IAEA/IRAN: BUSHEHR START-UP UNLIKELY UNTIL AT

S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000572 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/26/2021 TAGS: AORC IAEA IR KNNP SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: BUSHEHR START-UP UNLIKELY UNTIL AT LEAST 2009 Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for reasons 1.4 (c) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (S) The IAEA's Russ Clark, during a July 18 meeting with Msnoff, said that the Iranians would be "lucky" to commission the first power reactor at Bushehr (BNPP-1) by 2009 because the Russians are "dragging their feet." Key equipment required to finish the plant, such as valves and cables, has not been delivered, and there are only about 3000 workers on site (or about half of what we might expect for power plant construction). The Russians will not deliver fuel for BNPP-1 until six months before commissioning; however, they undoubtedly will complete the project to enhance marketing efforts to Iran and other possible clients. The BNPP-1 is a "bastardized" VVER reactor model resulting from extensive redesigns of the original Siemens design. He said the Russians are "not so big" on quality, but did not mention any specific problems, particularly pertaining to safety issues. He dismissed possible concerns about locating the plant in a seismically active area, indicating that the Russians had conducted reviews and then "beefed up" unspecified areas. Clark lobbied for continued IAEA technical cooperation, noting it would be dangerous for the Iranians to try to go it alone. End Summary. -------------- Iranians Will "Be Lucky" To Go By 2009 -------------- ¶2. (S) Clark, noting that BNPP-1 was supposed to have been completed two years ago, said the Iranians would "be lucky" to begin preoperational testing of the reactor by 2009, assuming that the Russians deliver the fuel and they encounter no serious technical glitches. He said that, even though the Iranians are pressing hard to complete the project, the Russians are obviously "dragging their feet," citing the fact that they are only operating one shift and have about 3000 workers (nationality breakdown not specified) on site--or about half of what you would expect based on plant construction in other countries. He said that the Iranians are growing increasingly frustrated with these delays, indicating the project managers are under a lot of political pressure to complete it. Iran's parliament, according to Clark, had recently authorized an additional $250 million to the project. As a technical guy who has worked in the field, Clark quipped that he almost feels sorry for the Iranians because of the way the Russians are "jerking them around." ¶3. (S) Clark provided us with copies of a presentation that the Iranians had presented to the IAEA circa mid-July titled the "Status and Progress of BNPP-Project." (Note: UNVIE will fax copies to ISN/RA. End note.) It includes a chart on Iran's expected completion of various phases of construction and equipment installation, which projects completion of most of this work by late 2006. The presentation includes many pictures showing progress of various civil works at the site, including physical protection measures, a meteorological lab, installation of steam and water pipes, views of the inside of the turbine plant (including equipment),transformers, and water demineralization equipment. There is also a chart titled "summary status" on how much of this equipment has been installed and expected completion dates. Regarding Iran's future plans for nuclear power, there is a chart outlining Tehran's plans to eventually develop 20000 MW of nuclear energy (unspecified timeline),with 7000 MW online by ¶2021. It indicates that the Iranians have completed a feasibility study for a second reactor at Bushehr (designated BNNP-2),and has developed a tender for this project. -------------- No Fuel Until Six Months Prior To Startup -------------- ¶4. (S) Regarding fuel delivery dates, the Russians, apparently at very high political levels, have made it clear that they will not provide fuel until six months prior to startup. Clark said that the Russians are obviously delaying fuel shipments because of "political considerations" and concerns that, once they deliver the fuel, they would lose leverage over Iran, which could attempt to start the reactor without Russian assistance. Despite these concerns, he was almost certain that Russia would complete the plant, even with a UNSC resolution, owing to concerns about the negative impact on other foreign reactor marketing efforts. The Iranians have also informed the Russians of their plans to develop 7 additional 1000 MW reactors by 2021, at a cost Clark estimated at about $3 billion per plant. ¶5. (S) Clark said that once the Russians ship the fuel, normal safeguards measures would be in place to verify its non-diversion, and that the Safeguard Dept would monitor BNPP-1 operations with the "same" (but unspecified) equipment that would be used in any other plant. Regarding physical security, he noted that the TC work plan includes projects with the IAEA's