C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000522

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/28/2021
TAGS: AORC ETRD IAEA IR KNNP PINR
SUBJECT: PROFILE OF MALAYSIAN AMBASSADOR RAJMAH HUSSAIN


Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for reason 1.4 (c)


1. (C) Summary and Introduction. Malaysian Ambassador
Rajmah Hussain, designated next Malaysian Ambassador to
Washington, arrived Vienna 16 months ago from her previous
position as Ambassador to the CD in Geneva. While in Vienna,
Hussain served as chair of the Vienna Chapter of the
Non-Aligned Movement, using that position to counter U.S.
initiatives and lend support to Iranian arguments on their
nuclear program. Hussain traveled to New York in May 2005
where she ended up coordinating (reportedly unhelpful) New
York NAM positions at the NPT Review Conference. She told us
she takes full credit for establishing in May 2005 the first
Vienna chapter of the Organization of Islamic Countries and
achieving observer status for this organization at the IAEA
General Conference. She has noted privately that NAM and
other organizations are important for defending the rights of
other countries vis--vis the superpower. End Summary and
Introduction.


2. (C) Hussain has served in Washington before, as DCM. She
is without immediate family, though her parents are still
alive and she has many siblings. She told us a year ago she
considered Vienna her last assignment before retirement. She
can come across as conversationally engaging, but
periodically seeks to trap interlocutors into principled
positions on non-proliferation or Iran. She appears to pride
herself on leading groups. She has asserted her primary
responsibility is to represent NAM positions, and not
necessarily Malaysian positions. Against this background,
she has exercised almost dictatorial control of NAM meetings
- according to some of her colleagues - and sets NAM policies
by declaring them herself. However, she has not won all
battles.


3. (C) During Hussain's time in Vienna, the NAM has become a
tougher adversary on political issues. Hussain has tried to
seize any issue at all away from G-77 purview and embrace it

in the NAM. She has successfully upstaged the G-77 to this
end.


4. (C) Hussain has forcefully trumpeted the NAM mantra that
defends Iran's rights to peaceful nuclear technologies,
without criticizing Iran's noncompliance with its NPT
obligations and its diminishing cooperation with the IAEA to
resolve the outstanding issues and restore international
confidence. During the particularly difficult September and
February IAEA Board of Governors meetings, which witnessed
contentious votes on Iran that split the NAM, she delivered
very emotional, almost combative statements.


5. (C) Some believe that Hussain has championed Iranian
positions within the NAM to such a degree as to almost allow
the Iranians to draft the substance of NAM statements and
positions that are eventually adopted. This has caused
chagrin among some NAM delegations. However, we have been
told by some NAM Ambassadors that when they question aspects
to the Iran issue in NAM meetings, Hussain either allows the
Iranians to unleash polemical tirades against them, and/or
rules against them. Some indicate to us that it is just
easier to go along with the herd than fight for what become
incremental changes to statements. Hussain has come across
de facto as one of Iran's key supporters in Vienna. Indeed,
the South African Governor (a member of the NAM troika
leadership) told us during a recent Board meeting that he had
tried to get her to amend and soften the NAM statement on
Iran in order to make it more realistic. However he said the
Malaysian flatly refused.


6. (C) In mid-2005 when UNVIE was soliciting support for the
Committee on Safeguards and Verification, Hussain was
reportedly working actively against the Committee. In fact,
other NAM delegations told us she had commissioned an
internal working group to torpedo the Committee. To
circumvent her, UNVIE approached the chairs of the three
regional sub-groups within the NAM (Asia Group, Africa Group,
GRULAC) and offered special briefings on the Committee, and
only afterwards offered the same briefing to Hussain and the
full NAM. She was angry to learn we had done this without
working through her, though we explained we were doing it so
we could deal with smaller groups. When we went to brief the
full NAM, she had us promise to not engage in direct
discussion with the floor, but only through her. In the end,
our working with the chairs of and individual members of the
sub-groups marginalized Hussain and allowed Board approval by
consensus of the Committee.


