U.S.-AUSTRALIA-JAPAN TROLATERAL LUNCH ON

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 006591 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: FOLLOWING KOREAN REUNIFICATION TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP MNUC CH AS KN KS JA SUBJECT: U.S.-AUSTRALIA-JAPAN TROLATERAL LUNCH ON IMPLEMENTING UNSCR 1718 Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer. Reasons: 1.4 (B/D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: At a Japan-hosted lunch on November 6 following the U.S.-Australia-Japan Trilateral meeting in Tokyo, participants discussed cooperation on Resolution 1718. The GOJ circulated a draft of Q & As to use in the event a ship would not consent to boarding for inspection. U/S Joseph suggested that Japan and Australia host a PSI exercise with a North Korea scenario in the 2007 timeframe. The U.S. proposed formation of a working group to stimulate cooperation on implementation of UNSCR 1718. Parties agreed that the U.S. would circulate a draft agenda for such a group, and others would comment. Participants exchanged views on the state of play on return to the Six-Party Talks. All agreed that China was the key to success, that South Korea would have to be brought along, and that the DPRK had to take concrete actions toward denuclearization before returning to the negotiating table. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) MOFA Director General for Disarmament, Nonproliferation and Science Takeshi Nakane hosted a lunch November 6 following the U.S.-Australia-Japan Trilateral Meeting on UNSCR 1718 implementation. All agreed that the morning discussion had gone well and that it was useful to coordinate views on cargo inspection and other issues. ¶3. (C) On legal issues, MOFA Director of the International Affairs Legal Division Masaki said that Japan agreed with the United States and Australia on legal explanations on cargo inspection, so far as they went. He explained that the debate over parameters was very political in Japan because of the Constitution and any possible role that Japanese Self-Defense Forces would play in inspections. His particular concern was how to handle a problem of a third-country ship in international waters that would not give consent for an inspection team to board. In the case that such a delicate situation might arise, Masaki wanted a common interpretation of that part of the resolution. He provided a paper with draft Q & As to use in the event of such a development (scanned and e-mailed to EAP/J Richhart). The Japanese embassy in Washington had passed the draft to its counterparts, he reported. Masaki said the UK had already agreed to the language and asked for a reaction from the U.S. and Australia. U/S Joseph said we would get back to them, as did Australian Deputy Secretary Ritchie. ¶4. (C) Director Masaki also raised the possibility of extending the concept of "global consent" as a way of resolving the issue of non-consent to board a vessel. Several on the U.S. delegation replied that it might not be possible to resolve this issue in a global manner. Since the resolution says that actions should be consistent with national as well as international law, different countries may have different ways of implementing the resolution based on their own national laws and practices. In this way, the resolution is similar to PSI practice. All parties agreed that while there might be no global certainty on this issue, it is vital that we continue to share information. ¶5. (C) Under Secretary Joseph proposed that parties agree to use the PSI process as a way to advance the common agenda, and suggested that Japan and Australia host a PSI exercise in 2007 with a North Korean nuclear scenario. Both Japan and Australia agreed to consider the request. ¶6. (C) Nakane asked what modalities the U.S.-proposed working group would have and on what specific issues it would develop cooperation. Joseph replied that he saw the group as being flexible with no formal trappings. He expected that it would work to develop cooperation on legal and technical issues, and perhaps to find ways to better share information. He wanted it to be broad enough to reach out to additional cooperators like Singapore and others. Participants would include technical as well as policy agencies (USG-participating agencies would include DHS, Energy, NSC, the intelligence agencies, State and Defense). DOE/ NNSA TOKYO 00006591 002 OF 002 Deputy Administrator Tobey added that the group could also discuss research and development, but for this topic, the group should be small so discussion could be candid. Deputy Secretary Ritchie added that the group should meet soon, SIPDIS perhaps in the next couple of weeks. Joseph said that the United States would propose an agenda, date and venue. ¶7. (S) Ritchie asked when Joseph thought Six-Party Talks would resume. Joseph replied that it was hard to say, given that much depended on the DPRK. The six parties could not just agree to talk. There would have to be some promise of a concrete outcome and some indication that the DPRK is moving toward de-nuclearization. That might require some preliminary negotiation, he suggested. ¶8. (C) Turning to China, all agreed that Beijing is the key to success. Joseph said that Secretary Rice had been encouraged by China's position during her recent visit and that China may be reassessing its relations with the DPRK. China must press for action by the DPRK. A return to talks must be part of the process, not an end in itself. China must not be allowed to throttle back its actions simply because talks resume. Talks must produce concrete progress. On detection and inspection, the United States hoped that China would continue to be fully supportive. Maritime interdiction might prove more difficult. As an aside, the U.S mentioned that the Russians were moving in the right direction on inspection and detection as well, but still had a ways to go on interdiction. ¶9. (C) On Korea, all agreed that domestic political problems will continue to limit ROK options. Other partners must work to bring South Korea along. Nakane asked what others thought the DPRK was likely to do. No one had a concrete answer, but agreed that they would do almost anything that they thought would improve their negotiating position. Ritchie and Joseph both mentioned the DPRK statement that Japan should not be party to the talks as ridiculous. ¶10. (C) Joseph asked about prospects for increased missile defense cooperation. Ritchie replied that there are active talks and exchanges between the Australians and the U.S. leading up to the annual AUSMIN meeting, and that there may well be some positive suggestions in the next three months. ¶11. (U) U/S Joseph cleared this message. DONOVAN