JAPAN-CHINA: CHINA TRYING TO "WALL OFF" YASUKUNI?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 000960 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2026 TAGS: PREL ETRD ECON ENRG USUN PINR CH JA SUBJECT: JAPAN-CHINA: CHINA TRYING TO "WALL OFF" YASUKUNI? REF: A. BEIJING 2461 ¶B. TOKYO 00775 ¶C. BEIJING 2981 Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer. Reason: 1.4 (b)(d). ¶1. (C) Summary. A flurry of political exchanges between China and Japan and initiatives arising out of the Dai Bingguo-Yachi "comprehensive policy dialogue" suggest that China's President Hu Jintao has decided to leave the Yasukuni issue aside for the time being and to move ahead on multiple fronts, MOFA China Division Director Izumi told us February ¶22. While mindful of domestic Chinese constraints on moving too fast, Hu recognizes the importance of the bilateral relationship and is now confident enough in his own position to proceed forward. During the February 10-11 Dai-Yachi talks, the two sides agreed to Director General-level talks on UN reform, on cooperation in Africa and on East China Sea exploration and development, among other initiatives. End summary. Dai in Niigata: "I Don't Want to Leave" -------------- ¶2. (C) The February 10-11 Japan visit by Executive Vice Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo yielded a number of results, MOFA China Division Director Hiroyasu Izumi told us February 22 in follow-up to his February 13 preliminary readout of the visit (ref b). In addition to 15 hours of talks with Vice Foreign Minister Shotaro Yachi, Dai met separately with FM Aso, Chief Cabinet Secretary Abe, Lower House Speaker Kono, Finance Minister Tanigaki, METI Minister Nikai, Komeito leader Kanzaki and others. ¶3. (C) Atmospherics for the off-site segment of the visit on February 11 could not have been better, Izumi observed. Unable to find a suitably impressive hot springs resort in his home prefecture of Toyama, Vice Minister Yachi, reciprocating for a Dai-hosted visit last year to Dai's native province of Guizhou, hosted Dai at a mountain hot springs in neighboring Niigata. While not all of the Chinese delegation took advantage of the communal bath, many from Beijing did -- and loved it. They particularly enjoyed the experience of soaking in a hot outdoor pool in the falling snow. Although Dai did not avail himself of the communal bath, Izumi reported that Dai loved the mountain scenery and the picturesque inn and proclaimed that he did not want to leave. Niigata, Izumi added, has traditionally been friendly toward China. ¶4. (C) Despite the fact that much of the discussion over the two days of talks revolved around the Yasukuni Shrine issue (reftels),China appears to be trying to "wall off" the Yasukuni issue from the broader relationship, Izumi reported. It was evident that the Chinese had met with as many politically prominent Japanese as possible in hopes of taking a series of positive messages back to Beijing, he explained. Reiterating his February 13 remarks, Izumi noted that Dai's February 10-11 visit was sandwiched between high-level December meetings in Beijing regarding Japan-China relations and the convening of the National People's Congress (NPC) on March 5. Izumi further speculated that President Hu Jintao is moving forward with consolidation of his position prior to the 17th Party Congress in 2007; Hu recognizes the importance, on multiple levels, of maintaining sound Japan-China relations, but mindful of his political rivals and an increasingly nationalistic populace, he cannot appear to be caving in to Japan. Contending Schools of Thought -------------- ¶5. (C) Simply put, Izumi explained, there are two broad schools of thought in China on how Beijing should handle relations with Japan. One believes that relations between the United States and China are the best they have ever been and that China will be able to manage the Taiwan issue. Consequently, relations with Japan are not particularly important. So if Koizumi or other Japanese leaders visit Yasukuni and are thus isolated (including, in the view of some, from the United States),it really didn't matter a whole lot. Japan, in their view, would at some point recognize that it needs to mend fences and try harder. The other school of thought believes that China needs the assistance of not only the United States, but also of its neighbor Japan, to help China overcome difficulties in a variety of areas, including energy and the environment. TOKYO 00000960 002 OF 003 Japan is too important to ignore. Hu subscribes to the latter school of thought, Izumi believes. Strained Ties: A Legacy of Jiang Zemin -------------- ¶6. (C) Hu inherited the strained state of bilateral ties from Jiang Zemin, Izumi asserted. According to the analysis of several Chinese academic acquaintances of Izumi, Jiang made two fundamental mistakes that continue to hobble bilateral relations. First, during a period when historical issues, Taiwan and territorial issues were the primary sources of tension, Jiang emphasized historical issues. Second, it was Jiang who first linked Koizumi's Yasukuni Shrine visits to high-level meetings. Now, Hu Jintao has to deal with the mess. (Izumi allowed that PM Koizumi has also done his fair share to complicate the issue.) Now that Hu has been able to acquire enough influence to