U/S JOSEPH'S NOVEMBER 06 MEETING WITH ACS ANDO,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 006592 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: FOLLOWING KOREAN REUNIFICATION TAGS: PREL PINR PARM KNNP ASCH CH KS KN JA SUBJECT: U/S JOSEPH'S NOVEMBER 06 MEETING WITH ACS ANDO, ACS YANAGISAWA ON UNSCR 1718 IMPLEMENTATION Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer. Reason: 1.4 (B/D). ¶1. (C) Summary. On 6 November U/S Joseph and ACS Ando agreed to coordinate as much as practical the formulation and announcement of their respective lists of luxury items to be banned under UNSCR 1718. Asked about the U.S.-proposed UNSCR 1718-related working group, U/S Joseph explained that it was meant to be an informal group to address specific operational issues at as low a level as possible. ACS Yanagisawa revealed that Japan was establishing a new mechanism meant to facilitate interagency information sharing. End summary. ¶2. (C) Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Robert Joseph met November 6 with Assistant Cabinet Secretary for Foreign Policy Hiroyasu Ando and Assistant SIPDIS Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management and Security Kyoji Yanagisawa to discuss implementation of UNSCR 1718. U/S Joseph described the U.S.-Japan-Australian trilateral meeting held earlier that day as &very productive,8 noting in particular the value of having broad Japanese interagency participation. UNSCR 1718, he stated, is a &baseline8 for action and must be fully implemented until the DPRK complies with UNSCR 1718 requirements to completely, verifiably and irreversibly eliminate its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs. Luxury Goods Ban -------------- ¶3. (C) ACS Ando explained that his cabinet office is responsible for interagency coordination within the Japanese government on UNSCR 1718 implementation measures and that ACS Yanagisawa would be involved if Japan were to undertake cargo inspection. Japan had already announced three sets of measures against North Korea and had taken steps in all areas except banning luxury goods and cargo inspections. Referring to U.S. and Japanese notional lists of luxury items to be banned under UNSCR 1718 that had been shared at the trilateral meeting, Ando explained that Japan intended to submit its list to the UN sanctions committee by the November 13 deadline and asked about U.S. intentions. Japan hopes to coordinate its list with those of the United States and Australia, he stated. ¶4. (C) U/S Joseph responded that the United States appreciates Japan,s unilateral measures in response to the DPRK,s July 5 missile launches and October 9 nuclear test and considers them a model. On the luxury goods, ban, Joseph agreed that it was important to work together and to make clear to the international community that all countries need to be serious about implementing UNSCR 1718, noting that luxury items are important to the Pyongyang regime for retaining the loyalty of the North Korean elite. The Department of Commerce is working on the regulatory aspects of the proposed list of banned items. U/S Joseph indicated that the United States would finalize its list of luxury items in time for inclusion in its own report to the UNSC by 13 November and offered to share that list in advance with the Japanese. Ando welcomed the suggestion and provided a point-of-contact. (Note: Embassy DCM Donovan on November 7 personally provided follow-up information to ACS Ando.) Cargo Inspections -------------- ¶5. (C) Turning to the issue of cargo inspections, U/S Joseph said that we need to use all of the tools at our disposal, including the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), sharing information, detection and monitoring capabilities, and customs inspections. ACS Yanagisawa observed that Japanese politicians had &become excited8 following the passage of UNSCR 1718, debating whether Japan would have to invoke for the first time its law involving &Situations In Areas Surrounding Japan8 (SIASJ). Currently, many Japanese agencies exchange information with their U.S. counterparts, TOKYO 00006592 002 OF 003 but have no mechanism for sharing with their Japanese interagency colleagues. With Cabinet Office guidance, they are now establishing such a mechanism. How, Yanagisawa asked, did the United States intend to handle information sharing among relevant countries? ¶6. (C) Noting that this was an important question, U/S Joseph stated that successful cargo inspection would depend on information sharing, as well as the operational, legal and technical aspects. In the trilateral, he had proposed the establishment of a U.S.-Japanese-Australian working group in the near term to address these issues. The United States would look forward to sharing information with Japan and Australia and would selectively share information with other countries, based on the specific circumstances. Deputy Foreign Minister Nishida had earlier indicated that Japan would participate in the proposed follow-on meetings, the Under Secretary noted. ¶7. (C) Responding to Ando,s questions on the proposed working group, Joseph explained that the United States did not intend to make it public, but would simply refer to &follow-on meetings,8 which would be expected. Asked whether the &terms of reference8 (TOR) would be limited to cargo inspections only or address all UNSCR 1718-related issues, U/S Joseph replied that the United States did not envision formalizing the working group through a TOR, but rather, intended it to be an informal process addressing technical issues as the need arose. As to level, he suggested the working group be conducted &at a level that is as low as possible but still able to resolve issues.8 The United States hoped to have a practical proposal to present to Japan as quickly as possible. ¶8. (C) China,s participation in the cargo inspection process would be very important, Ando stressed, particularly the inspection of land-based cargo passage. He asked the Under Secretary whether he thought China was really serious about SIPDIS cargo inspection. U/S Joseph observed that when he was in Beijing with Secretary Rice in late October, the Chinese had told the Secretary that they would fully and effectively implement UNSCR 1718. While he did not expect China to interdict DPRK-flagged ships, he did expect it to greatly enhance its inspection of land cargo. At the close of the meeting, U/S Joseph promised to stay in close contact on issues related to UNSCR 1718 sanctions. ¶9. Participants United States -------------- Robert G. Joseph, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Joe Donovan, DCM U.S. Embassy David Stephens, Acting Senior Director for COutner-Proliferation Strategy, NCS Patricia McNerney, ISN Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, DOS William H. Tobey, Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, DOE/NNSA Dr. Victor Cha, Director, NSC/EAP Eliot Kang, Senior Adviser, ISN/RA, DOS Carol Reynolds, U.S. Embassy (notetaker) Japan -------------- Hiroyasu Ando, Assistant Cabinet Secretary for Foreign Policy, Cabinet Secretariat Kyoji Yanagisawa, Assistant Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management and Security, Cabinet Secretariat Makita Shimokawa, Cabinet Counsellor, Office of the Assistant Cabinet Secretary (Ando),Cabinet Secretariat Atsushi Kato, Office of the Assistant Cabinet Secretary (Yanagisawa),Cabinet Secretariat TOKYO 00006592 003 OF 003 Kenichi Takahashi, Office of the Assistant Cabinet Secretary (Yanagisawa),Cabinet Secretariat ¶10. (U) Under Secretary Joseph cleared this message. DONOVAN