ABE ON THE EVE OF APEC: STRONG, DECISIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TOKYO 006471 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2016 TAGS: PGOV PINR JA SUBJECT: ABE ON THE EVE OF APEC: STRONG, DECISIVE LEADERSHIP OVERSHADOWS EARLY CRITICISMS Classified By: AMBASSADOR J. THOMAS SCHIEFFER. REASONS 1.4 (B),(D). ¶1. (C) Summary. Prime Minister ABE has moved quickly and decisively to demonstrate strong leadership since assuming office on September 26. Perceived as pragmatic and effective, he is receiving approval ratings in the 65-75 percent range. Abe's emphasis on close ties with the United States and the strength and reliability of the US-Japan security relationship, highlighted during the visit of Secretary Rice to Tokyo, have bolstered his public support. SIPDIS Prime Minister Abe's successful visits to China and Korea, coupled with his decisive moves following North Korea's nuclear test, have overshadowed early criticisms that his cabinet picks had been poor and that his "Beautiful Japan" package of domestic policies was too fuzzy and ambiguous. ABE has reassured the LDP's pacifist-leaning Komeito coalition partner that he and the LDP would not allow a debate or reconsideration of Japan's non-nuclear status. LDP victories -- aided by personal appearances by ABE -- in two by-elections for Diet seats quieted Abe's detractors in the LDP and has taken the wind out of the sails of the opposition. End summary. -------------- Diplomacy, Elections Fuel Abe's Success -------------- ¶2. (C) When SHINZO ABE first declared, "today I formed a Cabinet to create a beautiful nation" on September 26, media reports were less than complimentary. Faulted by even some of his own supporters for winning the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) presidential election too easily, he was criticized by many in the media and the opposition for his lack of experience and failure to articulate a clear policy vision. A Yomiuri Shimbun poll at the time showed 70.3 percent support among the general public, but only 9.1 percent said they were "very satisfied," with another 26.4 percent only "somewhat satisfied." Six weeks later, the momentum has clearly swung in Abe's favor, as press attention focuses on his policy successes and less on the personalities of his cabinet members and advisors. His support rate in polls ranges from the mid-60's to close to 75 percent. ¶3. (C) Within two weeks of his election as prime minister, Abe surprised everyone by pulling off summit meetings in Beijing and Seoul, upholding his campaign pledge to mend frayed ties with Japan's Asian neighbors. He earned praise for his firm response to the North Korean nuclear test, including a meeting with Secretary Rice in Tokyo. At home, LDP victories in two Lower House by-elections on October 22 boosted confidence in Abe's ability to work together with coalition junior partner Komeito to win elections. ABE has already begun using the momentum from those wins to push his legislative agenda in the remaining four weeks of the extraordinary Diet session. The revised Basic Education Law and a bill elevating the Japan Defense Agency to a Ministry are two likely recipients of Abe's strengthened mandate. An extension to the Anti-Terror Special Measures Law, authorizing Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces to provide refueling support to counterterrorism efforts in the Indian Ocean, passed quickly in October. -------------- But Serious Challenges Remain -------------- ¶4. (C) One of Abe's most significant challenges is to prevent the internal debate over security issues from creating divisions between the LDP and coalition partner Komeito. The Komeito -- whose Diet members are needed for an Upper House majority and whose well-oiled electoral machine holds the difference between victory and defeat for scores of LDP Diet members -- is key to Abe's political future and longevity as Prime Minister. Following the DPRK nuclear test, calls by LDP executives and administration officials for open debate on Japan's possession of nuclear weapons ran counter to Komeito policy and conflicted with many LDP leaders' views as well. ABE quickly reacted and declared "the debate" was already over: Japan would adhere to the three non-nuclear principles, rely on the U.S. nuclear deterrent, and not develop nuclear weapons. ¶5. (C) While ABE came into office with strong conservative TOKYO 00006471 002 OF 004 credentials and a reputation as a "nationalist" with strongly held views, he has shown himself to be a pragmatic, political realist. ABE is moving to the center and broadening his base of support in order to win next year's Diet elections and to have a chance of staying on as Prime Minister for several years. (Note: Japanese Prime Ministers are limited to two three-year terms.) ABE will have to skillfully navigate Diet debates on controversial initiatives, such as constitutional revision and a permanent dispatch law for the Japanese Self-Defense Forces, while avoiding alienating either LDP conservatives or Komeito's pacifist-leaning leaders. Embassy contacts predict ABE will likely continue what some characterize as his "boring, safe driver" approach through next year, making it difficult for the opposition to pick a fight. Further provocation from North Korea