DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 02/14/06-2

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 TOKYO 000796 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA SUBJECT: DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 02/14/06-2 INDEX: (8) Japan-North Korea talks: North Korea abandons moratorium on missile launching: Pyongyang declaration stripped of meaning (9) SDP to adopt first party platform 10 years since name change, underscoring determination to narrow income disparity (10) Truth behind Ehime Maru incident: US Navy brass sealed off disadvantageous evidence; Responsibility for nuke submarine tour not accounted for; Double tragedies combining fatal incident and sharing of same lawyers (11) Foreign Ministry perplexed by the use of name cards with title of vice minister by some parliamentary secretaries (12) Truth about replacement of defense bureau deputy director general (13) Housecleaning at MOFA ARTICLES: (8) Japan-North Korea talks: North Korea abandons moratorium on missile launching: Pyongyang declaration stripped of meaning SANKEI (Page 1) (Full) February 11, 2006 It has been learned that Pyongyang had told Japan during the bilateral talks with Japan, held in Beijing from Feb. 4 through 8, its intention to abandon a moratorium on missile launching, according to several sources informed of Japan-North Korea relations. The North's commitment to freeze missile launching is mentioned in the Japan-North Korea Pyongyang Declaration, issued in 2002. Pyongyang's move is viewed as motivated by the desire to overshadow the abduction incident, by bringing a nuclear and missile issue to the Japanese side's attention, as well as to obtain economic assistance from it. The move will in effect strip the Pyongyang Declaration of its meaning. The government will likely be pressed to make a more difficult response in the future. The said talks concurrently discussed the abduction issue, normalization of diplomatic ties and the missile issue. The nuclear and missile issue was discussed on the morning of Feb. 7. According to a source informed of bilateral relations, the Japanese side during the meeting called on Pyongyang to totally scrap its nuclear weapons and nuclear development program, as well as to completely abandon ballistic missiles. The North Korean side, however, rejected Japan's requests. On the contrary, it declared to the Japanese side, "We want Japan to think that there is no longer a moratorium on missile launching." It thus indicated that it was ready to launch a missile at any time. The Japanese side urged the North Korean side to live up to the Pyongyang Declaration, but Pyongyang reportedly remained unchanged. The Japan-North Korea Pyongyang Declaration mentions that North Korea expressed its readiness to extend the moratorium on missile launching after 2003 as well. A Japanese government source is TOKYO 00000796 002 OF 008 increasingly becoming alarmed about the development of the matter, noting, "North Korea has clarified its intention to abandon the Pyongyang Declaration." With North Korea, which continues to turn a blind eye to the abduction issue, taking on a more hard-line stance on the missile issue, Japan's domestic front is bound to intensify its call for applying pressure on that nation, including economic sanctions. Referring to the possibility of applying pressure on North Korea, Foreign Minister Taro Aso during a press conference on Feb. 10 noted, "It is true that many proposals have been floated in the ministry." North Korea's nuclear and missile issue has been on the agenda at the six-party talks, including Japan, the US and China, as well. North Korea's indication of a stance of rejecting the moratorium on missile launching will likely affect the fate of the six-party talks. In 1998, North Korea test-launched a Taepodong-I with a range of about 2,500 kilometers, and part of the missile came down in the Pacific Ocean, passing over Japan. (9) SDP to adopt first party platform 10 years since name change, underscoring determination to narrow income disparity ASAHI (Page 4) (Full) February 11, 2006 In its convention that starts today, the Social Democratic Party (SDP) will adopt a declaration for the first time in the 10 years since the opposition party changed its name. Some have become critical of the Koizumi administration's structural reforms in the wake of the Livedoor scandal. The SDP will set forth the slogan of "a society with a narrow gap between rich and poor" as part of efforts to underscore its different policy stance from the Koizumi administration's neo-liberalism, based on which the administration has promoted reforms. The SDP tends to convey only the image of a supporter of the current Constitution, so the party aims to increase support by bringing this slogan to the fore. In order to realize it, the party must work out specific measures. Key points in the draft SDF declaration Following is a partial text of the final draft of SDP declaration to be adopted in its convention today. Aim to create a peaceful society with no gaps Under neo-conservatism, specific values are imposed on people, given market-oriented neo-liberalism, as well as strong political, economic, and military power. There is now a neo- conservative tendency in the nation. Our party stresses the importance of fairness and cooperation in society and proposes reforming the current society into