IAEA/BOG/IRAN: STATEMENTS CALL ON IRAN TO

UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000500 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: AORC IAEA IR KNNP SUBJECT: IAEA/BOG/IRAN: STATEMENTS CALL ON IRAN TO COOPERATE, RESTORE CONFIDENCE, AND NEGOTIATE REF: UNVIE 475 -------------- Summary and Introduction -------------- ¶1. (SBU) At the June BOG, mission, per reftel, accomplished its objectives of underscoring the absence of confidence in the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program, stressing Iran's need to halt enrichment-related activities, and re-dividing the NAM. Iran was dealt with under agenda item 8 (g) "Report by the Director General on the implementation of NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran." The session consisted of a DG introductory statement, 33 country statements (28 Board members, 4 Rule 50 speakers, and Iran),and a Chairman's summary. The statements began in the morning on June 15 and the Chair provided his summary at 1245 hours. ¶2. (SBU) The "like-minded" countries, including France (on behalf of the EU3) and Austria (on behalf of the EU), provided statements that were generally more muted in tone than previous ones. EU members did not provide individual statements, despite our recommendation during consultations. Reflecting extensive prior coordination, these statements all noted the lack of cooperation cited in the DG's report, called on Iran to implement confidence building measures (CBMs),and to resume negotiations on the basis of the P5 plus one package. Japan, Australia, Canada, Norway, and the US (full text below) echoed these themes, as did Russia, China, and most of the NAM. ¶3. (SBU) Malaysia (representing the NAM),read the May 30 Ministerial Statement verbatim and hit on all of the well-known themes. Nevertheless, 12 NAM countries delivered tough national statements calling on Iran to cooperate with the Agency and respond positively to the P5 plus one offer. Eight NAM members explicitly called on Iran to implement previous Board resolutions and CBMs to restore confidence in the nature of its program. End Summary. -------------- DG's Opening Remarks: Not "Much Progress" -------------- ¶4. (SBU) DG ElBaradei's opening statement on June 12 flagged Iran's lack of cooperation with the Agency, noting "the report makes clear that the Agency has not made much progress in resolving outstanding verification issues." (Note: these remarks, as well as his last two reports on Iran, seemed to provide cover for most of the NAM to make tougher statements 
on Iran. End note.). Without specifically mentioning the P5 plus one initiative, he also lauded the recent efforts that aim to reach a comprehensive agreement that would simultaneously address the international community's need to establish confidence in the peaceful nature of Iran's program, while addressing Iran's security, technology, and energy needs. -------------- Chairman Amano Calls the Meeting to Order -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Board Chairman Amano, noting the April 28 and June 8 DG reports, convened the meeting to discuss the implementation of safeguards in Iran on June 15 at 1015 hours. Country statements immediately ensued. -------------- NAM Reads Ministerial Statement -------------- ¶6. (SBU) The Malaysian Ambassador, representing the NAM, provided a verbatim reading of the May 30 NAM Ministerial Statement, which regurgitated all of the well known NAM themes: states' rights to peaceful nuclear cooperation in conformity with their legal obligations; voluntary confidence-building measures should not be construed as legal obligations; the IAEA is the sole competent authority for safeguards verification; support for a Middle East nuclear weapon free zone; cited Israel's need to join the NPT; decried threats of attacks against nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes; and proclaimed support for negotiations without preconditions. The statement welcomed Iran's cooperation with the Agency, seeming to completely ignore the DG's reports and comments to the Board demonstrating Iran's lack of cooperation with the Agency. It also did not call on Iran to take steps that would enable the P5 plus one initiative to succeed. -------------- Tougher NAM Country Statements -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Many NAM counties associated themselves with the NAM statement, 12 countries-including Venezuela-called on Iran to cooperate with the Agency and respond positively to the P5 plus one offer. India, Singapore, South Africa, Ghana, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Egypt, Algeria, Libya, Brazil, Colombia, and Ecuador echoed these themes, suggesting these statements had been closely coordinated to distance themselves from the official NAM gibberish and demonstrate growing international concern over Iran's actions. Eight NAM members explicitly called on Iran to implement previous Board resolutions and CBMs to restore confidence in the nature of its program. Many also lauded the U.S. willingness to engage in direct negotiations with Iran. (Note: Many NAM countries, during private consultations with various delegation members yesterday, had initially expressed reluctance to deliver individual statements, but apparently responded positively to our entreaties to send Iran a unified message. End note.). ¶8. (SBU) Syria and Cuba were Iran's only defenders at this Board meeting, with both decrying the Board's February decision to refer Iran to the UNSC. Neither criticized Iran for the lack of cooperation cited in the DG's recent reports or called on Iran to implement CBMs. Cuba, noting the "setbacks" in the Agency's progress to resolve outstanding issues, blamed this turn of events the UNSC referral, claiming this action never should have happened. Cuba mentioned "recent events" by countries that raise the prospects for a negotiated settlement, but did not call on Iran to take actions that would enable such talks. Belarus was equivocal, noting the ongoing diplomatic initiative but not calling on Iran to respond positively or take steps to create the conditions for its success. Yemen was the only NAM country on the Board that did not provide a statement, citing the absence of a sufficiently senior Yemeni representative in Vienna. -------------- Austria Delivers EU Statement -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Austria, representing 37 EU countries, expressed concern at the lack of progress in resolving the outstanding issues, which is required to restore the international community's confidence in the nature of Iran's nuclear program. It called on Iran to cooperate with the Agency, implement CBMs (without specifically saying "suspension"), and respond positively to the P5 plus one package. There was no reference to the UNSC or possible future sticks that the EU could deploy. -------------- EU3 and "Like-minded" Echo EU Themes -------------- ¶10. (SBU) France (speaking for the EU3) endorsed the EU statement, noted that Iran's cooperation with the Agency had "dwindled to almost nothing," and provided a short recitation of the P5 plus one-related developments over the previous several weeks. The U.S., Japan, Korea, Canada, Australia, Norway, and Argentina hit on similar themes, reflecting close coordination over the past two weeks. On balance, these statements were calibrated to highlight Iran's lack of cooperation and need to implement CBMs, while seeking to avoid an Iranian overreaction that could undermine ongoing diplomatic efforts. The EU3, Australia, Canada, Norway, and U.S. all specifically mentioned the UNSC, while Japan, ROK, and Argentina did not (but called on Iran to implement BOG resolutions and implement CBMs). -------------- Russia and China Follow Suit -------------- ¶11. (SBU) Russia said that Iran's cooperation is necessary to dispel the international community's concerns about the nature of Iran's program, while calling on Iran to respond positively to this "serious" proposal. It did not mention the UNSC. China, however, said Iran needs to respond to Board resolutions and the UNSC Presidential Statement. China lauded the U.S. decision to engage Iran, noting that the P5 plus one had reached "consensus" on a far reaching proposal to Iran. -------------- Others Chime In Under Rule 50 -------------- ¶12. (SBU) Under Rule 50, which allows non-Board members to speak, New Zealand, Chile, Pakistan, and Panama all echoed the themes that Iran must increase its cooperation with the Agency and respond positively to the P5 plus 1 offer. Pakistan used this opportunity to trumpet Islamabad's efforts to shut down the A.Q. Khan network, emphasizing that people from about 30 countries had been involved, and imploring states to take steps to curtail development of other proliferation networks. -------------- Iran: Ready To Negotiate On Its Terms -------------- ¶13. (SBU) Iranian Ambassador Soltanieh, noting the May 30 Ministerial Statement, thanked the NAM for their support, which he claimed reflected the views of 116 countries. He then delivered, at least for him, a rather low-keyed speech that played up Iran's cooperation with the Agency, citing the litany of over 2000 man days of inspections, implementation of the Additional Protocol prior to its ratification (even though they are no longer implementing the AP),over 20 complementary accesses with short notice, and at least 13 samplings conducted at military sites. He also noted that the DG had found no evidence of diversion of declared materials. He claimed that referral of the Iran file-not done because of verification issues but because Iran halted CBMs-was a "historical mistake" and noted the file should be returned to the IAEA. ¶14. (SBU) Regarding the P5 plus one offer, it was notable that Soltanieh specifically mentioned the other five partners but omitted the U.S. Repeating the official Iranian line, he proclaimed Iran's willingness to negotiate, but without preconditions and said the package has some positive elements but there are many (unspecified) ambiguities. Iran will respond to the offer in "due course." He then requested that the Board remove Iran from the agenda of subsequent Board meetings, something that many delegations, including UNVIE, will not support. -------------- Chairman's Summary Inadequate -------------- ¶15. (SBU) Chairman Amano, at 1245 hours, promptly delivered a summary that did not accurately capture the debate in the Board room. He noted that some countries expressed concern about Iran's diminishing cooperation with the Agency, cited Iran's need to implement CBMs and the Additional Protocol as called for by the Board, and encouraged Iran to react positively to the P5 plus one diplomatic initiative. 16 (SBU) However, he then noted "other country" concerns, and then regurgitated themes from the official NAM statement-with out reflecting the widespread calls in the individual country statements for Iran to increase its cooperation with the Agency, implement CBMs, and respond positively to the P5 plus one initiative. (Note: Ambassador Schulte will issue a strong demarche over the Chairman's misleading portrayal of the debate. End note.). -------------- U.S. Statement, As Delivered June 15 -------------- ¶17. (U) Mr. Chairman, Last September, the IAEA made two important findings: first, that Iran had violated its safeguards obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty; and second, that Iran had lost international confidence that its nuclear program is exclusively peaceful. The IAEA and the UN Security Council have called on Iran to cooperate, fully and proactively, in resolving troubling questions