DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 02/14/06-2

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 TOKYO 000796

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SUBJECT: DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 02/14/06-2

INDEX:

(8) Japan-North Korea talks: North Korea abandons moratorium on
missile launching: Pyongyang declaration stripped of meaning

(9) SDP to adopt first party platform 10 years since name change,
underscoring determination to narrow income disparity

(10) Truth behind Ehime Maru incident: US Navy brass sealed off
disadvantageous evidence; Responsibility for nuke submarine tour
not accounted for; Double tragedies combining fatal incident and
sharing of same lawyers

(11) Foreign Ministry perplexed by the use of name cards with
title of vice minister by some parliamentary secretaries

(12) Truth about replacement of defense bureau deputy director
general

(13) Housecleaning at MOFA

ARTICLES:

(8) Japan-North Korea talks: North Korea abandons moratorium on
missile launching: Pyongyang declaration stripped of meaning

SANKEI (Page 1) (Full)
February 11, 2006

It has been learned that Pyongyang had told Japan during the
bilateral talks with Japan, held in Beijing from Feb. 4 through
8, its intention to abandon a moratorium on missile launching,
according to several sources informed of Japan-North Korea
relations. The North's commitment to freeze missile launching is
mentioned in the Japan-North Korea Pyongyang Declaration, issued
in 2002. Pyongyang's move is viewed as motivated by the desire to
overshadow the abduction incident, by bringing a nuclear and
missile issue to the Japanese side's attention, as well as to
obtain economic assistance from it. The move will in effect strip
the Pyongyang Declaration of its meaning. The government will
likely be pressed to make a more difficult response in the
future.

The said talks concurrently discussed the abduction issue,
normalization of diplomatic ties and the missile issue. The
nuclear and missile issue was discussed on the morning of Feb. 7.

According to a source informed of bilateral relations, the
Japanese side during the meeting called on Pyongyang to totally
scrap its nuclear weapons and nuclear development program, as
well as to completely abandon ballistic missiles. The North
Korean side, however, rejected Japan's requests. On the contrary,
it declared to the Japanese side, "We want Japan to think that
there is no longer a moratorium on missile launching." It thus
indicated that it was ready to launch a missile at any time.

The Japanese side urged the North Korean side to live up to the
Pyongyang Declaration, but Pyongyang reportedly remained
unchanged.

The Japan-North Korea Pyongyang Declaration mentions that North
Korea expressed its readiness to extend the moratorium on missile
launching after 2003 as well. A Japanese government source is

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increasingly becoming alarmed about the development of the
matter, noting, "North Korea has clarified its intention to
abandon the Pyongyang Declaration."

With North Korea, which continues to turn a blind eye to the
abduction issue, taking on a more hard-line stance on the missile
issue, Japan's domestic front is bound to intensify its call for
applying pressure on that nation, including economic sanctions.
Referring to the possibility of applying pressure on North Korea,
Foreign Minister Taro Aso during a press conference on Feb. 10
noted, "It is true that many proposals have been floated in the
ministry."

North Korea's nuclear and missile issue has been on the agenda at
the six-party talks, including Japan, the US and China, as well.
North Korea's indication of a stance of rejecting the moratorium
on missile launching will likely affect the fate of the six-party
talks.

In 1998, North Korea test-launched a Taepodong-I with a range of
about 2,500 kilometers, and part of the missile came down in the
Pacific Ocean, passing over Japan.

(9) SDP to adopt first party platform 10 years since name change,
underscoring determination to narrow income disparity

ASAHI (Page 4) (Full)
February 11, 2006

In its convention that starts today, the Social Democratic Party
(SDP) will adopt a declaration for the first time in the 10 years
since the opposition party changed its name. Some have become
critical of the Koizumi administration's structural reforms in
the wake of the Livedoor scandal. The SDP will set forth the
slogan of "a society with a narrow gap between rich and poor" as
part of efforts to underscore its different policy stance from
the Koizumi administration's neo-liberalism, based on which the
administration has promoted reforms. The SDP tends to convey only
the image of a supporter of the current Constitution, so the
party aims to increase support by bringing this slogan to the
fore. In order to realize it, the party must work out specific
measures.

Key points in the draft SDF declaration

Following is a partial text of the final draft of SDP declaration
to be adopted in its convention today.

Aim to create a peaceful society with no gaps

Under neo-conservatism, specific values are imposed on people,
given market-oriented neo-liberalism, as well as strong
political, economic, and military power. There is now a neo-
conservative tendency in the nation. Our party stresses the
importance of fairness and cooperation in society and proposes
reforming the current society into another society. We aim to
create a society that reflects the principles of the Constitution
and gives priority to preventing the income gap from widening.

