Mongolia's MCA Compact Nears Critical Juncture

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ULAANBAATAR 000809 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR E, EB, EAP/CM, AND EAP/RSP STATE PASS NSC FOR WILDER MCC FOR F. REID AND J. HALLMARK AID FOR ANE/ESA FORD/WINSTON USDOC FOR ZHEN-GONG CROSS TREASURY FOR T.T. YANG;PASS USEDS TO IMF, WORLD BANK MANILA FOR USED TO ADB LONDON FOR USED TO EBRD E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL EAID KMCC ECON MG SUBJECT: Mongolia's MCA Compact Nears Critical Juncture REF: Ulaanbaatar 0790 Sensitive But Unclassified -- Not for Internet distribution. ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Mongolia has submitted a rough draft of a program memo which -- with substantial hard work by both Mongolian and U.S. counterparts over coming months -- may enable a Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) Compact to be signed in early Spring 2007. A Compact will likely involve a significant expansion of bilateral aid (perhaps as much as 30 times our annual non-military assistance levels spread over five years),provide a boost to Mongolia's economic growth in coming years, and be a tangible, significant symbol of U.S. support for this friendly nation transforming from a single party, state-led economy to a multi-party democracy with a market-driven economy. However, it's been a long, bumpy ride since Mongolia was in the first group of MCA eligible countries announced in May 2004. Mongolians are feeling a little road weary, and any further delay in achieving a Compact will become a serious political problem for bilateral relations. Assuming Mongolia makes a good faith effort to bring the Compact to closure -- which they give every indication of doing -- it will be in our own interest, in post's view, to make a maximum effort to ensure a Compact can be signed next Spring. END SUMMARY. Where We Are -------------- ¶2. (U) On October 20 (Washington time),Mongolia's MCA National Council submitted the elements of a draft program memo, drawing from its submission, and retained many of the requisite professional experts outlined in the most recent MCC Aide Memoire. (Note: While MCC asked for a consolidated program memo, the GOM submitted four separate documents on each of the major projects. MCC then combined these into the draft program memo, albeit one without an overall Executive Summary.) MCC set the October 20 date as part of a timeline which could realistically enable signing a Compact in early spring 2007. ¶3. (U) Mongolia's proposal, after much winnowing and due diligence, now consists of four major projects: -- A Health Project to build a national diagnostic and treatment center (DTC) linked to a network of global, national and upgraded rural health centers. -- An Education Project to build a demand-driven, national vocational education system focused initially on up to seven growth industries or sectors. Vocational training programs would help prepare Mongolian workers for jobs in such industries as mining, which is attracting more interest from U.S. investors. -- An Information & Communication technology (ICT) Project, to improve the capacity, reliability and accessibility of Mongolia's ICT network, as well as lower access costs; and -- A Railway Project to improve the capacity and efficiency of Mongolia's main railway artery to secure critical shipments. -- The ICT, Health and Vocational Education proposals are interlocked and reinforce each other: the development of Mongolia's communication technology will help schools and hospitals upgrade their facilities and will permit distance learning and remote diagnosis for those who live in the country's vast rural areas. ¶4. (U) While the GOM did not submit updated materials by October 20, it has indicated that it wants to include two smaller projects in its proposed Compact. Both are an outgrowth of Mongolia's original proposal for the Compact, which included a major housing project, an idea which fell aside during MCC due diligence over the last year. A Housing Finance Project would focus on affordable housing finance for low income ger area residents and strengthen competition in the financial sector with the objective of reducing interest rates. A Property Rights Project would strengthen property rights and improve land management to enable development in ger settlements and surrounding areas. ULAANBAATA 00000809 002 OF 004 A Tangible Demonstration of U.S. Support -------------- ¶5. (SBU) While there are many unknowns pending completion of due diligence and the finalization of the Compact, the projects now on the table could involve MCC investments of US$250-300 million over a five year period. This is about six times what the United States otherwise has spent annually on non-military aid to Mongolia -- through USAID, the proceeds of agricultural commodities donated under PL-480, and regionally