about its nuclear program. The IAEA and the UN Security Council have also called on Iran to refrain from activities to enrich uranium and produce plutonium. Iran failed to heed these calls. Instead of suspending uranium enrichment-related activity, Iran is conducting small-scale operations and has announced ambitious plans to proceed with larger-scale operations. Instead of halting work on a heavy water reactor that will produce plutonium, Iran is forging ahead with construction. Instead of granting IAEA requests for greater access, Iran has limited the number and location of visits by inspectors and refused Agency requests to upgrade monitoring capabilities. Instead of answering IAEA questions, Iran has: declined to satisfy IAEA concerns about ties to the A.Q. Khan network, an illicit market for nuclear weapons technology and assistance; declined to meet the IAEA' s request to turn over a document from the A.Q. Khan network on fabricating components for nuclear weapons; declined to answer IAEA questions about advanced and potentially undeclared centrifuge programs; declined to explain apparent connections between an undeclared uranium conversion program and the design of a missile warhead. Last week's report by the Director General is sparing in words but clear in content: Iran continues to withhold cooperation with the IAEA on almost every outstanding issue. Iran is not implementing any of the confidence-building measures requested by the Board and backed by the Security Council. Mr. Chairman, No one disputes the right of Iran to a peaceful nuclear program in conformity with its NPT obligations. But Iran's program makes no sense from a civil perspective. Iran's leaders say they need the heavy water research reactor at Arak to produce medical isotopes. But why this large investment when an existing research reactor in Tehran remains underutilized? Iran's leaders claim they need enriched uranium for nuclear power plants. But Iran has no nuclear power plants. The one under construction at Bushehr will receive fuel from Russia. Iran's leaders claim they need the capability to enrich uranium to be self-sufficient. But Iran's known reserves of natural uranium are only sufficient to power a single reactor for under seven years. Even adding speculative reserves, Iran would run out of uranium soon after completing construction of just seven reactors. Compare Iran to the examples of South Korea and Sweden. South Korea has twenty nuclear power plants. Sweden gets 40 percent of its electricity from nuclear power. Both are advanced countries. Neither enriches uranium. The programs and actions of Iran's leaders are not consistent with a peaceful program. Mr. Chairman, Our goal is to secure a diplomatic solution, one in which the leaders in Tehran provide tangible assurances that they do not seek to acquire atomic weapons. With that goal in mind, we have worked with Europe, Russia, China, and other like-minded countries to present Iran's leaders with a clear choice. The negative choice is for Iran's leaders to maintain their present course, ignoring international concerns and international obligations. If Iran's leadership makes this choice, the Islamic Republic will only incur great costs and lost opportunities. The positive choice, the constructive choice, the choice that would most benefit the Iranian people, is for Iran's leaders to alter their present course and to cooperate in resolving the nuclear issue. This must start by Iran meeting IAEA and Security Council requests to suspend all activities related to uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing, including research and development. These activities, once pursued covertly, and now pursued in contradiction of IAEA resolutions, are not necessary for Iran to enjoy the benefits of civil nuclear power. But they are a necessary step in mastering the technology and acquiring the material and know-how to produce weapons-grade material. Hence our concern. And hence the requirement by the Security Council, the Board, and the six Ministers to suspend these activities. Suspending these activities will allow the Security Council to suspend its action. And suspending these activities will allow the EU3 countries, joined by the United States and others, to open negotiations for a long-term agreement. Such an agreement would both reaffirm and advance Iran's right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including access to nuclear fuel and civil nuclear technology. Such an agreement would also open the prospect for increasing political dialogue and economic cooperation with the rest of the world. This choice will lead to the real benefit and long-term security of the Iranian people. Mr. Chairman, When the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Russia, China, and the United States met here in Vienna two weeks ago, the substance of the message could not have been more clear -- a choice of two paths for the Iranian government: one offering considerable benefits, including peaceful nuclear technology and civil nuclear power; the second bringing to bear the weight of the Security Council. And the delivery of the message could not be more clear: Six Ministers representing Europe, Russia, China, and the United States standing side-by-side, in complete solidarity. We hope that Iran's leaders will think carefully about the proposal from the six Foreign Ministers. We hope that Iran's leaders will think about what is best for the economic prosperity and long-term security of the Iranian people. And we hope that other countries, including all represented here today, will encourage Iran's leaders to make the right choice: a choice for cooperation and negotiation; and a choice to grasp the diplomatic opportunities now being offered. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. SCHULTE