JAPAN-CHINA: CHINA TRYING TO "WALL OFF" YASUKUNI?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 000960

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2026
TAGS: PREL ETRD ECON ENRG USUN PINR CH JA
SUBJECT: JAPAN-CHINA: CHINA TRYING TO "WALL OFF" YASUKUNI?

REF: A. BEIJING 2461


B. TOKYO 00775

C. BEIJING 2981

Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer. Reason: 1.4 (b)(d).


1. (C) Summary. A flurry of political exchanges between
China and Japan and initiatives arising out of the Dai
Bingguo-Yachi "comprehensive policy dialogue" suggest that
China's President Hu Jintao has decided to leave the Yasukuni
issue aside for the time being and to move ahead on multiple
fronts, MOFA China Division Director Izumi told us February

22. While mindful of domestic Chinese constraints on moving
too fast, Hu recognizes the importance of the bilateral
relationship and is now confident enough in his own position
to proceed forward. During the February 10-11 Dai-Yachi
talks, the two sides agreed to Director General-level talks
on UN reform, on cooperation in Africa and on East China Sea
exploration and development, among other initiatives. End
summary.

Dai in Niigata: "I Don't Want to Leave"
--------------


2. (C) The February 10-11 Japan visit by Executive Vice
Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo yielded a number of results,
MOFA China Division Director Hiroyasu Izumi told us February
22 in follow-up to his February 13 preliminary readout of the
visit (ref b). In addition to 15 hours of talks with Vice
Foreign Minister Shotaro Yachi, Dai met separately with FM
Aso, Chief Cabinet Secretary Abe, Lower House Speaker Kono,
Finance Minister Tanigaki, METI Minister Nikai, Komeito
leader Kanzaki and others.


3. (C) Atmospherics for the off-site segment of the visit on
February 11 could not have been better, Izumi observed.
Unable to find a suitably impressive hot springs resort in
his home prefecture of Toyama, Vice Minister Yachi,
reciprocating for a Dai-hosted visit last year to Dai's
native province of Guizhou, hosted Dai at a mountain hot
springs in neighboring Niigata. While not all of the Chinese
delegation took advantage of the communal bath, many from
Beijing did -- and loved it. They particularly enjoyed the
experience of soaking in a hot outdoor pool in the falling
snow. Although Dai did not avail himself of the communal
bath, Izumi reported that Dai loved the mountain scenery and
the picturesque inn and proclaimed that he did not want to
leave. Niigata, Izumi added, has traditionally been friendly
toward China.


4. (C) Despite the fact that much of the discussion over the
two days of talks revolved around the Yasukuni Shrine issue
(reftels),China appears to be trying to "wall off" the
Yasukuni issue from the broader relationship, Izumi reported.
It was evident that the Chinese had met with as many
politically prominent Japanese as possible in hopes of taking
a series of positive messages back to Beijing, he explained.
Reiterating his February 13 remarks, Izumi noted that Dai's
February 10-11 visit was sandwiched between high-level
December meetings in Beijing regarding Japan-China relations
and the convening of the National People's Congress (NPC) on
March 5. Izumi further speculated that President Hu Jintao
is moving forward with consolidation of his position prior to
the 17th Party Congress in 2007; Hu recognizes the
importance, on multiple levels, of maintaining sound
Japan-China relations, but mindful of his political rivals
and an increasingly nationalistic populace, he cannot appear
to be caving in to Japan.

Contending Schools of Thought
--------------


5. (C) Simply put, Izumi explained, there are two broad
schools of thought in China on how Beijing should handle
relations with Japan. One believes that relations between
the United States and China are the best they have ever been
and that China will be able to manage the Taiwan issue.
Consequently, relations with Japan are not particularly
important. So if Koizumi or other Japanese leaders visit
Yasukuni and are thus isolated (including, in the view of
some, from the United States),it really didn't matter a
whole lot. Japan, in their view, would at some point
recognize that it needs to mend fences and try harder. The
other school of thought believes that China needs the
assistance of not only the United States, but also of its
neighbor Japan, to help China overcome difficulties in a
variety of areas, including energy and the environment.

TOKYO 00000960 002 OF 003


Japan is too important to ignore. Hu subscribes to the
latter school of thought, Izumi believes.

Strained Ties: A Legacy of Jiang Zemin
--------------


6. (C) Hu inherited the strained state of bilateral ties from
Jiang Zemin, Izumi asserted. According to the analysis of
several Chinese academic acquaintances of Izumi, Jiang made
two fundamental mistakes that continue to hobble bilateral
relations. First, during a period when historical issues,
Taiwan and territorial issues were the primary sources of
tension, Jiang emphasized historical issues. Second, it was
Jiang who first linked Koizumi's Yasukuni Shrine visits to
high-level meetings. Now, Hu Jintao has to deal with the
mess. (Izumi allowed that PM Koizumi has also done his fair
share to complicate the issue.) Now that Hu has been able to
acquire enough influence to assert authority in a number of
areas, he is looking for ways to do the same in China's
relations with Japan. To that end, Izumi continued, Hu sent
Dai, whom the Japanese regard as a reliable direct channel to
Hu, to Japan with a mandate to bring back a "positive
message" prior to the preparatory meetings for the NPC.

