JAPAN-DPRK TALKS: FURTHER DETAILS FROM N.E. ASIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 000756 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO EAP/FO AND TREASURY DAS GLASER E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/2016 TAGS: PARM PREL PHUM JA KN SUBJECT: JAPAN-DPRK TALKS: FURTHER DETAILS FROM N.E. ASIA DIRECTOR ITO REF: A. TOKYO 433 ¶B. TOKYO 644 ¶C. BEIJING 2089 ¶D. TOKYO 709 Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR W. MICHAEL MESERVE. REASON : 1.4 (b),(d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: MOFA Northeast Asia Director Ito reported "no progress" resulting from the February 4-8 Japan-DPRK talks despite the 20 hours they spent discussing the abduction issue, security concerns, and normalization of relations. Ito identified the likely DPRK motivations for engaging in the talks, but concluded that Pyongyang remains unprepared to engage in real bilateral negotiations at this time. He reported that during normalization talks the DPRK broke with past statements to insist that Japan's formula for providing ODA in exchange for closing all historic claims applied only to material losses, not cases of human suffering. The North Koreans said they remain committed to implementing the September 2005 Joint Statement, but stated they would do so only after the United States ended its "sanctions," dropped its "hostile policy," and provided a LWR, Ito said. He added that they claim no evidence exists to prove the DPRK is engaged in money laundering. Ito also reported there was nothing new in the DPRK position on the abduction issue, aside from what he called their "absurd" demand that Japan turn over several journalists and NGO members who had allegedly assisted North Korean refugees in their escape from the DPRK. He described the atmospherics of the talks as very poor, adding that both sides agreed to continue their bilateral negotiations at a later date, but that no agreement could be reached on the timing. END SUMMARY ¶2. (C) MOFA Northeast Asia Director Naoki Ito described the February 4-8 Japan-DPRK bilateral talks as "effectively no progress on every front" in a meeting with POL Deputy Reynolds. He had requested the meeting to provide the Embassy with further details on the talks. Ito, a key member of the Japanese delegation, made it clear that he and his colleagues were deflated by the demeanor shown by the North Korean delegation. In several meetings leading up to the talks the DPRK had indicated willingness to "make serious efforts" and "take concrete steps" to resolve its bilateral concerns with Japan. As a result, that became the criteria we used to assess the outcome of the talks, Ito said. By that measure, and despite the fact they had met for nearly 20 hours of talks, Ito indicated that the lack of progress has left him convinced Pyongyang remains unprepared to engage in real bilateral negotiations at this time. ¶3. (C) During six hours of normalization talks on February 6, the Japanese delegation had hoped to establish a "common understanding" that the DPRK would drop past monetary claims in exchange for the promise of significant amounts of future official development assistance (ODA). Ito pointed out that the same formula had been used when Japan and the Republic of Korea normalized relations, and that Prime Minister Koizumi and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il had agreed to pursue a similar approach in negotiating the Pyongyang Declaration. Contrary to all that, however, the DPRK delegation stated on February 6 that the formula would only be applied to "material losses," while insisting that "human suffering" (e.g. the comfort women issue) must be dealt with outside of the scope of that framework. They did not appear to be all that interested in ODA, Ito concluded. ¶4. (C) In response to Japanese security concerns (nuclear and missile),the North re-stated that the DPRK "is committed to implementing the September 2005 Joint Statement," but added they would do so only after the United States lifted its "sanctions" on North Korea, ceased its "hostile policy," and "built up trust" through provision of a Light Water Reactor (LWR),Ito reported. In response to the money laundering issue, the North stated there was "no evidence" of such activities, Ito said, adding that they acknowledged "some rules had been violated" but insisted they would deal with those infractions through their existing legal system. ¶5. (C) During 11 hours of abduction talks the DPRK side provided "no new information and offered no commitment to resume investigation of the remaining abduction cases," Ito reported. Instead, they asked the Japanese to return the "remains" of abductee Megumi Yokota and called for an experts TOKYO 00000756 002 OF 002 meeting to analyze the DNA evidence. Ito said the Japanese government has offered such a meeting since December 2004, but admitted it has little enthusiasm for the idea because the North is likely to use that opportunity to increase doubts, rather than to resolve the issue. ¶6. (C) In the end, both sides agreed to continue their three-track bilateral talks, but couldn't agree on the timing of their next session, Ito said. DPRK delegation head Song Il-ho was "very cautious" about not committing to any future dates, he added. Song reportedly showed anger when he interrupted Ambassador for Normalization Haraguchi's statement at the concluding plenary session with the words: "I don't want to hear anymore of your speech." This prompted Haraguchi to stop talking and hand over a copy of his full remarks to Song, Ito said. ¶7. (C) Asked to analyze the behavior of the DPRK delegation, Director Ito offered the following observations: -- Pyongyang most likely agreed to the talks because it is concerned about the negative public perceptions of North Korea now prevalent in Japan. Song Il-ho held an unprecedented one-hour pre-planned press conference to get out the DPRK message, rather than issuing his usual short statement on the steps of the North Korean embassy. -- Pyongyang may also be calculating that the Diet, which is currently in session, will be less likely to invoke punitive measures against North Korea so long as the DPRK shows a willingness to engage in talks with Japan. -- Finally, the North Koreans were interested in obtaining Japan's plan for normalization of relations so the leadership in Pyongyang can fully consider whether the economic advantages are worth the political cost of negotiating an agreement. ¶8. (C) While the Japanese used the talks to describe their plan for providing ODA to North Korea if normalization talks are concluded, Ito also reported that the Japanese delegation had clearly spelled out to the DPRK what economic sanctions and other punitive measures the Japanese government will consider implementing if North Korea fails to get serious about resolving the nuclear, missile and abduction issues. The most likely of these, according to Ito, will be passage by the Diet, later this session, of human rights legislation targeting North Korea (to be reported septel). SCHIEFFER