JAPAN'S INITITAL MEDIA RESPONSE TO ANNOUNCED DPRK

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 005876 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL KNNP PGOV KN JA SUBJECT: JAPAN'S INITITAL MEDIA RESPONSE TO ANNOUNCED DPRK NUCLEAR TEST TOKYO 00005876 001.2 OF 002 ¶1. Summary. The public and media reaction to the DPRK's October 9 announcement of a nuclear test was universally condemnatory. Press coverage throughout the day highlighted the cool, unflappable responses of Prime Minister Abe and his aides, the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance, and the counterproductive nature of Kim Jong-il's efforts to gain U.S. attention. End summary. ¶2. The public response to North Korea's announced nuclear test, predictably, was one of universal outrage and condemnation. Because the test occurred on one of Japan's press holidays, the immediate media response was limited to television and the internet. (Note: No newspaper reports will appear until late Tuesday afternoon.) Japanese television featured special news reports throughout the day, with the NHK evening news extending from 30 minutes to an hour to accommodate intense interest in the story. The news broadcasts were filled with Japanese and international reaction, including what was portrayed as the cool, unflappable responses of Prime Minister Abe and his aides. ¶3. The intense discussion and analysis presented on televisions news and talk shows included speculation on Kim Jong-il's motive, the nature of the underground explosion and its international consequences. NHK, for example, featured military affairs analyst Kensuke Ebata explaining the technical aspects of the test. He stated that, based on available information, the explosion appeared to be small, much smaller than the bomb which was detonated over Hiroshima, and speculated that the test may have been a failure. On one talk show, most participants expressed faith in the Japan-U.S. alliance and the UN Security Council. Talk show guests also called for further toughening of sanctions against the DPRK. No one argued for Japan to go it alone: i.e., the nuclear option. Reactions of the people on the street interviewed by NHK and TV-Asahi reflected anger, dismay and disgust. Like the talk show "experts," ordinary Japanese citizens saw the solution in Japan's alliance with the United States, the UN and Japan's postwar peace record. No one called for Japan to react to the nuclear threat by developing its own nuclear capability. ¶4. The media coverage of the international response to test featured assurances by Ambassador Schieffer that the U.S. would honor its security commitments to Japan. News reports also highlighted the responses of Beijing and Seoul, where Abe was just going into his summit meeting with ROK President Roh when the news hit the street. Commentators noted that, with the push of a button, Kim had managed not only to add even more epoxy glue to the already solid U.S.-Japan alliance, he had also contributed greatly to Japan's rapprochement with China and the ROK. Television coverage suggested that President Roh, who was viewed here as "soft" on Pyongyang, had finally seen the light, based on the joint statement issued with Prime Minister Abe that used the word "threat" repeatedly. Commentators also noted that China's spokesman used some of the strongest words ever in protesting the purported test, reflecting official anger and embarrassment, particularly for the country that shepherded the 6-party talks and had placed itself out on a limb defending Kim in past actions. ¶5. Keio University Professor Masao Okonogi, one of Japan's foremost experts on North Korea, argued that North Korea's intention all along in its missile and nuclear programs has been "survival" and not necessarily to use the weapons against Japan or the United States. Okonogi insisted that TOKYO 00005876 002.2 OF 002 Kim Jong-il believes that possessing nuclear weapons will allow North Korea to be recognized as a nuclear power internationally and that this will buy it protection. The timing of the nuclear test had been carefully calculated to occur just when Abe was visiting Seoul, he said. Kim apparently judged that the time was right, in that the United States had its hands full with such major issues as Iraq's security, Iran's nuclear obstinacy, and the upcoming U.S. congressional election. ¶6. Okonogi further insisted that Kim is already resolved to accept more sanctions from the international community. The DPRK leader thinks that ultimately his nuclear card will force other countries to seek dialogue with him since he has a strong hand. Kim may even believe that this move will help him tighten his own domestic authority and control and place more confidence in him by the military. He did not think China and Russia would cooperate in a Chapter VII resolution in the UNSC and believes the United States' only recourse now is to contain North Korea through political and economic measures. Okonogi also expected more nuclear tests before the North's first round of testing was complete. SCHIEFFER