JAPAN-ROK RELATIONS: STRONG EMOTIONS WON'T SHAKE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TOKYO 000925 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR JA KS SUBJECT: JAPAN-ROK RELATIONS: STRONG EMOTIONS WON'T SHAKE FIRM COMMON GROUND REF: A. SEOUL 03719 ¶B. TOKYO 04926 Classified By: AMBASSADOR J. THOMAS SCHIEFFER. REASONS: 1.4 (b),(d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: While acknowledging bad relations at the top caused in large part by PM Koizumi's controversial visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, political, academic and diplomatic experts on ROK-Japan relations contacted in the run-up to Shimane Prefecture's February 22 "commemoration" of Takeshima Day point to: -- a rise in bilateral trade and investment; -- flourishing cultural exchanges, including 690 programs commemorating the 40th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic ties; -- Japan's decision to eliminate the visa requirement for South Korean citizens. The overall consensus is that strong emotions over historical issues (Yasukuni Shrine, textbooks, and the Takeshima/Tokdo) won't shake the firm common ground that exists between the two countries. END SUMMARY Fundamentally Like-Minded -------------- ¶2. (C) Despite headlines over the past year suggesting dramatically deteriorating bilateral ties, relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea remain firmly rooted in common ground and are thriving at most levels of society in the view of leading Korean experts resident in Japan. The country's foremost expert on Japan-Korea affairs, a Japanese lawmaker of Korean ancestry, and knowledgeable Japanese and South Korean diplomats stationed in Tokyo all agree that while political relations between Tokyo and Seoul have become embittered at the highest level over persistent historical issues, economic and cultural interactions between the two countries are robust and on the rise. ¶3. (C) The most attention-grabbing feature of Japan-ROK relations is the current dispute between Prime Minister Koizumi and President Roh over historical concerns, but now that South Korea has become a fully-democratized country with a highly developed economy, there is "no fundamental regime friction" between the two countries, in the view of Keio University Professor Masao Okonogi, Japan's leading scholar on the subject. Professor Okonogi's view was echoed in separate recent meetings with Japanese-Korean Diet member Shin Kun Haku, MOFA Northeast Asia Division Principal Deputy Kosei Murota, who headed the ministry's South Korean Affairs unit for the past two years, and First Secretary and Political Officer Chung Byong-won of the South Korean Embassy in Japan. In the words of Murota, "Resolving our historical dispute will not be easy, but the truth is by any measure Japan and the ROK are fundamentally like-minded countries with compatible governmental and societal structures." Cracks in the Foundation -------------- ¶4. (C) That said, the experts consulted for this report also agree that the tectonic plates that underlie the respective domestic political systems in Japan and South Korea have begun to grind up against one another in recent years. As a result, several political tremors have shaken the overall solid structure of relations between the two countries. While experts believe it is highly unlikely a "big one" will someday shake the two countries apart, they point to worrisome cracks in the relationship's foundation. ¶5. (C) The elimination of Japanese ODA to South Korea has affected political ties, according to Upper House Councillor Haku, an ethnic Korean member of the Japanese Diet who spent nearly 20 years working for the Chosun Ilbo (Korea Daily News) in both Tokyo and Seoul. Haku claimed that in the days of generous ODA, leading ROK politicians regularly siphoned off large amounts for themselves, while providing "kickbacks" to their counterparts in Tokyo. Whenever an issue threatened TOKYO 00000925 002 OF 004 to disrupt relations, influential lawmakers on both sides would put a stop to it because they shared a mutual desire to sustain this "self-supporting arrangement." This, however, is no longer the case. ¶6. (C) Councillor Haku cited three additional factors he believes have contributed to the weakening of political ties between the two countries: 1) Generational change. Now 60 percent of ROK National Assembly members were newly elected in the last election; they lack the ties developed over the years by their predecessors. 2) Lack of a common language. Many Koreans learned to speak Japanese during the colonial occupation; the younger generation lacks that skill. 