U/S BURNS NOVEMBER 6 MEETING WITH LDP DIET MEMBERS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 006634 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/2011 TAGS: PREL PGOV JA SUBJECT: U/S BURNS NOVEMBER 6 MEETING WITH LDP DIET MEMBERS Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer, reasons 1.4 (b, d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: A group of ruling party Diet members expressed skepticism over North Korea's willingness to abandon its nuclear weapons program during a November 6 lunch with U/S Burns in Tokyo. Former Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba suggested that the recent agreement to restart Six-Party Talks provided a way to postpone a showdown over North Korea's nuclear program. Cabinet Office Parliamentary Vice Minister Katsuei Hirasawa urged the U.S. to maintain pressure on both China and North Korea on the abduction issue. LDP Upper House Policy Chief Yoichi Masuzoe warned that elements of the Japanese media are trying to undermine Japanese public confidence in the U.S. nuclear umbrella. U/S Burns emphasized that the U.S. security commitment to Japan is crystal clear and assured the Diet members that the U.S. is not prepared to let North Korea use an open-ended dialogue as a way out of making commitments on denuclearization. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) U/S Burns met November 6 with a group of veteran Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) members over lunch at the Ambassador's Residence. The LDP participants were Lower House member and former Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba, Lower House member and Cabinet Office Parliamentary Vice Minister Katsuei Hirasawa, and Upper House Policy Affairs Chairman Yoichi Masuzoe. Six Party Talks: More Delaying Tactics? -------------- ¶3. (C) Former Japan Defense Agency (JDA) Minister Ishiba suggested that the recent agreement in Beijing to return to the Six-Party framework aimed to delay a confrontation on the Korean Peninsula. Ishiba assessed that the agreement to resume dialogue served the interests of all three parties involved. China, he asserted, wants to avoid a crisis before the 2008 Olympics. For the United States, Ishiba continued, commitments in Iraq have made military action against North Korea difficult in the medium term. Finally, Ishiba assessed that North Korea came out ahead by getting more time to develop its nuclear and missile programs. Ishiba said this approach also works for Japan, since a delay in action gives Tokyo more time to enhance its military alliance with the United States. ¶4. (C) All three Diet members questioned Pyongyang's willingness to abandon WMD's through dialogue or initiate 
domestic reform. Ishiba suggested that North Korean leaders have drawn lessons from the collapse of the USSR, Romania, and Iraq. From the USSR, it learned that allowing in foreign influence will erode the government's control over the population. From Romania, Ishiba continued, Kim Jong Il likely appreciates the importance of keeping the military satisfied. Finally, from Iraq, Ishiba asserted that Kim has learned that one needs to have nuclear weapons to avoid being attacked by the United States. Don't Trust, But Verify -------------- ¶5. (C) U/S Burns responded that the U.S. will not allow North Korea to use dialogue as a substitute for action on its September 2005 commitments on denuclearization. The key factor, he suggested, will be whether Beijing will use its influence to press Pyongyang for early concrete action. Burns noted that the U.S. intends to work closely with Japan, our closest Asian ally, emphasizing that Tokyo was the first stop in his, and the Secretary's, visits to the region. When asked by Hirasawa how the current approach was different "from the last administration's," Burns said that the U.S. is approaching North Korea with no illusions about Pyongyang's intentions or credibility. The U.S. attitude to any concession on Pyongyang's part will be "don't trust, but verify." ¶6. (C) Cabinet Office Vice Minister Hirasawa, a long-time leader in the LDP's Abduction Issue Group, expressed appreciation for U.S. support on the abduction issue. He urged the U.S. to continue to raise this issue in future discussions, both with Pyongyang and with Beijing. Differences between the United States and Japan over the issue, he continued, could have negative consequences for the overall alliance. The Ambassador underlined the President's TOKYO 00006634 002 OF 002 personal commitment to resolving the abduction issue. U/S Burns stated that the U.S. would continue to raise the issue with the Chinese and North Koreans at every available occasion. Deterrence -------------- ¶7. (C) Upper House member Masuzoe estimated that 80 percent of the public has faith in the U.S. nuclear deterrent. Nevertheless, a large segment of the media is working to undermine this confidence. Masuzoe commented that on a recent news program he took part in, the host suggested that the U.S. nuclear guarantee would only extend to a North Korean nuclear attack on a major urban area. If the North Koreans destroyed a rural village, the host argued, the United States would not respond. Masuzoe said that Secretary Rice's recent statements on the U.S. commitment were helpful. He suggested that U/S Burns find an opportunity to publicly reaffirm the U.S. nuclear guarantee. Noting the effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear umbrella over Western Europe during the Cold War, Burns said that there should be no doubts over the willingness of the U.S. to defend its allies. U.S.-China Strategic Competition -------------- ¶8. (C) While acknowledging the significance of near-term U.S.-China cooperation on Korea, Ishiba asked how Washington planned to respond to longer term strategic competition in the region. Specifically, Ishiba asserted that China's military modernization coincided with an expanded U.S. strategic presence in the Western Pacific, including Guam. U/S Burns stated that the U.S. can live with an emerging China, but added that we will maintain our influence in the region, with the U.S.-Japan alliance as the cornerstone of our presence. The Ambassador rejected suggestions by those in Japan who link the movement of Marines from Okinawa to Guam as part of a broader U.S. strategy, emphasizing that the decision was solely taken in response to a specific Japanese request. ¶9. (U) Delegations: United States -------------- ¶R. Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary for Political Affairs ¶J. Thomas Schieffer, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Mike Meserve, Political Minister Counselor, U.S. Embassy Sung Kim, Director, EAP/K Ray Greene, Pol-Mil Chief, Embassy Notetaker Steven Fagin, Special Assistant to U/S Burns Brett Blackshaw, Control Officer Yoko Yamamoto, Interpreter Japan -------------- Hon. Shigeru Ishiba, former Defense Minister Hon. Katsuei Hirasawa, Sr. Vice Minister, Cabinet Office Hon. Yoichi Masuzoe, Chairman of Upper House Policy Research Council, Liberal Democratic Party ¶10. (U) This cable has been cleared by U/S Burns. SCHIEFFER