LIBYANS DISCUSS NON-PROLIFERATION WITH AMB. SCHULTE - WHERE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000459 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/MAG, NEA/RA, VCI, PM, G E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/31/2016 TAGS: CMGT OVIP PARM KNNP LY SUBJECT: LIBYANS DISCUSS NON-PROLIFERATION WITH AMB. SCHULTE - WHERE ARE THE REWARDS? CLASSIFIED BY: Elizabeth Fritschle, Pol/Econ Chief, U.S. Liaison Office, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Ambassador Schulte conducted extensive discussions on non-proliferation with Libyan officials and the Jamahiriya press August 28-30. The Libyans agreed with our assessment that Iran was working on a weapons program and that it should comply with the IAEA, while stressing that confrontation and deadlines would set back negotiating efforts. Libya anticipates the Iran will use the NAM Summit in Havana to politicize the IAEA report due August 31. Libyans also vented their frustration that there wasn't a "Libya Model" for other countries to follow, based on Libyan perceptions that they have not received tangible rewards for deciding to comply with international norms. If pressed, interlocutors either acknowledge or dismiss our observations of the many advantages that have accrued to Libya since its December 2003 decision to end its WMD programs. Ambassador Schulte met with Secretary of the General People's Committee for Manpower, Training and Employment (GPCMET) Matouq Matouq and Secretary for European Affairs at the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation Abdulati Obeidi, and academics from Al-Fateh University. Ambassador Schulte also held a roundtable discussion with Libyan-based journalists that highlighted U.S. support for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and international concerns over Iran's lack of cooperation with the IAEA. END SUMMARY. LIBYANS CLAIM LIBYA MODEL DOES NOT OFFER ANY REWARDS -------------- -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) In a 75 minute meeting with Matouq Matouq and his science advisors -- Dr. Ali Gashut, Director of the National Bureau for Research and Development (NBRD) and Dr. Mohammed Enami of the NBRD -- Ambassador Schulte heard the Libyan's standard opening gambit, " the Libyan case is not a good model for the rest of the world because Libya received no benefits from its decision to give up WMD programs." Matouq oversaw the Libyan WMD program before heading the GPCMET, and in his current position he oversees the related scientific activities under his very broad "employment" mandate. Matouq said, "I know we tell all the Americans the same thing in every meeting, but it is a basic fact that affects everything else we are trying to do." He told Schulte the Iranians "scorned" Libya for giving up something for nothing, and that within Libya, and especially the scientific community, there was an "internal feeling of resentment." He also described Libyan opposition groups in the U.S. and the UK that criticized the Libyan government for its decision to give up the WMD without negotiating for any concrete rewards. Schulte reminded Matouq that Libya reaped major benefits as sanctions were lifted, trade and investment opportunities flowed to Libya, Libya was offered WTO accession, and world leaders began to consult with Libya on matters of mutual interest. ¶3. (C) Asked for his assessment of the U.S.-Libyan cooperative activities up until this point, including the conversion of the Tajoura facility, Matouq said that the conversion was complete and successful. He hoped it would be fully operational by the end of September with even better performance than before. He was generally pleased with the on-going scientific engagement program focused on biological life sciences, environmental issues, water management, and mechanical engineering, but he and his colleagues were frustrated that there weren't any "deliverables" to show the Libyan people. While admittedly the Libyan priorities are technology transfer and training, they hoped for some specific, large projects that they could show the Libyan public as the "reward." They wanted the U.S. to build Libya a nuclear powered plant to desalinate water or generate electricity, or they wanted the U.S. to build a radioactive isotope production facility at Tripoli Medical Center to support cancer research throughout Africa. Matouq's team has also asked for water management assistance, microsatellites for the Remote Sensing Center to work on environmental monitoring, solar energy technology for power generation or water desalination, and desertification prevention assistance. ¶4. (C) When Schulte reviewed the U.S. Global Energy Partnership framework, Matouq responded, "there can't be a double standard; technologies should be disseminated equally to all countries through the IAEA. The UNSC should engage in more outreach to identify and limit WMD capabilities of all countries, while at the same time encouraging more use of nuclear power as a clean and efficient fuel." Matouq, noting Libya's full compliance with IAEA inspections, called for universal, regular inspections by IAEA officials since human interaction was a critical component of building confidence and "cameras can be adjusted." Matouq said he would attend the IAEA General Conference and would press his views in that forum. IRANIAN INTERNAL POLITICS AND PRESTIGE OF WMD PROGRAMS ARE MOTIVATION -------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) Matouq's primary concern regarding proliferation was the potential diversion of nuclear material rather than enrichment activities by Iran or other countries. He said, "political assurances are not enough given the regular changes in government leadership." In his view, Iran was determined to "use nuclear to its end," whatever that meant -- the end of its fuel cycle, the end of its destructive power? Matouq, while his science advisors nodded their concurrence, said that in Libya's opinion the Iranian actions added up to weapons program development. He believed that the Ayatollah originated the WMD program in the 1980s, following on whatever research programs might have been underway while the Shah ruled Iran. The WMD program was initially deemed critically important to counter Iraq, but now had taken on even greater significance. ¶6. (C) Ambassador Schulte pressed for Libya to make the point forcefully to Iran that moving forward with its WMD program would only lead to isolation and a lack of prestige. Matouq replied that Iranian internal politics were driving its decisions. Iranian