Our social democracy

We open the door to all people. Our key principles are "peace,
freedom, equality, and coexistence." Our party considers our

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nation's history as a victimizer that invaded other Asian
countries and placed them under our colonial rule and as a victim
of atomic bombings.

Basic policy tasks

Our party aims to establish a fair market-oriented economy placed
under social regulations. Labor is indispensable for self-
fulfillment. We guarantee the principle of equal compensation for
equal work. We also respect various working styles. Our party
will take measures to raise the maximum income and residential
tax rates, strengthen graduated taxation, and review the
corporate tax.

Based on the spirit of the United Nations Charter, as well as the
Preamble and Article 9 of the Constitution, our party will work
hard to denuclearize Northeast Asia and to create a security
mechanism in the region. The presence of the Self-Defense Forces
(SDF) apparently infringes on the Constitution, so we will scale
down and reorganize the SDF into groups engaged in border
security, disaster relief, and international cooperation, in an
effort to make the region free from any nuclear threat. Our party
will change the Japan-US Security Treaty into a peace treaty.

We thoroughly protect the freedom of speech. We also aim to
reform the present electoral system to give priority to
proportional representation over the single-seat constituency
system.

Roadmap to reforms

The SDP will surely provide an opportunity for every citizen to
equally take part in society. We aim to establish a social
democratic government by joining hands with small- and medium-
sized firms, individual shopkeepers, workers in primary
industries, and those engaged in civic movements. We aim at
forming a coalition government while keeping our own policy
identity.

(10) Truth behind Ehime Maru incident: US Navy brass sealed off
disadvantageous evidence; Responsibility for nuke submarine tour
not accounted for; Double tragedies combining fatal incident and
sharing of same lawyers

TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 26) (Abridged slightly)
February 11, 2006

February 10 marked the fifth anniversary of the Ehime Maru's
fatal collision with the USS Greeneville off Hawaii. American
lawyer Peter Erlinder, 57, and his journalist wife Masako Usui,
51, have coauthored a book titled The Ehime Maru Incident, which
was published by Shin Nihon Publishing Co. The Tokyo Shimbun's
Masatomo Asai sat with Erlinder and Usui, who have been
endeavoring to uncover the whole picture of the accident, to
learn the truth behind the incident that has never been revealed.

What was not revealed?

"That 16 civilian guests were aboard the Greeneville when the
accident occurred and that a civilian had his hands on the lever
when the ship made a rapid ascent to the surface. The Navy has a
program to invite influential lawmakers and business leaders to
its vessels to please them, and the Ehime Maru accident occurred

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as part of such a program. The top brass was not held responsible
for the accident because investigators failed to touch on the
fact that the civilians were aboard the vessel under obscure
safety rules."

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) produced last
October a final report on the accident.

Erlinder and his wife said:

"The report only restated facts that had already been revealed.
Such a scenario was prepared by (then) Pacific Fleet Commander
Thomas Fargo and other top-level Navy officers."

In the following month, the US Navy opened a court of inquiry.
Erlinder was in Japan at the time.

"The court of inquiry was a Navy investigative committee placed
directly under Commander Fargo. Nobody expected evidence placing
top-level Navy officers at a disadvantage would come out. In
fact, no civilian quests were ever summoned, and facts putting
senior Navy officials in jeopardy were sealed off."

After the court of inquiry, the Navy decided not to call for a
court martial, and the Greeneville's Captain Scott Waddle
received an honorable discharge. The top brass was not held
responsible for the accident.

"The Navy held a court of inquiry to push the blame only on
Waddle to minimize the impact on the top brass. The Navy had no
intention of thoroughly uncovering the facts; it simply wanted to
put an early end to the incident."

Fargo initially had promised to let Waddle visit Japan to offer
apologies, but the commander began opposing it once the court of
inquiry was over.

Erlinder and his wife took this view:

"Waddle had shown a stance of blaming his commanding officer, so
the Navy feared what he would say undesirable things in Japan.
The Navy figured that a delay in Waddle's trip to Japan would
prompt the families of the victims and the Japanese public to
direct their anger at the submarine's captain."

Erlinder also indicated that the NTSB report had failed to touch
on the structure of the Ehime Maru.

After the accident, some questioned the appropriateness of the
structure of the Ehime Maru. One speculated that because the
dining area was situated close to the ship's bottom, the students
and crewmembers found it difficult to escape the vessel in such
an emergency. But the NTSB report simply said, "Many lives
perished because the Ehime Maru sank from rapid flooding."

