DPRK "LESSONS LEARNED CAPSTONE CONFERENCE"

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 TOKYO 005336 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/15/2016 TAGS: PREL MARR PGOV PINR JA SUBJECT: DPRK "LESSONS LEARNED CAPSTONE CONFERENCE" Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer, Reasons 1.4(B)/(D) ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: Senior foreign policy, defense, intelligence, and military officials from the United States and Japan met September 7 in Tokyo to review the U.S.-Japan response to the July 4/5 DPRK missiles launches. The one-day "Lessons Learned Capstone Conference" produced a list of recommended areas for improved bilateral cooperation in the areas of Bilateral and Inter-Agency Policy Coordination, Intelligence Cooperation, Operational Coordination, and Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Measures (Full text in Para 6). Officials recognized the importance of institutionalizing ad hoc inter-agency coordination structures established during the July missile events and expanding bilateral intelligence and operational data sharing. The two sides will review progress on the Conference recommendations in existing bilateral forums by the end of the year. Key findings from the conference were highlighted during a set of meetings between the Ambassador and senior U.S. agency representatives and the Japanese Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (S) Embassy Tokyo, U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ),the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA),and the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) co-hosted a bilateral "Capstone Lessons Learned Conference" September 7 to review the bilateral response to events surrounding the July 5 DPRK missile launches. The Conference was held at the government of Japan's Mita Conference Facility in Tokyo and included about 50 officials from each side. Participation -------------- ¶3. (S) Attendees from the U.S. side included representatives from the working to senior flag/Deputy Assistant Secretary Level from the Departments of State and Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS),Missile Defense Agency (MDA),Director of National Intelligence (DNI),U.S. Pacific Command, Pacific Fleet, USFJ, Seventh Fleet, Fifth Air Force, U.S. Embassy Tokyo, and U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM). Japanese participants included representatives up to the Director-General Level from MOFA, JDA, the Joint Staff Office (JSO),the Cabinet Information Research Office (CIRO),and the Cabinet Secretariat. Format -------------- ¶4. (S) The conference opened with a plenary session co-chaired by EAP Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary (PDAS) Stephens and Defense Department Senior Director for Northeast Asia Hill on the U.S. side, and MOFA Deputy Director General (DDG) for Foreign Policy Nagamine and JDA DDG for Defense Policy Kanazawa on the Japanese side, which outlined the policy context for the meeting. Attendees proceeded into break-out sessions focused on four areas: Bilateral and Interagency Coordination, Intelligence Cooperation, Operational Coordination, and Additional BMD Measures. Each group reviewed the events before and after July 5 and identified take away lessons for future contingencies. The reports of each group were presented to a Senior Level TOKYO 00005336 002 OF 005 Session, co-chaired by Embassy Tokyo DCM, USFJ Deputy Commander MGEN Larsen and MOFA North American Affairs DG Kawai and JDA Defense Policy DDG Kanazawa. The Conference culminated in two Executive Sessions attended by the Foreign and Defense Ministers and the Ambassador, USFJ Commander LtGen Wright, and senior U.S. agency representatives (see Tokyo 5177). Outcome Document -------------- ¶5. (S) The Conference produced a classified bilateral "Outcome Document" incorporating general lessons learned from the July 5 events and specific recommendations from each working group (full text in para 6). The two sides will use the Outcome Document to prioritize action items in each of the four issue areas. Progress on agenda items is to be reviewed in existing fora, including the DAS-level Roles, Missions, and Capabilities Working Group (RMCWG),by the end of the year. The two sides may also use the Outcome Document to periodically reconvene the ad hoc inter-agency coordination group established before the July 5 missile launches to review both policy and process issues related to current and future developments on the Korean Peninsula. This group, co-chaired by the Embassy DCM and the Deputy Vice Foreign Minister, included representatives from MOFA, JDA, CIRO, the Cabinet Secretariat, Embassy Tokyo, and USFJ. ¶6. (S/Rel Japan) Begin text of Outcome Document: SECRET/REL U.S./JAPAN SIPDIS Capstone Lessons Learned Seminar Outcome Document The U.S.-Japan policy, public affairs, intelligence, and operational responses to the July 5 launch of North Korean missiles validated the progress made in enhancing our alliance over the past decade. At the same time, the experience exposed areas for even closer cooperation in the future, particularly in situations with minimal warning time. Expanded Japanese military and intelligence capabilities require greater attention to bilateral coordination issues. Policy guidance will be necessary to facilitate enhanced data sharing, and to establish mechanisms for coordinating diplomatic and public affairs strategies. Reflecting the events following the launch, the Capstone Lessons Learned Seminar (LLS) identified the following lessons for future similar security challenges. Progress on the agenda specified in this document should be reviewed by the end of this year in existing fora. ¶1. Intelligence Cooperation Bilateral information sharing during the time and events surrounding the July 5 missile launches was excellent. As the number of bilateral channels for information sharing expands, it will be increasingly important to enhance the timely and secure internal distribution of policy-relevant intelligence within both governments. The Capstone conference recommended that the two sides should: -- Further enhance information and intelligence sharing, TOKYO 00005336 003 OF 005 including the release of indications and warning information; -- Explore more effective procedures to ensure that relevant information can continue to reach policy makers in a timely manner so as to ensure close policy coordination; and -- Study measures to strengthen information and intelligence security, including ways to avoid damaging leaks of sensitive intelligence. ¶2. Bilateral and Interagency Policy Coordination The success of the U.S.