FOREIGN MINISTER ASKS FOR ADVICE ON POSSIBLE DALAI

C O N F I D E N T I A L ULAANBAATAR 000608 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/09/2016 TAGS: PREL SOCI PHUM KIRF MG CH SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER ASKS FOR ADVICE ON POSSIBLE DALAI LAMA VISIT REF: A. ULAANBAAATAR 385 ¶B. 2002 ULAANBAATAR 818 AND PREVIOUS Classified By: Acting DCM Patrick J. Freeman, for reasons 1.5(B) and (D ) ¶1. (U) This is an action request -- please see para 4. ¶2. (C) After an August 9 meeting on another matter, Foreign Minister Enkhbold asked to meet the Ambassador one-on-one. Enkhbold said that Gandan monastery had told the government it wishes to invite the Dalai Lama to Mongolia for a visit this year (ref a). Enkhbold said that the Prime Minister had asked him to make the decision on whether Mongolia should approve the visa -- for a visit by the Dalai Lama in his capacity as a religious leader, not a political leader. Enkhbold said that no date had yet been set for the Dalai Lama's visit, other than it would be this year. He stated that, if a visa were granted, Mongolia hoped the Dalai Lama could transit to Mongolia through Tokyo, as he had in 2002. (Note: In 2002, both Russia and South Korea declined to allow the Dalai Lama to transit. Mongolia's direct connection with Japan is seasonal and ends in September, after which the MIAT flight from Tokyo stops en route in Seoul. Moscow permitted the Dalai Lama to visit the Republic of Kalmikya earlier this year, but he was not permitted to transit Moscow -- or to travel on to Ulaanbaatar.) ¶3. (C) Before he made the decision, the Foreign Minister continued, he hoped to gain a U.S. assessment of the state of China's relations with the Dalai Lama, and any USG views on how Beijing might react to such a visit. He added that he hoped the Chinese would not "over react," as they had to the Dalai Lama's 2002 visit (ref b). (Note: In 2002, the Chinese stopped for "technical reasons" Mongolian freight trains from entering China for two days -- while allowing other international trains to continue crossing.) Enkhbold said his impression is that there had been an easing of tensions this year between the Beijing Government and the Dalai Lama, and some efforts at reconciliation. He wondered how sincere this effort was and whether Beijing and the Dalai Lama had reached any tacit understanding that might mitigate a harsh reaction from the Chinese to a Dalai Lama visit to Mongolia. ¶3. (C) Comment: From our perspective, the Chinese might find it harder today to apply pressure on Mongolia in the event of a visit. While the single north-south rail line is important to Mongolia as its link to goods from and through China, keeping that line open is increasingly vital for the Chinese, as it has become more dependent on raw materials from Russia (e.g., logs). Too, China is aggressively seeking to obtain access to major coal and other mining concessions in Mongolia, but given Mongolian distrust and dislike of the Chinese, this is an uphill battle. Beijing has also become a major source of capital and loans for infrastructure projects, employiing Chinese workers and materials. All in all, Beijing may be reluctant to jeopardize its economic relationship with Mongolia. ¶4. (C) Action request: Embassy asks for information the U.S. is willing share with the Mongolian government regarding our assessment of the recent state of relations between China and the Dalai Lama, and particularly how the Chinese have reacted to possible Dalai Lama visits elsewhere and how they might react to one to Mongolia. SLUTZ