Neither Japan nor the US tried to closely examine the Ehime
Maru's hull. The Ehime Maru was towed to shallow waters eight
months after the accident in line with the wishes of the
survivors and the families of the victims.

"Although the wrecked hull was the only evidence objectively
testifying to the circumstances of the collision, Japan did not
conduct an independent investigation after SDF personnel had

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searched for missing people in the vessel."

Then Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori repeatedly said, "We will deal
with the situation from the perspective of strengthening the
Japan-US alliance." A key to Japan's true intention behind its
failure to conduct an independent investigation lay in Mori's
statement, according to Erlinder.

"The Japanese government was more intent on keeping Japan-US
military ties intact than on finding missing students. The Ehime
prefectural government followed the central government's policy
by turning a deaf ear to the bereaved families' strong desire for
finding what actually happened at sea."

Erlinder became involved in the Ehime Maru incident following his
trip to Uwajima in compliance with a request from a Japanese
lawyer asking him to brief the surviving victims and bereaved
families on the American legal system two months after the
accident.

The lawyers hired by the Ehime prefectural government were also
serving as the attorneys representing the surviving victims and
bereaved families. Erlinder felt that such arrangements were not
legally appropriate. Why?

"The Ehime prefectural government had the ownership of the Ehime
Maru. The prefectural government's defense team was required to
work in the best interest of the prefectural government in, for
instance, seeking compensation for the Ehime Maru. But
considering the possibility that the Ehime Maru's structure
amplified the scale of the disaster, the surviving victims and
bereaved families might file a lawsuit against the prefectural
government as the owner of the ship."

Such a situation conflicted with lawyers' ethics.

"The prefectural government urged the victims and bereaved
families to stop using the same lawyers and sought an out-of-
court settlement instead of a lawsuit. If many of them had
entrusted the case to the people's lawyers independent of the
prefectural government, the outcome of their efforts to elucidate
the whole picture of the accident and negotiations on
compensation would have been different altogether. The surviving
victims and bereaved families experienced double tragedies: the
tragic accident and the sharing of the same lawyers. Such
elements should not be overlooked."

The book's title The Ehime Maru Incident implies that it was not
a mere accident but a tragedy resulting from the US Navy's
attempt to cover up the truth and where responsibility lay and
the Japanese government's motive not to harm relations between
Japan and the US.

Erlinder and Asai concluded:

"The report which took the NTSB five years to produce did not
help uncover the truth. The Ehime Maru incident has taught us
that in facing accidents or problems caused by huge
organizations, such as the military and government, the only way
for settling them fairly and squarely is for citizens to band
together in taking action and exercising power."

(11) Foreign Ministry perplexed by the use of name cards with

TOKYO 00000796 006 OF 008


title of vice minister by some parliamentary secretaries

MAINICHI (Page 2) (Full)
February 14, 2006

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) is now feeling disturbed
by the fact that several parliamentary secretaries (seimukan),
including Satsuki Katayama, a parliamentary secretary of the
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI),have started
calling themselves "vice minister" in English. Katayama and other
parliamentary secretaries have explained their reason for using
the title of "vice minister" that they might be mistaken as
"parliamentary secretariat staff members if they call themselves
parliamentary secretaries."

The Japanese government has decided that the word kakuryo refers
to a cabinet minister, fuku-daijin, to the senior vice minister,
and the word vice minister is used only for jimu-jikan, the top
administrative office in a ministry or agency. However, a
seimukan or parliamentary secretary cannot be called a "vice
minister." According to MOFA's Personnel Division, which sets
English titles, the National Administration Organization Law
differentiates by classifying vice ministers as line officials
and parliamentary secretaries as staff officials.

However, since some parliamentary secretaries wishing to play up
their political leadership are now referring to themselves as
vice ministers, Katayama, too, has followed suit. Both Foreign
Minister Taro Aso and METI Minister Toshihiro Nikai reportedly
have endorsed their use of the title of "vice minister."

The Foreign Ministry has urged them to reconsider using the title
of vice minister, stating, "If they use titles on their cards
different from those on their passports and official documents,
it would create confusion."

(12) Truth about replacement of defense bureau deputy director
general

BUNGEI SHUNJU, March 2006
(Full)

Tokyo and Washington last October reached an interim agreement on
the realignment of US forces in Japan. Chisato Yamauchi (entered
Defense Agency = JDA in 1976),Defense Policy Bureau deputy
director general responsible for working-level negotiations with
the US on the JDA side (Administrative Vice Minister Takemasa
Moriya, entered JDA in 1971) was transferred as of Jan. 30 to
National Defense Medical College to serve as vice president.
Hironori Kanazawa (entered JDA in 1977),a press officer at the
Director General's Secretariat, succeeded him. At the same time,
Masanori Nishi (entered JDA in 1978),director general of the
Defense Facilities Administrative Agency (DFAA) Regional Defense
Facilities Administration Bureau in Naha, was transferred to the
Technical Research & Development Institute to serve as deputy
director general. Tsutomu Sato, DFAA facilities inspector, a non-
career official, was picked to fill his post.