-Japan alliance in formulating a common public message in response to the July 5 missile launches sent an important message to the U.S. and Japanese publics as well as the international community. Early senior political and military level consultations were a key factor. Bilateral interagency meetings were extremely effective in coordinating views on operations, intelligence, and policy responses. This approach will be critical during the next possible event. It is important to establish procedures in advance to convene political, senior, and working level consultation in the event of another provocation. In order to prepare for an effective response to future similar provocations, the conference recommended that the two sides should: -- Develop general policies and detailed procedures for convening consultations at the political, senior, and working levels to coordinate public diplomacy and policy responses during various levels of crisis and pre-crisis situations; -- Convene periodic coordination meetings similar to those held during the North Korean missile launch period to discuss bilateral cooperation in response to similar developments; -- Enhance Mil-Mil contingency planning as directed by the SDC (Sub-committee for Defense Cooperation) and ensure that policy levels are regularly briefed on military options available in response to various scenarios; -- Dispatch appropriate policy liaisons to interface with operation/intelligence counterparts; -- Discuss contingency public affairs strategies (including reference to the deterrent capabilities of the U.S.-Japan alliance) in response to possible minimal warning scenarios; -- Review coordination for assessments of Armed Attack Situation, Situation Where an Armed Attack is Anticipated (SWAAA),Emergency Response Situation, or Situation in Areas Surrounding Japan (SIASJ); -- Develop a strategy to engage third countries (especially China, Australia, Republic of Korea, Russia and European countries),including through the UNSC; -- Ensure flexibility of our bilateral mechanisms; -- Consider additional measures, including sanctions, to induce North Korea to comply with its international TOKYO 00005336 004 OF 005 obligations, in particular the Joint Statement of September 19, 2005, and UNSCR 1695; and -- Discuss common messages to North Korea and to the publics in the United States and Japan on our policies and preparations. ¶3. Operational Coordination The Self-Defense Forces (SDF) played a critical role in responding to recent threats from North Korea. As Japan's capabilities continue to expand, especially in the BMD and related areas, greater policy level guidance will be needed to ensure enhanced bilateral coordination between U.S. and Japanese forces. The exceptional day-to-day relationships between U.S. components and their JSDF counterparts provided great dividends that facilitated a seamless transition to a heightened response status. These relationships should continue to be advanced. Additionally, the proven capabilities, value, and effectiveness of the USFJ interim BJOCC (Bilateral Joint Operations Coordination Center),with JSDF liaison officers, were critical to the intelligence and information sharing and operational coordination during the North Korean missile launches. In order to further enhance bilateral operational coordination and to ensure robust defense postures, which will also contribute to strengthening deterrence and capabilities, the conference recommended that the two sides should: -- Develop a common understanding on respective C2 structures; -- Enhance data sharing arrangements, including air defense information such as BADGE and ballistic missile data collected from U.S. and Japanese assets; -- Expand capabilities of U.S. and Japanese Aegis vessels to operate together; -- Examine the joint C4I network with the assets actually used in response to the launches and increase opportunities for training on data links; -- Maintain close coordination between the two sides to gain common recognition of threats and each other's operational procedures based on this recognition; -- Deepen the study, by the end of this year, on the posture of joint responses and conclude necessary procedures to implement joint responses including shared CAL/VAL; -- Convene Operational Working Group meetings more frequently, including via VTC, to address those issues mentioned above and refer the results of the study to the policy levels in a speedy and smooth manner. Participation from PACOM will be also expected in those meetings; -- Accelerate bilateral contingency planning and related discussions at the policy level to "consider, as necessary, use of forces providing additional strike power" (The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation) in response to ballistic missile attacks on Japan; TOKYO 00005336 005 OF 005 -- Continue to advance the capabilities and functions of the BJOCC in accordance with SCC (Security Consultative Committee) direction; and -- Develop mutual understanding of U.S. Rules of Engagement and Japanese operational procedures for use in similar situations. ¶4. BMD Measures Strengthened U.S. and Japanese ballistic missile defenses is one important capability contributing to deterrence against ballistic missile threats from North Korea. In this context, Japan: -- Welcomed the U.S. plan to modify additional Aegis ships in the Forward-Deployed Naval Forces in the Western Pacific area with SM-3 capabilities by the end of this year in addition to USS Shiloh; -- Requested further cooperation for additional deployment of PAC-3 and other U.S. BMD assets to Japan; and -- Requested U.S. support to accelerate deployment of Japan's own BMD capabilities. In response, the U.S. expressed its willingness to: -- Facilitate the modification of additional U.S. Navy ships in the Pacific area of operations to be Aegis-BMD capable; -- Continue to consult with Japan on measures to accelerate deployment of Japan's own BMD capabilities; -- Consider Japan's request for the acceleration of BMD procurement, including the provision of 16 PAC-3 missiles to Japan through FMS during JFY2007; -- Discuss with Japan the desirability of conducting dialogues with countries in the region on BMD issues. The Capstone conference recommended that the two sides should: -- Maintain the exchange of information and ideas at existing venues such as Staff Talks to ensure smooth deployment of U.S. BMD capabilities to Japan; and -- Continue to give high priority to cooperative development of SM-3 Block IIA. End text. SCHIEFFER