another society. We aim to create a society that reflects the principles of the Constitution and gives priority to preventing the income gap from widening. Our social democracy We open the door to all people. Our key principles are "peace, freedom, equality, and coexistence." Our party considers our TOKYO 00000796 003 OF 008 nation's history as a victimizer that invaded other Asian countries and placed them under our colonial rule and as a victim of atomic bombings. Basic policy tasks Our party aims to establish a fair market-oriented economy placed under social regulations. Labor is indispensable for self- fulfillment. We guarantee the principle of equal compensation for equal work. We also respect various working styles. Our party will take measures to raise the maximum income and residential tax rates, strengthen graduated taxation, and review the corporate tax. Based on the spirit of the United Nations Charter, as well as the Preamble and Article 9 of the Constitution, our party will work hard to denuclearize Northeast Asia and to create a security mechanism in the region. The presence of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) apparently infringes on the Constitution, so we will scale down and reorganize the SDF into groups engaged in border security, disaster relief, and international cooperation, in an effort to make the region free from any nuclear threat. Our party will change the Japan-US Security Treaty into a peace treaty. We thoroughly protect the freedom of speech. We also aim to reform the present electoral system to give priority to proportional representation over the single-seat constituency system. Roadmap to reforms The SDP will surely provide an opportunity for every citizen to equally take part in society. We aim to establish a social democratic government by joining hands with small- and medium- sized firms, individual shopkeepers, workers in primary industries, and those engaged in civic movements. We aim at forming a coalition government while keeping our own policy identity. (10) Truth behind Ehime Maru incident: US Navy brass sealed off disadvantageous evidence; Responsibility for nuke submarine tour not accounted for; Double tragedies combining fatal incident and sharing of same lawyers TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 26) (Abridged slightly) February 11, 2006 February 10 marked the fifth anniversary of the Ehime Maru's fatal collision with the USS Greeneville off Hawaii. American lawyer Peter Erlinder, 57, and his journalist wife Masako Usui, 51, have coauthored a book titled The Ehime Maru Incident, which was published by Shin Nihon Publishing Co. The Tokyo Shimbun's Masatomo Asai sat with Erlinder and Usui, who have been endeavoring to uncover the whole picture of the accident, to learn the truth behind the incident that has never been revealed. What was not revealed? "That 16 civilian guests were aboard the Greeneville when the accident occurred and that a civilian had his hands on the lever when the ship made a rapid ascent to the surface. The Navy has a program to invite influential lawmakers and business leaders to its vessels to please them, and the Ehime Maru accident occurred TOKYO 00000796 004 OF 008 as part of such a program. The top brass was not held responsible for the accident because investigators failed to touch on the fact that the civilians were aboard the vessel under obscure safety rules." The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) produced last October a final report on the accident. Erlinder and his wife said: "The report only restated facts that had already been revealed. Such a scenario was prepared by (then) Pacific Fleet Commander Thomas Fargo and other top-level Navy officers." In the following month, the US Navy opened a court of inquiry. Erlinder was in Japan at the time. "The court of inquiry was a Navy investigative committee placed directly under Commander Fargo. Nobody expected evidence placing top-level Navy officers at a disadvantage would come out. In fact, no civilian quests were ever summoned, and facts putting senior Navy officials in jeopardy were sealed off." After the court of inquiry, the Navy decided not to call for a court martial, and the Greeneville's Captain Scott Waddle received an honorable discharge. The top brass was not held responsible for the accident. "The Navy held a court of inquiry to push the blame only on Waddle to minimize the impact on the top brass. The Navy had no intention of thoroughly uncovering the facts; it simply wanted to put an early end to the incident." Fargo initially had promised to let Waddle visit Japan to offer apologies, but the commander began opposing it once the court of inquiry was over. Erlinder and his wife took this view: "Waddle had shown a stance of blaming his commanding officer, so the Navy feared what he would say undesirable things in Japan. The Navy figured that a delay in Waddle's trip to Japan would prompt the families of the victims and the Japanese public to direct their anger at the submarine's captain." Erlinder also indicated that the NTSB report had failed to touch on the structure of the Ehime Maru. After the accident, some questioned the appropriateness of the structure of the Ehime Maru. One speculated that because the dining area was situated close to the ship's bottom, the students and crewmembers found it difficult to escape the vessel in