS: AORC IAEA IR KNNP SUBJECT: IAEA/DPRK/IRAN: JAPAN NIXES BOG DPRK RESOLUTION; LIKE-MINDED AGREES ON WAY-FORWARD TO BLOCK SUPPORT FOR ARAK REACTOR PROJECT REF: A. UNVIE 777 ¶B. UNVIE 804 Classified By: DCM George A. Glass for reasons 1.4 (h) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (S) Like-minded countries, meeting at the US mission November 2, agreed with Japan's view that, in light of the October 31 announcement on Six-Party talks, the Board should pursue a Chairman's Summary, but not a resolution unless the DPRK reneges on this agreement. Country statements at the Board should be very strong and clear to enable a stronger Chairman's summary. On Iran, all parties agreed that it would be inappropriate for the Board to approve technical cooperation (TC) for the heavy water reactor at Arak. Agreement was reached on questions to put to the Secretariat, common talking points to be used with the Board Chair, and a division of responsibilities in approaching key NAM countries. Agreement was reached to consider deferring all new TC cooperation with Iran until the Secretariat certifies that this assistance would not enable Iran's enrichment, reprocessing, or heavy water reactor projects. The "like-minded" agreed to reconvene November 10. End Summary. -------------- No DPRK Resolution, For Now -------------- ¶2. (S) Ambassador Schulte met with Germany, France, UK, Finland, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Argentina, ROK, and Japan on November 2 to discuss DPRK and Iran issues in the run-up to the November Board. Ambassador Schulte raised the issue of preliminary thinking on how to respond to the October 9 nuclear test by the DPRK at the November BOG. At the previous like-minded meeting (ref A) the group noted a number of options that could be pursued: a resolution, a Chairman's Statement, or a Chairman's Summary. The Canadian chair of the "Core Group" agreed at that meeting to take the lead in reviewing elements that could be included in a resolution or Chairman's Statement and provided a readout of the Core Group's initial efforts. She started by taking note of the October 31 announcement that the DPRK has agreed to return to the Six-Party Talks without condition as possibly as soon as November or December, adding that with these new developments she was looking to the group to decide whether a resolution was an appropriate response or not. She reported that the Core Group had only discussed essential elements of a resolution if a decision were made to proceed. She said that those elements included a condemnation of the October test, strong support for UNSCR 1718, acknowledgment of the essential verification role of the IAEA, as noted in the resolution. She added that it welcomed the recent developments on the announced intention to resume Six-Party Talks. She emphasized that the resolution needed to be as strong as UNSCR 1781, so as to not undermine it. ¶3. (S) The Japanese Ambassador, noting he had new instructions from Tokyo following the October 31 announcement of the resumption of the Six-Party talks, said Japan prefers a Chairman's Summary and is opposed to a resolution; however, the issue could be revisited if North Korea "withdrew" its intention to resume the talks. The ROK ambassador said that at this point his government is flexible. He noted that UNSCR 1718 was a strong resolution and members were now working to implement it. He emphasized that BOG member statements should be strong and in no way weaken 1718. Australia noted the potential "awkwardness" in holding consultations in Vienna on a resolution during the APEC Ministerial Conference in Hanoi. Norway questioned what the objective of a resolution would be, cautioning that if it went too far it might jeopardize the Six-Party Talks. Ambassador Schulte summed up by noting that no country had spoken in favor of a resolution. He echoed the ROK sentiments that if there is n resolution, then members' statements at the BOG needed to be strong, and in sync. Former BOG Chairman Amano, noting that nuanced statements are difficult to capure in the Chair's Summary, advocated that the messages be strong, clear and simple. -------------- -------------- Agreement to Withhold TC on Arak And To Pressure the DG -------------- -------------- ¶4. (S) Japan, reiterating points in ref A, recommended a strategy that would emphasize the need for a consensus Board view on Iran's requests for technical assistance (TC),while stressing to the NAM that such consensus would not be possible if the heavy water reactor at Arak is included. Reinforcing the idea that the entire proposed TC program is at stake might then galvanize the NAM to pressure Iran to retract its Arak-related TC proposal. Japan prefers to cast this in terms of previous Board resolutions, i.e., it would not be appropriate for the Board to approve this TC proposal since previous resolutions have called on Iran to "reconsider" construction of Arak. Japan also recommended that like-minded delegations lobby the Chair to head off this project, as the Chair would relay these concerns both to the Director General and to NAM members. Japan also handed out a draft set of talking points on the need and reasoning for withholding TC cooperation on Arak. ¶5. (S) Australia, referring to a list of TC-related proposals for Iran, suggested that we may want to try to have all of them deferred until the Secretariat can certify that none of them would enable enrichment, reprocessing, or heavy water-related projects. France agreed that all of the proposals should be closely scrutinized. Canada, seeming to agree, also noted that it is not clear who makes the determination that projects are indeed intended for "safety" purposes. The UK said that it might make sense to stop Arak, while deferring cooperation on the other projects pending a report from the Secretariat. The UK added that the UNSCR would need to be specific on these issues, or else the Secretariat would defer to the Board to make those SIPDIS determinations. Finland, noting that consults with the EU will begin this week, cautioned that withholding TC on projects beyond Arak might complicate things. Norway said that we will need to have strong arguments to counter Iranian claims that Arak will only produce medical isotopes. Ambassador Schulte noted that UNVIE is moving forward with DOE briefings on this topic. ¶6. (S) Ambassador Schulte provided a five-point summary of the discussion: 1) starting at the November 2 TC technical briefing by the Secretariat to member states, members need to ask the Secretariat questions about the criteria it uses to scrutinize TC proposals and whether any of Iran's TC projects would have enrichment, reprocessing, or heavy water reactor applications (France, Australia, Canada, Japan and German agreed to ask questions); 2) the group should review Japan's talking points and get back to them with feedback so they can be finalized prior to consultations with the Chair the week of November 6; 3) The groups should consider whether we want to focus only on removing Arak from TC consideration, and/or putting the other Iran project proposals on hold pending the Secretariat's review; 4) the group needs to start lobbying SIPDIS the NAM to counter Iran's expected propaganda about Arak's use to produce medical isotopes (the US, UK, Canada, Japan, and Germany agreed to approach key NAM countries); and 5) the Group will need to wait and see how the expected UNSCR on Iran will affect us. Australia suggested that we should review what happened historically with countries like DPRK, Israel, India, and Pakistan in terms of TC issues. Ambassador Schulte agreed that the US mission could undertake this task. SCHULTE