MODERATE ISLAMISTS SEEK DIALOGUE WITH U.S. ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L TUNIS 002155 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS FOR NEA/MAG (HARRIS) E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM TS SUBJECT: MODERATE ISLAMISTS SEEK DIALOGUE WITH U.S. ON DEMOCRATIC REFORM REF: TUNIS 2144 Classified By: CDA David Ballard for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: In a meeting hosted in Tunis by Washington-based Center for Islam and Democracy President Radwan Masmoudi, several self-described "moderate Islamists", including a founding member of the banned Tunisian Islamist party An-Nahdha, sought out Embassy officials to "reopen a dialogue" they claimed had been disrupted after the GOT persecution of An-Nahdha in the early 1990s. While recognizing "great differences" between the USG and Tunisian Islamists, particularly with regard to the recent fighting in Lebanon and the war in Iraq, the Tunisian participants emphasized areas of common interests, zeroing in on the promotion of democracy and human rights in Tunisia. The group gave Emboffs their assurances that they and the organizations they represent are all opposed to the use of violence. End Summary. -------------- Moderate Islamists' Pitch for Dialogue -------------- ¶2. (C/NF) On August 15, Pol/EconCouns and Poloff met with self-described "moderate Tunisian Islamists," including Saida Akremi, of the International Association for the Support of Political Prisoners; Slaheddine Jourchi, a journalist and civil society leader who, while once a member of an-Nahdha, said he had broken with the party due to a number of ideological differences and had become a member of the now defunct Progressive Islamist Party; and Zied Doulatli, a founding member of An-Nahdha who in 2004 was released from prison after serving 15 years, more than half of which were in solitary confinement. The meeting was arranged by Radwan Masmoudi, a Tunisian-American who lives in the U.S. and heads the Washington, D.C.-based Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy. Masmoudi is a long-time Embassy contact and MEPI grantee. ¶3. (C) The moderate Islamists who came together for this meeting made clear that they were seeking out Embassy officials to "reopen a dialogue," with an emphasis on areas of common interest. They expressed that they were pursuing this dialogue, "despite great differences" over U.S. policy in the region, particularly with regard to the recent fighting in Lebanon and the war in Iraq, but also vis-a-vis perceived U.S. support for repressive regimes in the Middle ;East. They claimed that their previously robust relations with the Embassy, which in the mid-1980s had included dialogues with visiting Members of Congress, had been disrupted after the GOT persecution of An-Nahdha in the early 1990s. They gave their assurances that they, along with the groups that they represent, are all opposed to the use of violence. -------------- Tunisia as Model for Democracy -------------- ¶4. (C/NF) Reprising many of our own arguments, Zied Doulatli made the case that Tunisia could serve as a model for democratic reform in the Middle East. As a result of its homogenous nature, he argued, the environment in Tunis was more receptive to democracy than any other Arab country. Acknowledging that he was pointing out the obvious, he noted that Tunisia is not a monarchy, and that it does not have different sects: "We are all Sunni, and all of the Maliki school." Moreover, he said, there are not great differences between the country's intellectual elites, be they secular or Islamist: "We are all graduates of the Bourgiba school, grounded in European values of democracy and human rights." Finally, he said, the fact that Tunisia, unlike other Arab countries, is "ninety percent secular," is an "encouraging factor" with respect to the prospects for the development of genuine democracy. (Comment: The irony of this last statement, coming from an Islamist, was not lost on Emboffs, but if it registered with our interlocutors, they did not let it show. It was all the more so when Doulatli later claimed that, although an-Nahdha did not currently exist as a functional organization in Tunisia, it still enjoyed broad support throughout the country and had won 60 percent of the vote when it ran in the 1989 national election. Most observers estimate the true percentage to be somewhere between 15 and 30 percent. End Comment.) -------------- What's in it for the U.S? -------------- 5.(C/NF) Turning to their perceptions of U.S. interests in the region, the Tunisian meeting participants stated their view that the U.S. needs to re-establish trust and credibility in the Middle East, especially following its perceived acquiescence to Israeli attacks on Lebanese civilians. "For those of us who believe in democracy, watching the events unfold in Lebanon over the last month has been synonymous with torture." Given what they called the damage to the U.S. image in the region, they made the case that the USG "needs" a successful model of democracy in the Middle East. ¶6. (C/NF) Positing that the USG had initially intended that Iraq would serve this purpose, Zied Doulatli reasoned that Tunisia would be a more appropriate model, given that the Arab world tends to equate America's campaign for democracy with the violence and instability that exist in Iraq, which does not make it an enticing proposition on the Arab street. Moreover, he argued, it is in all of our interests to have an alternative to Bin Ladenism. In the absence of democratic space that would allow any kind of alternative, the younger generation is increasingly drawn to jihadist groups, such as al-Qaeda he said, "even in Tunisia. " ¶7. (C) Beyond seeking to re-establish dialogue with the Embassy, the group asked for USG support in the following areas: -- Supporting human rights defenders. (In this context, they expressed appreciation that the United States had been the first country to speak out on behalf of the October 18 hunger strikers.) -- Advocating the release of political prisoners. -- Advocating freedom of movement of several specific moderate Islamist leaders who have been denied passports and/or confined to specific governors. (In some cases family members are penalized, as well.) -- Visiting one such moderate Islamist who is prevented from traveling outside of Sousse. -- Inclusion of moderate Islamists on Embassy guest lists and U.S. visits. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶8. (C/NF) As we conveyed to our interlocutors in this meeting, we were pleased that they took the initiative to reach out to us. Although this was the first formalized approach to the U.S. Embassy by self-described "moderate Islamists," we have met with Jourchi and Akremi; indeed, the President of AISPP, for whom Akremi works, was a guest at Embassy's July 4 reception. In addition, we have often met with contacts with similar political tendencies, such as representatives of the Movement of 18 October. ¶9. (C) As in our August 17 meeting with Tunisian civil society activists (reftel),the participants were clearly genuine in their desire to find common ground, in spite of their strongly held positions regarding recent events in Lebanon and Iraq. We agree with their view that Tunisia has the potential to serve as a positive role model for democratic reform in the region. Indeed, the priority we attach to this goal is reflected in our MPP. Given our experience in trying to encourage this process through a variety of policies and programs, however, we are less sanguine than our interlocutors about the prospects for success in the near term. Post will continue to look for appropriate opportunities to include confirmed moderate Islamists in our outreach, while remaining mindful of GOT sensitivities. (None of our interlocutors is "illegal" in the GOT's eyes, but all are suspect.) We are also mindful of the obvious political motivations of our Islamist interlocutors, given that Doulatli claimed that 60 percent of Tunisians voted for an-Nahdha in 1989. End Comment. BALLARD