such an emergency. But the NTSB report simply said, "Many lives perished because the Ehime Maru sank from rapid flooding." Neither Japan nor the US tried to closely examine the Ehime Maru's hull. The Ehime Maru was towed to shallow waters eight months after the accident in line with the wishes of the survivors and the families of the victims. "Although the wrecked hull was the only evidence objectively testifying to the circumstances of the collision, Japan did not conduct an independent investigation after SDF personnel had TOKYO 00000796 005 OF 008 searched for missing people in the vessel." Then Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori repeatedly said, "We will deal with the situation from the perspective of strengthening the Japan-US alliance." A key to Japan's true intention behind its failure to conduct an independent investigation lay in Mori's statement, according to Erlinder. "The Japanese government was more intent on keeping Japan-US military ties intact than on finding missing students. The Ehime prefectural government followed the central government's policy by turning a deaf ear to the bereaved families' strong desire for finding what actually happened at sea." Erlinder became involved in the Ehime Maru incident following his trip to Uwajima in compliance with a request from a Japanese lawyer asking him to brief the surviving victims and bereaved families on the American legal system two months after the accident. The lawyers hired by the Ehime prefectural government were also serving as the attorneys representing the surviving victims and bereaved families. Erlinder felt that such arrangements were not legally appropriate. Why? "The Ehime prefectural government had the ownership of the Ehime Maru. The prefectural government's defense team was required to work in the best interest of the prefectural government in, for instance, seeking compensation for the Ehime Maru. But considering the possibility that the Ehime Maru's structure amplified the scale of the disaster, the surviving victims and bereaved families might file a lawsuit against the prefectural government as the owner of the ship." Such a situation conflicted with lawyers' ethics. "The prefectural government urged the victims and bereaved families to stop using the same lawyers and sought an out-of- court settlement instead of a lawsuit. If many of them had entrusted the case to the people's lawyers independent of the prefectural government, the outcome of their efforts to elucidate the whole picture of the accident and negotiations on compensation would have been different altogether. The surviving victims and bereaved families experienced double tragedies: the tragic accident and the sharing of the same lawyers. Such elements should not be overlooked." The book's title The Ehime Maru Incident implies that it was not a mere accident but a tragedy resulting from the US Navy's attempt to cover up the truth and where responsibility lay and the Japanese government's motive not to harm relations between Japan and the US. Erlinder and Asai concluded: "The report which took the NTSB five years to produce did not help uncover the truth. The Ehime Maru incident has taught us that in facing accidents or problems caused by huge organizations, such as the military and government, the only way for settling them fairly and squarely is for citizens to band together in taking action and exercising power." (11) Foreign Ministry perplexed by the use of name cards with TOKYO 00000796 006 OF 008 title of vice minister by some parliamentary secretaries MAINICHI (Page 2) (Full) February 14, 2006 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) is now feeling disturbed by the fact that several parliamentary secretaries (seimukan), including Satsuki Katayama, a parliamentary secretary of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI),have started calling themselves "vice minister" in English. Katayama and other parliamentary secretaries have explained their reason for using the title of "vice minister" that they might be mistaken as "parliamentary secretariat staff members if they call themselves parliamentary secretaries." The Japanese government has decided that the word kakuryo refers to a cabinet minister, fuku-daijin, to the senior vice minister, and the word vice minister is used only for jimu-jikan, the top administrative office in a ministry or agency. However, a seimukan or parliamentary secretary cannot be called a "vice minister." According to MOFA's Personnel Division, which sets English titles, the National Administration Organization Law differentiates by classifying vice ministers as line officials and parliamentary secretaries as staff officials. However, since some parliamentary secretaries wishing to play up their political leadership are now referring to themselves as vice ministers, Katayama, too, has followed suit. Both Foreign Minister Taro Aso and METI Minister Toshihiro Nikai reportedly have endorsed their use of the title of "vice minister." The Foreign Ministry has urged them to reconsider using the title of vice minister, stating, "If they use titles on their cards different from those on their passports and official documents, it would create confusion." (12) Truth about replacement of defense bureau deputy director general BUNGEI SHUNJU, March 2006 (Full) Tokyo and Washington last October reached an interim agreement on the