and centrally administered aid programs. The five-year total is roughly equal to one year's total of all forms of aid, loans, assistance provided by all donors. The Compact number is also substantial by comparison to Mongolia's $2 billion a year economy, and the projects could provide a significant boost to Mongolian economic growth in future years. In short, a Compact will be a very large and tangible demonstration of U.S. support for a country which has made many right choices since its peaceful democratic revolution in 1990 and its transformation toward a market economy. A Long, Bumpy Ride -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Mongolia was among the first batch of 16 countries announced as eligible in May 2004. Since then, it has watched as ten of its "MCC cohort class" signed compacts, while Mongolia remained mired in the preliminary stage. Even if the current timeline is met, MCC disbursements will not be immediate -- and, in Mongolia's harsh climate, any projects requiring external construction may well not get started until Spring 2008 (the construction season runs from May to October). In Mongolian political terms, that will mean the MCC process will have taken one full, four-year parliamentary election cycle -- with the announcement of Mongolia's eligibility coming just before the June 2004 election, and the start of implementation occurring just prior to the June 2008 elections. For politicians eager to show accomplishments to voters, that seems like an eternity. GOM officials had hoped to sign an agreement in 2006 as part of Mongolia's 800th anniversary celebrations. ¶7. (SBU) Mongolian frustration with this lengthy process is not far beneath the surface. The last grueling year of waves of due deliberation teams has been particularly dyspeptic, with the penciled in date for a Compact signing receding from Fall 2006 to Spring 2007. In August, while discussing Mongolia's deliberations on the size of its 7th six-month troop rotation to Iraq, Foreign Minister Enkhbold asserted that the public perceived a link between the Iraq deployments and MCC, and was increasingly dismayed that the MCC Compact remained only on the distant horizon. In October, explaining why Mongolia was exploring issuing $300-500 million of high yield sovereign debt (Mongolia's first-ever such bond issuance),a central bank official attributed it in part to the delay in receiving MCC funds. Mistakes Were Made -------------- ¶8. (SBU) The frustration and disillusionment is partially a reflection of unrealistic expectations and euphoria after Mongolia was announced as MCC eligible in May 2004. With no precedents to inform them on the new MCA process, Mongolian officials assumed they could whip together a proposal and a large check from the MCC would soon be sent their way to be deposited into the GOM's coffers. They opined that the forthcoming quick MCC cash would allow them to ignore IMF recommendations. ¶9. (SBU) Once disabused of these notions, Mongolia then began its long struggle to prepare a sound MCA proposal, but labored under several major handicaps. First, after the June 2004 elections resulted in a hung parliament, the weak and distracted government made decision making problematic. This was true under both the ULAANBAATA 00000809 003 OF 004 'grand coalition' government -- which had 16 troubled months of existence between September 2004 and January 2006 -- and by the 'government of national unity' which succeeded it. Not a day has passed in the last two years without plausible rumors of the government's imminent demise. Cabinets have suffered from poor discipline, and the governments (and the MCC process) have had been forced to rely on multi-party coalitions, something new for Mongolia's young democracy. In short, while "grand coalition" PM Elbegdorj provided personal support during his term, there has been no strong, well-backed leader or political force which could ensure a taut, disciplined MCA Compact preparation process. ¶10. (SBU) Second, as a government, Mongolia has a notably poor planning capacity. Since 1990, Mongolia has enjoyed one of the highest per capita aid totals in the world -- a cumulative US$1,000 per capita through 2004. However, the prioritization and project planning has been done by donors. Fortunately, the donors talk and coordinate amongst themselves, reducing overlap. Only this month, after sustained cajoling by donors, has democratic Mongolia unveiled its first attempt at a national development strategy (see reftel). MCC's requirements thus were novel ones for Mongolia's government: conduct a broad-based consultative process about possible projects; prioritize and narrow these down; and submit a detailed, economically and financially defensible investment justification. ¶11. (SBU) Mongolia's initial proposal in November 2004 was considered too large and ill-defined; it was returned and Mongolia was