would only strengthen his hand domestically, they say. ¶6. (C) Other domestic challenges include a difficult contest in the Okinawa gubernatorial race on November 19 and internal LDP debates over whether to readmit the so-called "postal rebels." A win by the opposition candidate in Okinawa, Keiko Itokazu, could help restore some of the shine to the lackluster opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). DPJ leader Ichiro Ozawa's less than impressive showing in his first Diet debate with ABE and losses in the two by-elections have done little to bolster the confidence of his supporters. More problematic for ABE is the split within the LDP over whether to readmit members expelled last year for their opposition to Koizumi's postal privatization plan. Press reports have made ABE look indecisive on the issue, as he was forced to choose between taking back the rebels for their proven vote-getting value or fulfilling his role as the heir to Koizumi's political reforms. In the end, Abe, acting more like a traditional LDP conservative leader than the anti-LDP-old-boy, take-no-prisoners Koizumi, chose to readmit some postal rebels who recanted their opposition to postal privatization. ¶7. (C) Coming off a landslide victory in the LDP presidential election, ABE was criticized for having a too-easy ride to the top and presenting a fuzzy domestic policy vision. His September 29 maiden Diet policy address was criticized for containing too little in the way of substance. The speech, which was peppered with English terms unfamiliar to most Japanese, used the term "beautiful" more than a dozen times, leading a group of Kyoto business leaders to tell the Consulate General in Osaka-Kobe that they were skeptical there was any real substance in Abe's message. The press characterized his approach as "strategic ambiguity," coining the label "safe driver" to describe his answers during initial Diet interpellations. The North Korean crisis has kept the public and media's attention focused squarely on security issues, but ABE will soon have to tackle difficult -- and potentially vote-losing -- economic policy issues once the new Diet session starts in January. ¶8. (C) Abe's initiative to establish new bureaucratic structures within the Prime Minister's Office (Kantei) is a work in progress, which may result in a stronger executive with more effective decision-making processes and policy coordination. However, at present, lines of authority have yet to be clearly defined. Embassy contacts within the Prime Minister's Office seem uncertain of their roles and responsibilities and complain of turf battles. Others say the Prime Minister tends to micro-manage and still answers his own e-mails as if he were a first term Diet member. The position of National Security Advisor Koike is particularly problematic. With a broad mandate to create an "NSC" for Japan and manage security policy, she is limited to a staff of two and has no clear authority over any one issue. Embassy contacts say she has been marginalized by CCS Shiozuki and FM Aso but, retains her close friendship with Abe and sees him often. -------------- Initial Criticisms of ABE -------------- ¶9. (C) Reading the overwhelmingly positive appraisals of ABE 's first month as Prime Minister it is difficult to remember the harsh reaction to his cabinet appointments in the first few days of his term. Many in the LDP, media and opposition charged ABE had made his cabinet appointments based on TOKYO 00006471 003 OF 004 personal relationships, rather than experience or expertise. He was accused of especially favoring those who had supported him early in his campaign or who had been friends through the 80's and 90's. Many noted the cabinet's relative lack of experience. Abe's Cabinet has 11 ministers with no prior cabinet experience. The previous all-time record was Koizumi's nine. While a certain amount of sniping from Abe's opponents and those who failed to get tapped for senior appointments was inevitable, the strong negative reaction from conservative LDP supporters was surprising. Part of the problem may have been the secrecy surrounding Abe's decision-making, which appears to have been, in the end, ABE deciding on his own without consulting anyone. Well-placed Mission contacts in a variety of government offices, who are usually well informed, seemed sincere when they confessed before the Cabinet line-up announcement that they had no idea who might be appointed, or to which ministries. ¶10. (C) Criticism of ABE began early inside the LDP and even among his allies. Senior Vice Minister for Okinawa and Northern Territories Affairs Katsuei Hirasawa (who served as Abe's tutor when ABE was a school boy and had been appointed Senior Vice Minister by ABE two days before) told Embassy Tokyo that ABE did not trust most MOFA officials -- including most notably Asia Director General and Six Party Talks representative Kenichiro Sasae. As a result Hirasawa claimed, ABE communicated only with one person at MOFA: Vice Minister Yachi, and froze all others out. Hirasawa said the appointment of Yuriko Koike as Special Advisor to the Prime Minister for National Security had further muddied the waters and made it impossible to determine which agency had the lead in foreign affairs. ¶11. ( C) Hirasawa also noted that Abe's