assert authority in a number of areas, he is looking for ways to do the same in China's relations with Japan. To that end, Izumi continued, Hu sent Dai, whom the Japanese regard as a reliable direct channel to Hu, to Japan with a mandate to bring back a "positive message" prior to the preparatory meetings for the NPC. Dai: Seeking Positive Feedback -------------- ¶7. (C) As reported reftels, Dai asked all his interlocutors the same basic question, Izumi explained. How does Japan view China's rise: As a competitor or a cooperative partner or a strategic rival? Yachi's response was unequivocal, Izumi stated. Japan welcomes China's economic development and hopes to share with it the fruits of prosperity. As Prime Minister Koizumi had said, Japan views China as an opportunity. But at the same time, Yachi had stressed, Japan need's Chinese transparency. All of Dai's interlocutors provided basically the same positive message, Izumi stated. Asked if even FM Aso and CCS Abe, noted hawks, had been positive, Izumi said they had. He sheepishly elaborated that, confidentially, MOFA had been a little hesitant in approaching the two for appointments with Dai, who is lower in protocol order. MOFA was a little concerned, he admitted, that they might decline. In the event, MOFA briefed them both in advance on why Dai was visiting and what he hoped to hear. In the end, both Abe and Aso delivered "good" messages. ¶8. (C) Asked if he believed U.S. expressions of concern about the state of Japan-China relations had affected China's approach, Izumi responded obliquely by pointing to what he termed a "sequence of events:" -- High-level meetings in Beijing regarding the bilateral relationship; -- Tang Jiaxuan's February 8 comments to the LDP's Takeshi Noda that China had basically given up on Koizumi; -- Politburo member Li Changchun's recent remarks to Diet member and LDP leader Hidenao Nakagawa that China envisions broad prospects for future cooperation, including in the areas of energy, the environment and rapid transportation; -- Trade Minister Toshihiro Nikai's current visit to Beijing to discuss the East China Sea energy exploration dispute, including a meeting with Premier Wen Jiabao; -- The National People's Congress from March 5, and the address by Wen that will likely address foreign policy issues; -- Former PM (and friend of China) Hashimoto's late-March visit to China. Izumi believes the sub-text of this flurry of visits is that China wants to wall-off the Yasukuni issue, deal with it separately from the broader Japan-China bilateral agenda and create a political atmosphere that will lead to improved relations. President Hu will be able to reassure President Bush during his April U.S. visit that relations between China and Japan are okay, he surmised. Forging Ahead -------------- ¶9. (C) Looking ahead, Izumi previewed a series of initiatives arising out of the Dai-Yachi "Comprehensive Policy Dialogue" (called the China-Japan Strategic Dialogue" by Beijing). Unable to compromise on Yasukuni and engage at TOKYO 00000960 003 OF 003 the leaders' level, the Chinese seemed determined to engage on every other level during the Dai visit, Izumi remarked. While Dai and Yachi were holding their 15 hours of talks over two days, Jing Dunquan, vice chair of the China-Japan Friendship Association was making the rounds in Tokyo, drumming up support within the Japanese business community and elsewhere. Separately, apparently having been given the green light by Hu to pursue a more active people-to-people exchange, Vice Minister of Culture Meng Xiaosi presented Japan with a three-page long list of cultural activities to be held in Japan this year as part of a China "culture year" in Japan, funded by China. A Japan "culture year" will follow in China in 2007. Already in 2006, each country will send over 1,000 high school students to the other for week-long home stays, an initiative funded earlier by Japan. ¶10. (C) On the official level, the two sides agreed to pursue a series of Director General-level talks under the umbrella of the Dai-Yachi dialogue. These will include separate meetings on UN reform, cooperation in Africa, and resource exploration and development in the East China Sea. On the latter issue, both sides recognize that joint exploration and development is the only feasible solution, Izumi averred. Now that Cui Tiankai has been promoted to Assistant Foreign Minister, new MFA Asia Department DG Hu Zhengyao, former PRC ambassador to Malaysia, will lead the Chinese team. This a positive development for Japan; Izumi believed. Cui had been difficult to deal with; Hu appears to be more reasonable, he opined. Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) Director Izumi, a member of MOFA's "China School," has often presented an optimistic analysis of Japan-China relations and his comments noted above are no exception. Embassy Beijing will have its own views on President Hu's intentions toward Japan-China ties, but it seems reasonable to us that the PRC would begin working now to put in place the foundation for improving bilateral relations with PM Koizumi's successor. The Yasukuni question and the problem of history will not be easily or quickly resolved, but it is a good sign that Beijing may have realized the drawbacks to letting Yasukuni monopolize the agenda with Japan. SCHIEFFER