JAPAN-DPRK TALKS: FURTHER DETAILS FROM N.E. ASIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 000756

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO EAP/FO AND TREASURY DAS GLASER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/2016
TAGS: PARM PREL PHUM JA KN
SUBJECT: JAPAN-DPRK TALKS: FURTHER DETAILS FROM N.E. ASIA
DIRECTOR ITO

REF: A. TOKYO 433


B. TOKYO 644

C. BEIJING 2089

D. TOKYO 709

Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR W. MICHAEL MESERVE. REASON
: 1.4 (b),(d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: MOFA Northeast Asia Director Ito reported
"no progress" resulting from the February 4-8 Japan-DPRK
talks despite the 20 hours they spent discussing the
abduction issue, security concerns, and normalization of
relations. Ito identified the likely DPRK motivations for
engaging in the talks, but concluded that Pyongyang remains
unprepared to engage in real bilateral negotiations at this
time. He reported that during normalization talks the DPRK
broke with past statements to insist that Japan's formula for
providing ODA in exchange for closing all historic claims
applied only to material losses, not cases of human
suffering. The North Koreans said they remain committed to
implementing the September 2005 Joint Statement, but stated
they would do so only after the United States ended its
"sanctions," dropped its "hostile policy," and provided a
LWR, Ito said. He added that they claim no evidence exists
to prove the DPRK is engaged in money laundering. Ito also
reported there was nothing new in the DPRK position on the
abduction issue, aside from what he called their "absurd"
demand that Japan turn over several journalists and NGO
members who had allegedly assisted North Korean refugees in
their escape from the DPRK. He described the atmospherics of
the talks as very poor, adding that both sides agreed to
continue their bilateral negotiations at a later date, but
that no agreement could be reached on the timing. END SUMMARY


2. (C) MOFA Northeast Asia Director Naoki Ito described the
February 4-8 Japan-DPRK bilateral talks as "effectively no
progress on every front" in a meeting with POL Deputy
Reynolds. He had requested the meeting to provide the
Embassy with further details on the talks. Ito, a key member
of the Japanese delegation, made it clear that he and his
colleagues were deflated by the demeanor shown by the North
Korean delegation. In several meetings leading up to the
talks the DPRK had indicated willingness to "make serious
efforts" and "take concrete steps" to resolve its bilateral
concerns with Japan. As a result, that became the criteria
we used to assess the outcome of the talks, Ito said. By
that measure, and despite the fact they had met for nearly 20
hours of talks, Ito indicated that the lack of progress has
left him convinced Pyongyang remains unprepared to engage in
real bilateral negotiations at this time.


3. (C) During six hours of normalization talks on February
6, the Japanese delegation had hoped to establish a "common
understanding" that the DPRK would drop past monetary claims
in exchange for the promise of significant amounts of future
official development assistance (ODA). Ito pointed out that
the same formula had been used when Japan and the Republic of
Korea normalized relations, and that Prime Minister Koizumi
and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il had agreed to pursue a
similar approach in negotiating the Pyongyang Declaration.
Contrary to all that, however, the DPRK delegation stated on
February 6 that the formula would only be applied to
"material losses," while insisting that "human suffering"
(e.g. the comfort women issue) must be dealt with outside of
the scope of that framework. They did not appear to be all
that interested in ODA, Ito concluded.


4. (C) In response to Japanese security concerns (nuclear
and missile),the North re-stated that the DPRK "is committed
to implementing the September 2005 Joint Statement," but
added they would do so only after the United States lifted
its "sanctions" on North Korea, ceased its "hostile policy,"
and "built up trust" through provision of a Light Water
Reactor (LWR),Ito reported. In response to the money
laundering issue, the North stated there was "no evidence" of
such activities, Ito said, adding that they acknowledged
"some rules had been violated" but insisted they would deal
with those infractions through their existing legal system.


5. (C) During 11 hours of abduction talks the DPRK side
provided "no new information and offered no commitment to
resume investigation of the remaining abduction cases," Ito
reported. Instead, they asked the Japanese to return the
"remains" of abductee Megumi Yokota and called for an experts

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meeting to analyze the DNA evidence. Ito said the Japanese
government has offered such a meeting since December 2004,
but admitted it has little enthusiasm for the idea because
the North is likely to use that opportunity to increase
doubts, rather than to resolve the issue.


6. (C) In the end, both sides agreed to continue their
three-track bilateral talks, but couldn't agree on the timing
of their next session, Ito said. DPRK delegation head Song
Il-ho was "very cautious" about not committing to any future
dates, he added. Song reportedly showed anger when he
interrupted Ambassador for Normalization Haraguchi's
statement at the concluding plenary session with the words:
"I don't want to hear anymore of your speech." This prompted
Haraguchi to stop talking and hand over a copy of his full
remarks to Song, Ito said.


7. (C) Asked to analyze the behavior of the DPRK delegation,
Director Ito offered the following observations:

-- Pyongyang most likely agreed to the talks because it is
concerned about the negative public perceptions of North
Korea now prevalent in Japan. Song Il-ho held an
unprecedented one-hour pre-planned press conference to get
out the DPRK message, rather than issuing his usual short
statement on the steps of the North Korean embassy.

-- Pyongyang may also be calculating that the Diet, which is
currently in session, will be less likely to invoke punitive
measures against North Korea so long as the DPRK shows a
willingness to engage in talks with Japan.

-- Finally, the North Koreans were interested in obtaining
Japan's plan for normalization of relations so the leadership
in Pyongyang can fully consider whether the economic
advantages are worth the political cost of negotiating an
agreement.


8. (C) While the Japanese used the talks to describe their
plan for providing ODA to North Korea if normalization talks
are concluded, Ito also reported that the Japanese delegation
had clearly spelled out to the DPRK what economic sanctions
and other punitive measures the Japanese government will
consider implementing if North Korea fails to get serious
about resolving the nuclear, missile and abduction issues.
The most likely of these, according to Ito, will be passage
by the Diet, later this session, of human rights legislation
targeting North Korea (to be reported septel).
SCHIEFFER