realignment of US forces in Japan. Chisato Yamauchi (entered Defense Agency = JDA in 1976),Defense Policy Bureau deputy director general responsible for working-level negotiations with the US on the JDA side (Administrative Vice Minister Takemasa Moriya, entered JDA in 1971) was transferred as of Jan. 30 to National Defense Medical College to serve as vice president. Hironori Kanazawa (entered JDA in 1977),a press officer at the Director General's Secretariat, succeeded him. At the same time, Masanori Nishi (entered JDA in 1978),director general of the Defense Facilities Administrative Agency (DFAA) Regional Defense Facilities Administration Bureau in Naha, was transferred to the Technical Research & Development Institute to serve as deputy director general. Tsutomu Sato, DFAA facilities inspector, a non- career official, was picked to fill his post. Speculation had been rife among bureau officials that the replacement of Yamauchi was only a matter of time, because the disbandment of "Team Yamauchi," which had been responsible for talks with the US until the end of last year, had already been decided. Winning high praise from Deputy Under Secretary of TOKYO 00000796 007 OF 008 Defense Richard Lawless, responsible for working-level negotiations on the US side, Yamauchi's group had been considered the strongest JDA team ever in talks with the US. However, Kazuo Ofuru (Defense Policy Bureau Director General, entered JDA in 1973),and DFAA Director General Iwao Kitahara (entered JDA in 1972),main figures under the Moriya structure, took a dim view of the team. To make a long story short, there was confrontation between the "international school" and the "domestic school" in JDA. The Yamauchi team consisted of Masatomi Oka (entered JDA in 1986),a first secretary to the Japanese Embassy in the US, Taro Yamato (entered JDA in 1990),senior official of the Defense Policy Bureau Defense Intelligence Division, and Mitsuko Hayashi (entered JDA in 1993) at the Defense Policy Bureau Defense Policy Division from internal bureaus, and Noboru Yamaguchi (major general, entered Ground Self-Defense Force in 1972),deputy director of the National Institute for Defense Studies, Tetsuro Doshita (captain, entered Maritime Self-Defense Force in 1982), planning coordinator of Joint Staff Office Fifth Staff Office), and Shunji Izutsu (colonel, entered Air Self-Defense Force in 1986) at the Air Staff Office Defense Division from the uniformed group. All members of Team Yamauchi have an international background with Oka and Yamato studying at the Fletcher School of Tufts University, Hayashi at Oxford University, Yamaguchi at the Fletcher School and Harvard University, Doshita at Georgetown University, Izutsu at Harvard University and Yamauchi at National Defense University. If the replacement of Yamauchi was the result of the careers of the members of his team getting on Moriya's nerves, the JDA as ruled by "Emperor Moriya" has become hopeless. (13) Housecleaning at MOFA BUNGEI SHUNJU, March 2006 (Full) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs' (MOFA) personnel transfers in the summer will likely have major implications. MOFA's efforts to have Japan secure a permanent seat on the UN Security Council fell through. The suicide of a staff member at the Japanese Consul General in Shanghai came to light. Regarding the realignment of US forces in Japan, too, MOFA has dumped the coordination of views with local communities on the Defense Agency to the great annoyance of government officials. The focus of the planned personnel shakeup is on the treatment of Administrative Vice Foreign Minister Shotaro Yachi (entered MOFA in 1969). It had at first been thought that he would retain the post, but now the rumor has it that he might be replaced. Former Assistant Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Shin Ebihara (entered MOFA in 1971) had once been seen as the most likely successor to Yachi, but he has been replaced, as he was on bad terms with Secretary to the Prime Minister Iijima. Deputy Foreign Minister Tsuneo Nishida (responsible for political affairs, entered MOFA in 1970),who continually misjudged Japan's chances in the drive to secure a permanent seat on the UNSC, and Deputy Vice Foreign Minister Mitoji Yabunaka (responsible for economic affairs, entered MOFA in 1969),who got on the career track midway, have also been removed from the list of potential contenders. To begin with, there are no potential vice ministerial candidates among those who entered MOFA in 1972 and TOKYO 00000796 008 OF 008 ¶1973. Then, it comes to the question of whether to undergo a rejuvenation with the selection of Kenichiro Sasae, director general of the Asian and Oceania Affairs Bureau, who entered MOFA in 1974. However, that option is hard to choose in view of keeping a balance with other agencies. A plan has been floated to choose someone from another agency or a private citizen as a stopgap. The Finance Ministry installed Masaharu Hino, superintendent public prosecutor at the Nagoya High Public Prosecutors Office, when it was shaken by a series of scandals. Will the name of a former public prosecutor be floated because of the image of fairness that profession has? Or will Hiroshi Okuda, chairman of the Japan Business Federation (Nippon Keidanren),whose name was mentioned as a successor to Ambassador to China Koreshige Anan, be floated once again? SCHIEFFER