C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000626

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/21/2021
TAGS: AORC IAEA IR KNNP
SUBJECT: SUBJECT: POSSIBLE IRAN SCENARIOS LEADING UP TO
SEPTEMBER 11 BOG


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Summary
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1. (C) There are three possible Iranian responses to both the
EU3 "package" and UNSCR 1696: accept the package and comply
with the resolution (highly unlikely), reject the package and
the resolution outright (unlikely), or express a willingness
to negotiate the package "without preconditions", i.e.,
without complying with the resolution (most likely). Based
on past practice and senior Iranian officials' public
comments, we expect the Iranians to try to buy time and
minimize support for a UNSC sanctions resolution by proposing
to discuss the package, while continuing their enrichment
activities. At the same time, we expect the Iranians to
continue effort to degrade the IAEA's verification
capabilities by limiting inspector visas and access to
facilities. Under these circumstances, we would envision a
hard-hitting DG report on August 31, as well as tough
national statements at the September Board. End Summary.

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Scenario I: Accept the Package, Comply With UNSCR 1696
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2. (C) Based on senior Iranian leaders' public comments, this
scenario is highly unlikely; however, if Iran agreed to
suspend prior to August 31, the Secretariat would not have
sufficient time to fully verify the suspension in time for
the report to the UNSC, as the process could take two weeks
or more to consolidate and account for the large quantities
of centrifuge-related materials, production equipment, and
components. Under this scenario, the Secretariat would
continue pressing Iran to implement the additional protocol
and clarify outstanding questions, while the Board would
issue a resolution welcoming Iran's actions and calling for
early clarification of Iran's nuclear activities.

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Scenario II: Reject the Package and the Resolution
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3. (C) Iran could, as it did in August 2005, reject the
entire EU3 package and announce it will continue its full

nuclear program. Iran would also likely continue efforts to
degrade the Agency's verification capabilities by
blackballing inspectors and limiting the frequency of visits
to facilities. The Iranians undoubtedly would not cooperate
on any outstanding questions. Under this scenario, the IAEA
would undoubtedly issue a hard-hitting report on August 31,
but the BOG would likely resist terminating technical
cooperation with Iran at the September Board without a UNSC
sanctions resolution.

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Scenario III: Offer To Discuss Package--Without Suspension
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4. (C) In an effort to buy more time and limit support for a
UNSC sanctions resolution, Iran most likely will offer to
discuss elements of the package, but would reiterate its
rights to peaceful nuclear uses and its intent to continue
enrichment "R&D." Iran probably would also threaten again to
withdraw from the NPT if sanctions are imposed, while
continuing to whittle away at IAEA accesses. To establish
new facts on the ground and increase its leverage in
negotiations, Iran could soon announce that a second
164-centifuge cascade is operational. Under this scenario,
we would expect the DG to report that Iran has not complied
with the terms of UNSCR 1696, although the BOG probably would
not be in a position to take any action pending UNSC action.
UNVIE would encourage member states to make strong national
statements condemning Iran's continued intransigence, while
emphasizing the need for continued UNSC involvement to
bolster the IAEA's efforts.

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Strategy for the September Board
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5. (C) Assuming Scenario III, the main focus for USG efforts
will likely be in New York seeking early agreement on a
sanctions resolution. We would thus at this point recommend
against seeking any specific decisions at the September
meeting of the Board of Governors, due to start on September

11. Rather, our objective in Vienna should be to maximize
international support for action in New York. We can do this
by using the DG's report to highlight Iran's failure to
comply with UNSCR 1696 and cooperate with the IAEA; by
encouraging strong statements of concern by key Securty

Council countries, such as Russia and China, by influential
NAM countries, such as India, South Africa, and Brazil, and
by "like-minded countries," such as Japan, who are concerned
about the impact of sanctions; and, by contributing to our
overall public diplomacy on Iran. We will need to be on the
alert for any effort, at the Board or the subsequent General
Conference, to undermine our efforts in New York.


6. (C) As we prepare for the Board, we should be conscious
not only of likely Security Council deliberations but also of
other events scheduled for the same timeframe. The NAM
Summit, at which Cuba assumes the NAM chair, will be taking
place in Havana during the same week as the Board. The NAM
Summit will presumably receive much international attention,
given questions about the health and future of Fidel Castro.
We could imagine Iran trying to hijack this Summit, as it
hijacked a previous Ministerial NAM meeting in Kuala Lumpur,
to seek support for its nuclear program. In addition, UNGA
convenes during the second day of the Board meeting.
President Ahmadi-Nejad's speech at last year's UNGA played a
key role in heightening international concerns about Iran and
its nuclear program. We solicit the Department's insights as
to whether and when he is to speak this year.
SCHULTE