JDA UPGRADE, FORM OVER SUBSTANCE?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 007042 SIPDIS SIPDIS COMUS JAPAN FOR J5; OSD/ISA FOR HILL/BASALLA E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2016 TAGS: MARR PREL PGOV JA SUBJECT: JDA UPGRADE, FORM OVER SUBSTANCE? Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer; Reason: 1.4 (b/d) ¶1. (C) Summary: On December 15, the Diet passed a set of bills to upgrade the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) to full ministry status. The package of legislation also includes a revision to the Self Defense Forces Law that lists international peacekeeping, rear area support for U.S. forces, Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO),and minesweeping as "primary" responsibilities of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF). The creation of a new Ministry of Defense (MOD) on January 9 will have little immediate impact on defense policymaking. Over the medium term, however, the upgrade, combined with generational change in the JDA bureaucracy, should facilitate enhanced bilateral cooperation in the region and beyond. End Summary. Taking a Seat at the Table -------------- ¶2. (C) On December 15, the ruling coalition and opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) enacted legislation to upgrade JDA to full ministry status (Septel). The provision will authorize the Minister of Defense to convene cabinet meetings on security issues and directly submit legislation to the Diet. As an independent agency attached to the Prime Minister's Office, JDA had previously relied on the Cabinet Office to perform these functions. The package of legislation passed on December 15 also included revisions to the SDF Law that list overseas operations, such as NEO, rear area support for U.S. forces, peacekeeping, and minesweeping as "primary" responsibilities of the SDF. ¶3. (C) Although the formal name change is scheduled for January 9, additional legislation will be submitted in the January Diet session to reorganize the new ministry's structure, including merging the functions of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency (DFAA). JDA officials say they also need a Permanent Overseas SDF Dispatch Law to operationalize the revisions to the SDF Law. Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Diet member and former JDA Minister Shigeru Ishiba, who is drafting such legislation, told visiting DUSD Lawless on December 1 that this bill is unlikely to be submitted until the Spring, 2008 Diet session. In the interim, the Cabinet Office and JDA are considering an extension to special legislation governing SDF operation in Iraq, which expires on July 31, 2007. 
 ¶4. (C) Explicit endorsement of the SDF's role in providing rear area support for U.S. forces notwithstanding, the JDA upgrade will not change the structure of the alliance relationship. By the end of 2007, MOD will assume the DFAA seat on alliance management structures, including the Joint Committee. However, MOFA officials have made it clear to the embassy that they have no intention of ceding to MOD leadership in any bilateral security forums, including the Security Consultative Committee (2 2). Ready for Prime Time? -------------- ¶5. (C) Beyond a sense of enhanced prestige, few observers within or outside of JDA expect the MOD to gain any immediate additional political clout as a result of the upgrade. In some respects, the government's decision to pursue the JDA upgrade reflects the fact that the agency has already established itself as a major player on defense policy. TOKYO 00007042 002 OF 002 Nevertheless, media speculation that the new MOD will eclipse the Foreign Ministry on security policy appears premature. At least in the short term, the opposite is likely to be the case given Prime Minister SHINZO Abe's close ties to MOFA Vice Minister Shotaro Yachi and his strained relations with DefMin Fumio Kyuma and his deputy, Takemasa Moriya. ¶6. (C) A more fundamental challenge for the new MOD is the scarcity of talent in the upper ranks of the JDA bureaucracy. As a long-time bureaucratic orphan, JDA was denied more than a handful of new recruits each year and those who did enter the elite track tended to be rejects from more prestigious ministries. This situation improved over time, as careers in security policy gained greater public acceptance. However, the top ranks (Director-General level and above) continue to be dominated by second-rate JDA careerists or secondees from other ministries. It will likely take 5-7 years before some of the real talent that exists at the Director-level and below in JDA moves into key policymaking positions. ¶7. (C) In the meantime, the MOD will be saddled with many of the same constraints faced by JDA. Neither MOFA nor the PM's Office appears ready to cede international defense policy decisionmaking to MOD, especially under its current leadership. Similarly, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) is unlikely to be any more generous to MOD as they have been with JDA. The defense budget will not automatically increase as a result of the upgrade to full ministry status. ¶8. (C) The MOD's new authority also fails to address the most fundamental weakness in Japan's defense establishment -- the lack of military input into the defense policymaking process. While LDP defense specialists like Ishiba have pressed JDA to include uniformed personnel in senior agency positions, especially those involving operations and training, the JDA bureaucracy continues to resist any perceived weakening of civilian control. The legislative package passed on December 15 maintained the ban on uniformed SDF officers taking Counselor-level positions at MOD, a product of lingering sensitivities over the Japanese military's actions during the pre-war period. Normalizing Defense Policy -------------- ¶9. (C) Over the longer term, however, the JDA upgrade should help along a process of "normalizing" Japan's defense policy. Within JDA, there already is an emerging cultural divide between senior officials, whose concept of JDA's role often seems focused on fostering a domestic defense industrial base and keeping a tight lid on the uniformed SDF, and junior- and mid-ranking bureaucrats, who are more apt to see a positive role for the SDF in maintaining regional and global security. SCHIEFFER