dignity is now invested in its nuclear capability. He broadened the discussion to argue that the conflict in Gaza and the war between Israel and Lebanon only encouraged Iranian fanatics, made it easier for the Muslim Brotherhood to recruit members, and fostered the spread of Wahabi radicalism. Matouq said, "continued Israeli killings inflame public opinion; you must not underestimate how this enrages Muslims." Using graphic language, he continued, "Libyans see Israelis hunting human meat using high-tech U.S. weapons and we can not accept this." Ambassador Schulte replied that the leadership in Tehran was encouraging violence. He also recounted the striking coincidence that the Hezbollah kidnapping of Israeli soldiers and missile attacks on Israel happened directly after Iran rebuffed Solana and the negotiating proposals on non-proliferation. When Matouq countered that "if the Israel and Palestinian problems were resolved, Iran would have less room to maneuver," Schulte agreed and added, " we also need to reframe the issue beyond a U.S-Iran debate and reflect the concern of the entire international community. ¶7. (C) In a subsequent session with Libya's IAEA Governor and Secretary for European Affairs at the General People's Committee SIPDIS for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation Abdulati Obeidi, Secretary for American Affairs at the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation Ahmed Fatouri, Acting Americas Director Mohammed Hassan Ayaab of the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation and five academics from Al-Fateh University. As Libya's representative to the IAEA, Obeidi highlighted that Libya took the initiative to end its WMD program and had worked closely with the U.S. and UK since December 2003 to resolve any outstanding concerns. HOW TO ENGAGE WITH IRAN - DEADLINES AND CONFRONTATION WON'T WORK -------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) Obeidi's message was that Libya is in full agreement that the international community must prevent the spread of WMD. It wants to show that differences can be solved through peaceful negotiation. However, Obeidi advised, UNSC resolutions would not lead Iran to give up its program. Pressure, confrontation and challenge only make the Iranians more likely to take a defiant stand in Obeidi's assessment. He believed that Iran would try to avert straightforward compliance requests by converting issues into a political debate about national rights in the NAM and other public fora. "Political groups like the NAM will support the Iranians' position without fully comprehending the technical aspects of the case," Obeidi continued. ¶9. (C) "We agree the Iranians are playing for time," Obeidi said, "but you are helping them; why can there be no discussions on enrichment?" Obeidi said that more realistic positions with specific next steps could gain support, whereas setting a date for sanctions implementation would only strengthen the Iranian defiance. He said Libya was ready to work closely with the U.S. and others at the General Conference and at the NAM to keep Iran moving in the right direction, but that deadlines would not help. ¶10. (C) Ambassador Schulte emphasized to Obeidi and the other participants that Iran was trying to shift the debate from substantive points to a "denial of rights" whereas nuclear power encompassed not only rights but also obligations. Anticipating that Iran would try to highjack the NAM summit in Havana, it was important for other countries to convince them that security, respect and prestige are assured through international cooperation. The U.S. looked to Libya and others to make that point, especially since Iran continued to delay access by IAEA inspectors. Obeidi said that he looked forward to working with Ambassador Schulte in Vienna. LIBYANS FRUSTRATED AT DIFFICULTY OBTAINING U.S. VISAS -------------- -------------- -------------- ¶11. (C) Although the Libyans did not grant the Embassy permission to conduct public diplomacy at Al-Fateh University, the Americas Desk did arrange for five chemistry and engineering professors to sit in on the Obeidi meeting and then host Ambassador Schulte for lunch. The professors were not interested in discussing policy, but did make clear their desire for U.S. funded projects in the fields of science and technology. All but one of the professors studied in the U.S. during the 1960s and hoped that they would be able to visit there again and send more students for graduate work. They noted the extreme difficulty to obtain U.S. visas since most Libyans are unwilling to travel to Tunisia for interviews at the consulate. The academics also acknowledged that most younger Libyans had limited English language skills and might not pass the TOEFL requirements to enter a graduate program. Schulte's carefully crafted presentation resonated with the Libyan interlocutors, even the Al-Fateh University science professors who professed to have no interest in policy. PRESS QUESTIONS U.S. MIDDLE EAST POLICY -------------- -------------- -------------- ¶12. (C) Twenty Libya-based journalists and photographers attended a press roundtable with Ambassador Schulte for an hour-long session on nonproliferation issues. There were also many questions about U.S. policy in the Middle East and the U.S. role in the recent violence in Israel and Lebanon. One reporter queried, "why would Libya give up its relatively good relationship with Iran to align with the U.S. on this issue?" and Ambassador Schulte pointed out that it was not a U.S.-Iran issue, but a matter of grave concern to the international community. The IAEA had a clear position that reflected over three years of review. Several questions focused on the Israeli WMD program and questioned why the U.S. was not emphasizing the need for action against Israel -- with the response that the U.S. would support a Middle East free of nuclear weapons and that progress on the Middle East peace process was an important next step, along with the U.S. vision of two states living side by side in peace. As long as the leadership in Tehran opposes that vision and actively works against peace by trying to spark violence, it is deflecting attention from its lack of compliance with international obligations. Members of the Libyan press contacted Embassy staff after the roundtable to express their appreciation for the Ambassador's outreach efforts, commenting on his effective and thoughtful commentary. ¶13. (U) Ambassador Schulte did not have an opportunity to clear this message before his departure. BERRY