Physical protection experts to bolster internal security. He indicated that the Iranians had initially had a lax attitude about this, but seem to understand the importance of this issue. -------------- Key Equipment Not Delivered -------------- ¶6. (S) Clark also noted that BNPP-1 completion requires about 250 additional valves of an unspecified type, as well as extensive cabling. The Russians have intimated that they might allow the Iranians to produce some of the cables in Iran, but even if this were to occur, extensive delays would occur due to the time required to develop those capabilities. He indicated that these shortages were largely attributable to malfeasance on the part of the Russian general contractor, who apparently bilked vendors that had been providing the equipment. -------------- Bushehr a "Bastardized" VVER -------------- ¶7. (S) Asked about Russian work to redesign Bushehr, originally a 1970s Siemens design, Clark referred to BNPP-1 as a "bastardized" VVER that required extensive technical modifications. When asked, he said he was not aware of any other instances where a country had done such a redesign of an existing plan. The Iranians were not involved in the redesign work. He did not provide further details on the types of modifications, but we plan to follow-up to get additional information on the design characteristics as compared to the standard VVER. When asked about the quality of the construction, he quipped that the Russians are "not so big" on quality, but did not cite any specific safety-related concerns that his might pose. -------------- Iranian Technicians "Fairly Competent" -------------- ¶8. (S) Clark said that the Iranian technicians are pretty competent, with most having graduate degrees from western institutions. The Russians, who view Iran as a "developing country," often look down on the Iranians, which he noted is pretty common in these circumstances. Overall, the Iranians and Russians seem to work fairly well together. One of the biggest hurdles, according to Clark, is the language barrier. Many of the Iranians have trained in Russia and have learned the language, but others have not. Clark emphasized that this is not a big issue during construction of the plant, but this could present problems post-startup if some of the operators were using Russian terminology while others did not. -------------- Dismisses Seismic Concerns -------------- ¶9. (S) Asked whether Bushehr's location in an active seismic area posed problems, Clark seemed dismissive, noting that the Russians had conducted a seismic review and did not anticipate any problems, although he claimed they had reinforced some (unspecified) parts of the reactor area to "beef things up." He said that the IAEA had also conducted such reviews, indicating that they had not discerned any problems. -------------- --- Lobbies For Continued IAEA Technical Cooperation -------------- --- ¶10. (S) Clark said that an extension of Iran's TC agreement is pending and emphasized that he hoped the U.S. would not veto it. Most of these projects, which were approved "years ago" and are largely Iranian funded, are intended to strengthen Iranian understanding of nuclear reactor operations and enhance safety. In his view, it would be better to have the Iranians receive training on reactor operations from the IAEA instead of venturing out on their own. Clark conveyed that the Iranians have said that if the Russians were to halt cooperation on the BNPP-1, they would try to fabricate the fuel and operate the plant on their own. In his view, assuming the fuel were delivered, he thought the Iranians would be capable of starting up the BNPP-1 on their own, but not operate it safely. He also noted that it is in the U.S. interest for the Agency to maintain this cooperation because their access to the site is a valuable source of information. ¶11. (S) Clark provided us with a list of active TC projects related to Bushehr extending out to 2008, which we will also fax to ISN/RA. This list contains projects identified under the headings of: overall project management, support in the development of training systems and human performance, quality assurance and quality management, commissioning, operations and technical support, and nuclear safety related activities. ¶12. (S) Clark expressed similar concerns about Iran's construction of the IR-40 heavy water reactor at Arak, noting that Safeguards was monitoring its construction, but emphasized that the Safety department is not involved. On that point, he expressed concern that, with the design work about 96 percent completed, the Iranians might try to operate the reactor on their own-something he said he did not even want to contemplate because there could be a major accident. In his view, the U.S. at some point may want to re-evaluate its position concerning this project. Msnoff recalled that the Board has repeatedly called on Iran to reconsider construction of the reactor and that the UNSC would likely mandate a halt to this work. Clark acknowledged these points and clarified that this type of assistance could only occur via Board-approved TC contracts. SCHULTE