Speculation had been rife among bureau officials that the
replacement of Yamauchi was only a matter of time, because the
disbandment of "Team Yamauchi," which had been responsible for
talks with the US until the end of last year, had already been
decided. Winning high praise from Deputy Under Secretary of

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Defense Richard Lawless, responsible for working-level
negotiations on the US side, Yamauchi's group had been considered
the strongest JDA team ever in talks with the US. However, Kazuo
Ofuru (Defense Policy Bureau Director General, entered JDA in
1973),and DFAA Director General Iwao Kitahara (entered JDA in
1972),main figures under the Moriya structure, took a dim view
of the team. To make a long story short, there was confrontation
between the "international school" and the "domestic school" in
JDA.

The Yamauchi team consisted of Masatomi Oka (entered JDA in
1986),a first secretary to the Japanese Embassy in the US, Taro
Yamato (entered JDA in 1990),senior official of the Defense
Policy Bureau Defense Intelligence Division, and Mitsuko Hayashi
(entered JDA in 1993) at the Defense Policy Bureau Defense Policy
Division from internal bureaus, and Noboru Yamaguchi (major
general, entered Ground Self-Defense Force in 1972),deputy
director of the National Institute for Defense Studies, Tetsuro
Doshita (captain, entered Maritime Self-Defense Force in 1982),
planning coordinator of Joint Staff Office Fifth Staff Office),
and Shunji Izutsu (colonel, entered Air Self-Defense Force in
1986) at the Air Staff Office Defense Division from the uniformed
group. All members of Team Yamauchi have an international
background with Oka and Yamato studying at the Fletcher School of
Tufts University, Hayashi at Oxford University, Yamaguchi at the
Fletcher School and Harvard University, Doshita at Georgetown
University, Izutsu at Harvard University and Yamauchi at National
Defense University.

If the replacement of Yamauchi was the result of the careers of
the members of his team getting on Moriya's nerves, the JDA as
ruled by "Emperor Moriya" has become hopeless.

(13) Housecleaning at MOFA

BUNGEI SHUNJU, March 2006
(Full)

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs' (MOFA) personnel transfers in
the summer will likely have major implications. MOFA's efforts to
have Japan secure a permanent seat on the UN Security Council
fell through. The suicide of a staff member at the Japanese
Consul General in Shanghai came to light. Regarding the
realignment of US forces in Japan, too, MOFA has dumped the
coordination of views with local communities on the Defense
Agency to the great annoyance of government officials. The focus
of the planned personnel shakeup is on the treatment of
Administrative Vice Foreign Minister Shotaro Yachi (entered MOFA
in 1969). It had at first been thought that he would retain the
post, but now the rumor has it that he might be replaced.

Former Assistant Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Shin Ebihara
(entered MOFA in 1971) had once been seen as the most likely
successor to Yachi, but he has been replaced, as he was on bad
terms with Secretary to the Prime Minister Iijima. Deputy Foreign
Minister Tsuneo Nishida (responsible for political affairs,
entered MOFA in 1970),who continually misjudged Japan's chances
in the drive to secure a permanent seat on the UNSC, and Deputy
Vice Foreign Minister Mitoji Yabunaka (responsible for economic
affairs, entered MOFA in 1969),who got on the career track
midway, have also been removed from the list of potential
contenders. To begin with, there are no potential vice
ministerial candidates among those who entered MOFA in 1972 and

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1973. Then, it comes to the question of whether to undergo a
rejuvenation with the selection of Kenichiro Sasae, director
general of the Asian and Oceania Affairs Bureau, who entered MOFA
in 1974. However, that option is hard to choose in view of
keeping a balance with other agencies.

A plan has been floated to choose someone from another agency or
a private citizen as a stopgap. The Finance Ministry installed
Masaharu Hino, superintendent public prosecutor at the Nagoya
High Public Prosecutors Office, when it was shaken by a series of
scandals. Will the name of a former public prosecutor be floated
because of the image of fairness that profession has? Or will
Hiroshi Okuda, chairman of the Japan Business Federation (Nippon
Keidanren),whose name was mentioned as a successor to Ambassador
to China Koreshige Anan, be floated once again?

SCHIEFFER