3) Rising nationalism in both countries. Today, politicians must rely more on domestic sources for their political funds, Haku said. "Unfortunately, they've discovered that using nationalistic rhetoric is one of the best ways to raise money." Yasukuni and a Sense of Betrayal -------------- ¶7. (C) Our contacts generally agreed that Koizumi's pledge to visit the controversial Yasukuni Shrine as prime minister has done the most to rattle relations between the two countries. Koizumi had already visited Yasukuni when he met with then-President Kim Dae-jung for their first summit in October ¶2001. While Kim had agreed to meet in the interest of looking to the future, rather than the past, Koizumi's visit to Yasukuni required that he address Korea's historical concerns at that summit. It was for that reason that Kim proposed the creation of the Japan-ROK Joint History Project, Okonogi said. Koizumi separately told Kim that he would "look into" a proposal that Japan create a separate "national cemetery" that would exclude the spirits of the Class A war criminals. ¶8. (C) Okonogi, whom Koizumi consulted in preparation for that summit, contends that Kim's successor, Roh Moo-hyun, entered office with a relatively positive view of Koizumi because of what Roh took to be Koizumi's "promise" to Kim to resolve the Yasukuni issue through the creation of a national cemetery, as well as his pleasure over Koizumi's decision to meet with Kim Jong-il in Pyongyang. Roh, however, wound up feeling personally betrayed when Koizumi later "dropped" the national cemetery proposal and persisted with his annual visits to Yasukuni. ¶9. (C) Many in Japan, on the other hand, felt betrayed by the ROK, according to MOFA Northeast Asia Division Director Naoki Ito. According to Ito, MOFA Asia Bureau Director General Kenichiro Sasae for example was "outraged" to learn that Roh, for his own domestic political gain, intended to "break the deal" the Japanese government had hammered out with Roh's predecessor, Kim. Ito reports that Sasae, who had directed the MOFA division responsible for South Korean Affairs during the Kim Dae-jung administration, had worked hard to negotiate an arrangement whereby both governments agreed to "put the historical issues in a box" in the interest of moving the relationship forward. It is now MOFA's widely held belief that Roh broke that agreement when he "decided to re-open the box," Ito explained. Sasae, who considered forward progress in Japan-ROK relations to be his most significant diplomatic achievement, felt personally betrayed. The Takeshima/Tokdo Dispute -------------- ¶10. (C) While President Roh appears to have exploited his country's historical dispute with Japan for domestic political reasons, it was Japan's Shimane Prefecture and a Japanese diplomat in Seoul who lit the fuse for him. On February 23, 2005, the Shimane Prefecture's Prefectural Assembly introduced an ordinance, which it later passed, that henceforth designated February 22 as "Takeshima Day." The action was designed to commemorate the 100th anniversary of Japan's annexation of Takeshima Island in February 1905. The island (known as Tokdo in Korean) is an emotional issue for Koreans because its annexation by the Japanese is associated with the beginning of Imperial Japan's harsh colonial rule of the Korean Peninsula. South Korea immediately protested the TOKYO 00000925 003 OF 004 proposed ordinance. Later that same day, Japan's Ambassador to the ROK added fuel to the fire when he stated, in answer to a question, that Takeshima is "historically and legally Japanese territory." According to Okonogi, that statement was "the last straw" for Roh who, according to Okonogi's contacts in the South Korean government, "got very angry." The result was Roh's rather passionate March 23, 2005 "Message to the Nation Concerning Korea-Japan Relations" in which he warned of a "merciless diplomatic war with Japan." 2005 Japan-ROK Year of Friendship -------------- ¶11. (C) Yet even during this highly-charged period, there was plenty of evidence the Japan-ROK relationship would weather the storm. Although Ambassador Takano was replaced, diplomatic relations continued without little interruption. Neither side called for punitive actions. On the contrary, Japan-ROK trade grew that year to a record level. At the same time, direct flights between Haneda and Kimpo doubled to eight jumbo jets a day, while the most popular television show in Japan was the Korean drama, Winter Sonata. ¶12. (C) In 2005, Japan and the ROK went on to jointly commemorate the 40th anniversary of the normalization of Japan-ROK diplomatic ties. The shared goal of this "Japan-ROK Year of Friendship" was to deepen mutual understanding by conducting exchange programs in cultural, economic and social areas. In the end, 690 programs were jointly held. These included investment promotion efforts, exchanges between local municipalities, home stay programs and soccer matches. These goodwill activities generated favorable comment by political leaders and media organizations in both capitals; so much so that both sides commonly describe Japan-ROK relations as "politically cold" but "culturally hot." As a result of a successful pilot project conducted during that festival year, the Japanese government announced in January 2006 that South Korean citizens would no longer require visas to visit Japan. Strong Emotions Won't Shake the Common Ground -------------- ¶13. (C) Most of our contacts predicted that the first observance of "Takeshima Day" by the Shimane Prefecture on February 22, 2006 would pass in a calmer fashion than a year earlier. Because the event has been anticipated, both governments will try to keep their diplomatic relations on an even keel as they weather the occasion. The more troublesome date may be the Spring festival at Yasukuni Shrine, Professor Okonogi warned. Northeast Asia Principal Deputy Murota cautioned that the South Korean government is headed into a "political season" (regional elections in March) when ROK politicians will be tempted to score domestic political points at the further expense of Japan-ROK relations. Despite inevitable bumps in the road ahead, none of the experts we spoke with pointed to any real "potholes." Most agreed that the bumpiness of the road will depend on steps taken by both sides to address historical concerns in a constructive manner. Joint Committee on History Research -------------- ¶14. (C) To date, the primary process by which Japan and the ROK are working together to address their historical dispute is through the Japan-ROK Joint Committee on History Research. Professor Okonogi, a founding member of that committee, explained that during the October 2001 summit meeting between PM Koizumi and then-President Kim Dae-jung, the two leaders agreed to establish a forum for experts to discuss what would constitute a mutual understanding of historical events. The first round of committee meetings (May 2002-May 2005) clarified the areas in which there is a difference of opinion and where there is agreement. The second round, now underway, will tackle the history textbook issue. According to Okonogi, the committee will release that report in the fall of 2008. He agreed that differing historical interpretations will prove difficult to resolve, but noted that participants from both countries appear genuinely committed to finding a solution. TOKYO 00000925 004 OF 004 Uncertain Political Equation -------------- ¶15. (C) Diplomats from both countries observed that the dramatic swing to the left in South Korean politics, coincident with a definite swing to the right in Japan, has exacerbated the ideological divide between Tokyo and Seoul. Councillor Haku noted that the swing to the left in South Korean politics has been so pronounced that even members of his own opposition Democratic Party of Japan have found it difficult to relate to members of Korea's ruling Uri Party. Asked whether the ROKG's left-leaning policy approach will likely change when a new president takes office at the end of Roh's term, Professor Okonogi replied that it is bound to swing back towards the center "because they can't go any further left." While the so-called "386 Generation" of progressives influences the current Roh government, he said, they are driven more by domestic economic factors - jobs, re-distribution of wealth, and regional influence -- than by foreign policy or ideological concerns. ¶16. (C) In the meantime, it is uncertain who will replace Koizumi as Japan's next prime minister in the fall. While a change at the top could allow Japan to make a fresh start with Roh, ROK Embassy officials voiced concern over the list of likely successors. At a lunch with the Ambassador in September, ROK Ambassador Ra Jong-il said he has noticed a "disturbing recent phenomena" in Japanese political circles, including increasingly frequent articles in the mainstream media questioning the results of the "Tokyo Tribunal." From the Korean perspective, Koizumi's visits to Yasukuni imply that Japanese leaders are moving in the direction of denying the validity of the verdicts handed out by the war crimes tribunal. Okonogi disagrees, stating that Koizumi remains "within the post-war consensus," but acknowledged that his visits to Yasukuni have confused that message. ¶17. (C) More disturbing for the ROK, Okonogi suggested, is the fact that Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe has so far "obscured" his position on the issue by saying the interpretation of history is a job for historians. Abe, Okonogi added, may be "outside the post-war consensus." According to ROK Embassy First Secretary Chung, an even bigger concern within the ROKG is that Foreign Minister Taro Aso might become PM. That is because the Aso family is well known for having used forced Korean labor in its mines during the war, Chung explained. He also pointed out more recent concerns, such as the Foreign Minister's comment on January 28th that it was "desirable" for the Emperor to visit Yasukuni Shrine. Summing up the situation for reporters on February 15, Ambassador Ra stated that as long as top Japanese officials continue to visit the shrine, it will be "impossible" for Seoul and Tokyo to maintain "normal ties." Nonetheless, the dispute over historical issues should not get in the way of "practical diplomatic exchanges." The two countries are now discussing dates for their next round of vice-ministerial talks, Ra reported. SCHIEFFER