7. (C) In the final run-up to the Board decision to adopt
the Committee, the South African Governor told us he had had
to part ways with Hussain and "bypass the NAM itself" to
permit the broad support needed to approve the Committee and
dodge Hussain's efforts against the initiative. The Indian
Ambassador advised us on the day of approval to move the
issue to a decision before the Board floor debate to minimize
her influence over the issue during the floor debate. (We
did so.) In the end, the Board supported the Committee by
consensus and Hussain sat in the back of the room fuming and
apparently refusing to speak to anyone.


8. (C) Hussain advertised widely that she was being sent by
her government in mid-2005 to the New York NPT Review
Conference to help coordinate NAM positions focusing on
disarmament. In fact, she claims she wound up chairing most
of the NAM meetings at the RevCon. Hussain is proud for
promoting her "principled" positions on disarmament and
"rights" to peaceful nuclear uses. She exudes a proclivity
to uncompromising dogmatism in these areas.


9. (C) More recently, Hussain told us in early June that she
took full responsibility for the Creation of a Vienna chapter
of the Organization of Islamic Countries. She said that it
was important to have such an organization here, since the
OIC was interested in disarmament (sic) and
non-proliferation. Most Vienna missions are unaware of her
efforts. In mid-June the IAEA Board of Governors approved an
OIC request to participate as an observer in the September
IAEA Board of Governors meeting.


10. (C) Two of our working-level NAM contacts told us on the
record recently that Hussain has "generally been effective"
in her position as NAM Chair. She received high marks from
them for objectivity, management style, and intellect. They
said she listened to the views of the disparate members and
then was decisive once she has decided on an issue. They
both lauded her objectivity and ability to shape the NAM
agenda during plenary meetings. However, these and other
delegates privately often tell us they chafe under her
dictatorial methods and proclivity to press hardened
ideological positions. One of our contacts said Hussain was
"not well liked" by other NAM Ambassadors, and has been
described as "difficult" and "obstinate," though many
acknowledge her as being "friendly." We have heard that she
can be a hothead prone to emotional outbursts, especially
during times of duress such as in the debates on Iran that
took place during the September and February Board meetings.


11. (C) A senior IAEA official who has known her for several
years described her as uncompromising and dogmatic, which
limits the IAEA's ability to work with her. Indeed, the
official said that IAEA senior leadership shrug her off as a
less serious player who cannot bring added value to debates.



12. (C) Despite her prickly dealings on Iran and other IAEA
issues, Hussain has been relatively constructive in other
fora when dealing with issues of mutual interest. In
discussions on whether to share seismic data from the
International Monitoring System (IMS) with national and
regional tsunami alert organizations, Hussain was an
articulate advocate for making the data readily available.
She argued forcefully about the moral obligation of states to
contribute to the global effort to help prevent a reprise of
the devastation caused by the Asian tsunami of December 2004,
and has reminded colleagues of the embarrassing public
relations consequences of not providing tsunami alert
organizations with data that can improve the accuracy of
predictions on the likelihood and course of a tsunami.


13. (C) Hussein has not shied from challenging those among
her Group of 77 colleagues -- including the Chinese
delegation -- which has resorted to legalistic and procedural
arguments to block agreement on a permanent data-sharing
arrangement with alert organizations. Hussein has had no
reservations about associating herself with the U.S. position
during multilateral discussions of this issue, when positions
coincided.


14. (C) While in Vienna, Hussain was almost exclusively
playing the role of NAM Chair. She knew her script well, but
had the acumen and flexibility to successfully deal with a
much broader set of issues. However, she has indicated
little receptivity to hearing out or trying to understand
U.S. positions. In this regard, she has demonstrated little
inclination to compromise on issues. Some believe this
betrays a certain lack of intellectual acuity. She can
occasionally offer unpredictable and ideologically-laced
comments about U.S. nuclear history and policy (Hiroshima)
and disarmament. Hussain has told us that one of her top
priorities in Washington will be to negotiate a free trade
agreement with the U.S.
SCHULTE