advised to rethink and narrow its proposal. Mongolia submitted its revised official MCA proposal in October 2005. At that juncture, six of the original 15 country members of the MCC class of May 2004 had actually signed Compacts, and only Bolivia had yet to submit a proposal. Mongolian officials had spent the previous year running informal proposals by MCC-USA for reaction; unfortunately, these proposals often appeared to be laundry lists of the pet projects of a few influential members on Mongolia's MCA National Council. Behind the scenes, the Council had vicious internal battles and personality splits. The official proposal put forward in October 2005 was improved but still flawed. This meant that MCC-Mongolia started the due diligence phase with a complex proposal which needed substantial work to shape into a viable Compact. ¶12. (SBU) While acknowledging that the process has been a learning experience for them, Mongolian officials have been increasingly assertive in rebutting what they believe are mistaken impressions. First, they reject the notion that Mongolia has devoted few resources to the preparation process. Council members state Mongolia has spent over US$200,000 on its proposal since 2004, which excludes the time spent by government officials on the working groups in each sector. This has represented a substantial investment of manpower and money for a country with tiny ministries with official salaries ranging between US$100-$300 a month. Second, officials complain that the MCC-USA due diligence experts sent by MCC over the last year were "parachuted" into Mongolia for brief periods, that it can be difficult to later obtain feedback on their findings, and the guidance they provide is often conflicting and confusing. The due diligence visits have stretched Mongolia National Council's resources, the officials comment, without necessarily moving the Compact much forward. More than one member of the Council has stated some version of the sentiment that, "if MCC were serious about completing the compact, they would send all the experts out to Mongolia in unison to collaborate with the working groups for an extended period of, say, two or three months. Only that way could we hope to hash out a final plan acceptable to all." ¶13. (SBU) Third, officials have visibly begun to tire of homilies on Mongolia's need to take action to ensure the country stays eligible for MCA assistance. One official recently noted, for example, that Mongolian indeed had taken action to combat corruption through major legislation passed by Parliament in July. He then commented acerbically that he had recently looked through ULAANBAATA 00000809 004 OF 004 Transparency International corruption perception tables, and noted that Georgia, which signed an MCA Compact a year ago, had sharply lower scores than Mongolia. Why, he asked rhetorically, was Mongolia being held to a higher standard? Comment: Too Important to Fail -------------- ¶14. (SBU) In post's view, signing a Compact next year will be a major advance forward for bilateral ties, a fitting achievement for the 20th anniversary year for U.S.-Mongolia diplomatic relations. If a Compact is concluded on time and money soon thereafter disbursed, Mongolia's angst and tribulations of the last two years will be forgotten as the benefits of projects begin to be felt. Rep. Kolbe's visit in early September underlined to the Mongolians that Congress will not tolerate any shortcuts, and will insist that Compacts be well justified. Nevertheless, if Mongolia makes a good faith effort to bring the Compact to closure -- and we believe that the GOM is for the most part doing just that -- it will be imperative that the U.S. also make maximum effort to assist the Mongolians to prepare a satisfactory Compact. Mongolia is a low income country barely a decade and a half away from effective colonial rule by the Soviet Union. If the proposed projects are fundamentally sound, we will be far better served by helping the Mongolians get the project justifications right. Arguing that the Mongolians have not made enough efforts on their own would fall on deaf Mongolian ears and sound self-justifying. It will also be a fundamentally unfair characterization of the high degree of political commitment here to a long-term partnership with the U.S., and of the real effort being made by a large number of harried Mongolian officials to meet our requirements. ¶15. (SBU) As a success or as a lingering failure, the Compact will be a major landmark in bilateral diplomatic relations. Exaggerating a bit, one council member told us, "If the Compact does not come through, America will be finished here." That is hyperbole, but the stakes for the relationship are now very high. Both sides will have to display a firm commitment, and provide the time and personnel for the closest collaboration, to complete this joint endeavor on schedule. Minton