U/S BURNS NOVEMBER 6 MEETING WITH LDP DIET MEMBERS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 006634

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/2011
TAGS: PREL PGOV JA
SUBJECT: U/S BURNS NOVEMBER 6 MEETING WITH LDP DIET MEMBERS

Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer, reasons 1.4 (b, d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: A group of ruling party Diet members
expressed skepticism over North Korea's willingness to
abandon its nuclear weapons program during a November 6 lunch
with U/S Burns in Tokyo. Former Defense Minister Shigeru
Ishiba suggested that the recent agreement to restart
Six-Party Talks provided a way to postpone a showdown over
North Korea's nuclear program. Cabinet Office Parliamentary
Vice Minister Katsuei Hirasawa urged the U.S. to maintain
pressure on both China and North Korea on the abduction
issue. LDP Upper House Policy Chief Yoichi Masuzoe warned
that elements of the Japanese media are trying to undermine
Japanese public confidence in the U.S. nuclear umbrella. U/S
Burns emphasized that the U.S. security commitment to Japan
is crystal clear and assured the Diet members that the U.S.
is not prepared to let North Korea use an open-ended dialogue
as a way out of making commitments on denuclearization. END
SUMMARY.


2. (C) U/S Burns met November 6 with a group of veteran
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) members over lunch at the
Ambassador's Residence. The LDP participants were Lower
House member and former Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba,
Lower House member and Cabinet Office Parliamentary Vice
Minister Katsuei Hirasawa, and Upper House Policy Affairs
Chairman Yoichi Masuzoe.

Six Party Talks: More Delaying Tactics?
--------------


3. (C) Former Japan Defense Agency (JDA) Minister Ishiba
suggested that the recent agreement in Beijing to return to
the Six-Party framework aimed to delay a confrontation on the
Korean Peninsula. Ishiba assessed that the agreement to
resume dialogue served the interests of all three parties
involved. China, he asserted, wants to avoid a crisis before
the 2008 Olympics. For the United States, Ishiba continued,
commitments in Iraq have made military action against North
Korea difficult in the medium term. Finally, Ishiba assessed
that North Korea came out ahead by getting more time to
develop its nuclear and missile programs. Ishiba said this
approach also works for Japan, since a delay in action gives
Tokyo more time to enhance its military alliance with the
United States.


4. (C) All three Diet members questioned Pyongyang's
willingness to abandon WMD's through dialogue or initiate
domestic reform. Ishiba suggested that North Korean leaders
have drawn lessons from the collapse of the USSR, Romania,
and Iraq. From the USSR, it learned that allowing in foreign
influence will erode the government's control over the
population. From Romania, Ishiba continued, Kim Jong Il
likely appreciates the importance of keeping the military
satisfied. Finally, from Iraq, Ishiba asserted that Kim has
learned that one needs to have nuclear weapons to avoid being
attacked by the United States.

Don't Trust, But Verify
--------------


5. (C) U/S Burns responded that the U.S. will not allow North
Korea to use dialogue as a substitute for action on its
September 2005 commitments on denuclearization. The key
factor, he suggested, will be whether Beijing will use its
influence to press Pyongyang for early concrete action.
Burns noted that the U.S. intends to work closely with Japan,
our closest Asian ally, emphasizing that Tokyo was the first
stop in his, and the Secretary's, visits to the region. When
asked by Hirasawa how the current approach was different
"from the last administration's," Burns said that the U.S. is
approaching North Korea with no illusions about Pyongyang's
intentions or credibility. The U.S. attitude to any
concession on Pyongyang's part will be "don't trust, but
verify."


6. (C) Cabinet Office Vice Minister Hirasawa, a long-time
leader in the LDP's Abduction Issue Group, expressed
appreciation for U.S. support on the abduction issue. He
urged the U.S. to continue to raise this issue in future
discussions, both with Pyongyang and with Beijing.
Differences between the United States and Japan over the
issue, he continued, could have negative consequences for the
overall alliance. The Ambassador underlined the President's

TOKYO 00006634 002 OF 002


personal commitment to resolving the abduction issue. U/S
Burns stated that the U.S. would continue to raise the issue
with the Chinese and North Koreans at every available
occasion.

Deterrence
--------------


7. (C) Upper House member Masuzoe estimated that 80 percent
of the public has faith in the U.S. nuclear deterrent.
Nevertheless, a large segment of the media is working to
undermine this confidence. Masuzoe commented that on a
recent news program he took part in, the host suggested that
the U.S. nuclear guarantee would only extend to a North
Korean nuclear attack on a major urban area. If the North
Koreans destroyed a rural village, the host argued, the
United States would not respond. Masuzoe said that Secretary
Rice's recent statements on the U.S. commitment were helpful.
He suggested that U/S Burns find an opportunity to publicly
reaffirm the U.S. nuclear guarantee. Noting the
effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear umbrella over Western
Europe during the Cold War, Burns said that there should be
no doubts over the willingness of the U.S. to defend its
allies.

U.S.-China Strategic Competition
--------------


8. (C) While acknowledging the significance of near-term
U.S.-China cooperation on Korea, Ishiba asked how Washington
planned to respond to longer term strategic competition in
the region. Specifically, Ishiba asserted that China's
military modernization coincided with an expanded U.S.
strategic presence in the Western Pacific, including Guam.
U/S Burns stated that the U.S. can live with an emerging
China, but added that we will maintain our influence in the
region, with the U.S.-Japan alliance as the cornerstone of
our presence. The Ambassador rejected suggestions by those
in Japan who link the movement of Marines from Okinawa to
Guam as part of a broader U.S. strategy, emphasizing that the
decision was solely taken in response to a specific Japanese
request.


9. (U) Delegations:

United States
--------------

R. Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary for Political Affairs

J. Thomas Schieffer, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy
Mike Meserve, Political Minister Counselor, U.S. Embassy
Sung Kim, Director, EAP/K
Ray Greene, Pol-Mil Chief, Embassy Notetaker
Steven Fagin, Special Assistant to U/S Burns
Brett Blackshaw, Control Officer
Yoko Yamamoto, Interpreter

Japan
--------------
Hon. Shigeru Ishiba, former Defense Minister
Hon. Katsuei Hirasawa, Sr. Vice Minister, Cabinet Office
Hon. Yoichi Masuzoe, Chairman of Upper House Policy Research
Council, Liberal Democratic Party


10. (U) This cable has been cleared by U/S Burns.
SCHIEFFER