support from conservative LDP Diet members, in particular those affiliated with the conservative group, "Nihon Kaigi," was fragile, and had been damaged by Abe's statements affirming Prime Minister Murayama's declaration of Japan's war responsibility, and by suspicions that he traded a promise not to visit Yasukuni for a summit with China. Hirasawa claimed confidently that ABE would have lost 100 votes in the LDP presidential race from Nihon Kaigi Diet members had he made his conciliatory statements on comfort woman and the Murayama statement prior to the election. ¶12. (C) Executive secretary to former Prime Minster Junichiro Koizumi Isao Iijima described the new Cabinet as "very weak," telling Embassy Tokyo on the day after the Cabinet line-up announcement that when Koizumi made cabinet appointments, he always did so with a specific goal in mind. Iijima did not think ABE had given enough thought to choosing a Cabinet that would help achieve his administration's priorities, such as winning the Upper House elections in July ¶2007. Iijima was troubled by the absence of experts like Koizumi's Finance Minister Sadakazu Tanigaki and Koizumi's Minister for Economic and Fiscal Policy Kaoru Yosano, and wondered why ABE had not included former LDP Secretary General Tsutomu Takebe after Takebe had worked so hard for Abe's election. He also questioned the wisdom of reappointing Taro Aso as Foreign Minister, a move he termed a demotion for Aso. He thought Aso might try to sabotage Abe, as he had sometimes opposed Koizumi on foreign policy in the last administration. ¶13. (C) Chief Cabinet Secretary and longtime ABE personal friend Yasuhisa Shiozaki became an early target of anti-Abe critics. Shiozaki is known to have a short temper. His impatience with bureaucrats and "tough boss" attitude while MOFA Vice Foreign Minister has made him particularly unpopular among some MOFA officials (a fact that would not cause him any problems with Abe). His selection for a top job was attributed to his long acquaintance with ABE -- they met when both served as private secretaries to their Diet-member fathers in the 1980s. Sankei Shimbun noted that Shiozaki was not popular within his own party. Former LDP Secretary General and Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiromu Nonaka SIPDIS described Shiozaki as very smart but "condescending, and a poor communicator." He doubted Shiozaki or anyone else in Abe's inner circle had the skills to orchestrate policy priorities with the Diet or manage personnel issues behind the scenes. Other Embassy contacts have echoed that criticism, using terms like "lone wolf" to describe Shiozaki's lack of communication and coordination skills. TOKYO 00006471 004 OF 004 That said, in meetings with Ambassador Schieffer, Secretary Rice, and other visitors from Washington Shiozaki has been impressive and appeared to be in complete control of his issues. An AFS student in the U.S. in the late 60's and later a graduate student at Harvard, he is completely fluent and at ease in English, which he often uses in official meetings. ¶14. (C) The media also initially took an aggressive and critical approach to Abe's cabinet, although much of the criticism has since abated. One respected newspaper labeled the new Cabinet the "Botchan Naikaku," a term connoting a group of spoiled preppies. An NHK reporter scoffed at the appointment of Finance Minister Koji Omi, saying he only got the job because of his early and ardent support for ABE during the LDP presidential campaign. A political cartoon in the mainstream press portrayed ABE as a puppet. One Embassy contact at a major news network described the new ministerial lineup as a "Cabinet of friends." Unfortunately, he continued, ABE had not appointed anyone with the political skills to fight the entrenched bureaucracy. While there were some policy experts among the new ministers, he didn't think this particular lineup would accomplish very much. One of the more sensational weekly magazines ran a story citing a U.S. intelligence agency report that predicted ABE would never survive next year's Upper House Diet elections. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶15. (C) Six weeks into his administration, Prime Minister Abe has proved the naysayers wrong, winning praise from the mainstream press and strong support from the general public for his diplomatic skills and leadership. Abe's foreign policy and electoral successes, coupled with the ineffectiveness of the opposition, have almost completely overshadowed the early criticisms he lacked policy focus and had made poor personnel choices. The initial media feeding frenzy has also died down, as promises of sensational revelations and scandals involving his cabinet choices failed to materialize. While many Embassy contacts continue to voice generalized concerns over ABE and his Cabinet, the focus has shifted from personality to policy. ABE has shown he can lead his party and the nation, but now must explain where he would like them to go. Koizumi's success as Prime Minister and his unprecedented popularity among the general public was a result of his unswerving determination to reform and his ability to convince the electorate that he was sincere and would deliver on his promises for change. ABE faces the same challenge. SCHIEFFER