Dai: Seeking Positive Feedback
--------------


7. (C) As reported reftels, Dai asked all his interlocutors
the same basic question, Izumi explained. How does Japan
view China's rise: As a competitor or a cooperative partner
or a strategic rival? Yachi's response was unequivocal,
Izumi stated. Japan welcomes China's economic development
and hopes to share with it the fruits of prosperity. As
Prime Minister Koizumi had said, Japan views China as an
opportunity. But at the same time, Yachi had stressed, Japan
need's Chinese transparency. All of Dai's interlocutors
provided basically the same positive message, Izumi stated.
Asked if even FM Aso and CCS Abe, noted hawks, had been
positive, Izumi said they had. He sheepishly elaborated
that, confidentially, MOFA had been a little hesitant in
approaching the two for appointments with Dai, who is lower
in protocol order. MOFA was a little concerned, he admitted,
that they might decline. In the event, MOFA briefed them
both in advance on why Dai was visiting and what he hoped to
hear. In the end, both Abe and Aso delivered "good" messages.


8. (C) Asked if he believed U.S. expressions of concern about
the state of Japan-China relations had affected China's
approach, Izumi responded obliquely by pointing to what he
termed a "sequence of events:"

-- High-level meetings in Beijing regarding the bilateral
relationship;

-- Tang Jiaxuan's February 8 comments to the LDP's Takeshi
Noda that China had basically given up on Koizumi;

-- Politburo member Li Changchun's recent remarks to Diet
member and LDP leader Hidenao Nakagawa that China envisions
broad prospects for future cooperation, including in the
areas of energy, the environment and rapid transportation;

-- Trade Minister Toshihiro Nikai's current visit to Beijing
to discuss the East China Sea energy exploration dispute,
including a meeting with Premier Wen Jiabao;

-- The National People's Congress from March 5, and the
address by Wen that will likely address foreign policy issues;

-- Former PM (and friend of China) Hashimoto's late-March
visit to China.

Izumi believes the sub-text of this flurry of visits is that
China wants to wall-off the Yasukuni issue, deal with it
separately from the broader Japan-China bilateral agenda and
create a political atmosphere that will lead to improved
relations. President Hu will be able to reassure President
Bush during his April U.S. visit that relations between China
and Japan are okay, he surmised.

Forging Ahead
--------------


9. (C) Looking ahead, Izumi previewed a series of
initiatives arising out of the Dai-Yachi "Comprehensive
Policy Dialogue" (called the China-Japan Strategic Dialogue"
by Beijing). Unable to compromise on Yasukuni and engage at

TOKYO 00000960 003 OF 003


the leaders' level, the Chinese seemed determined to engage
on every other level during the Dai visit, Izumi remarked.
While Dai and Yachi were holding their 15 hours of talks over
two days, Jing Dunquan, vice chair of the China-Japan
Friendship Association was making the rounds in Tokyo,
drumming up support within the Japanese business community
and elsewhere. Separately, apparently having been given the
green light by Hu to pursue a more active people-to-people
exchange, Vice Minister of Culture Meng Xiaosi presented
Japan with a three-page long list of cultural activities to
be held in Japan this year as part of a China "culture year"
in Japan, funded by China. A Japan "culture year" will
follow in China in 2007. Already in 2006, each country will
send over 1,000 high school students to the other for
week-long home stays, an initiative funded earlier by Japan.


10. (C) On the official level, the two sides agreed to pursue
a series of Director General-level talks under the umbrella
of the Dai-Yachi dialogue. These will include separate
meetings on UN reform, cooperation in Africa, and resource
exploration and development in the East China Sea. On the
latter issue, both sides recognize that joint exploration and
development is the only feasible solution, Izumi averred.
Now that Cui Tiankai has been promoted to Assistant Foreign
Minister, new MFA Asia Department DG Hu Zhengyao, former PRC
ambassador to Malaysia, will lead the Chinese team. This a
positive development for Japan; Izumi believed. Cui had been
difficult to deal with; Hu appears to be more reasonable, he
opined.

Comment
--------------


11. (C) Director Izumi, a member of MOFA's "China School,"
has often presented an optimistic analysis of Japan-China
relations and his comments noted above are no exception.
Embassy Beijing will have its own views on President Hu's
intentions toward Japan-China ties, but it seems reasonable
to us that the PRC would begin working now to put in place
the foundation for improving bilateral relations with PM
Koizumi's successor. The Yasukuni question and the problem
of history will not be easily or quickly resolved, but it is
a good sign that Beijing may have realized the drawbacks to
letting Yasukuni monopolize the agenda with Japan.
SCHIEFFER