Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06TOKYO5330
2006-09-15 08:17:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tokyo
Cable title:
JAPAN ON MAINTAINING THE MOMENTUM ON LEBANON
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C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 005330
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA DONICK
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2016
TAGS: PREL PTER ECON IS LE JA
SUBJECT: JAPAN ON MAINTAINING THE MOMENTUM ON LEBANON
REF: STATE 148157
Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer for reasons 1.4(b),(d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 005330
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA DONICK
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2016
TAGS: PREL PTER ECON IS LE JA
SUBJECT: JAPAN ON MAINTAINING THE MOMENTUM ON LEBANON
REF: STATE 148157
Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer for reasons 1.4(b),(d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: Japan agrees that momentum must be
maintained promoting peace in Lebanon and fully supports the
implementation of UNSCR 1701. Tokyo is hesitant to
contribute additional funds, however, citing Lebanon's wealth
and the fact that assistance pledges at the Stockholm
Conference yielded nearly twice what was requested. In
addition, while Japan agrees pressure must be exerted on Iran
and Syria to stop their unhelpful activities, Tokyo believes
these countries must be engaged, rather than isolated. MOFA
holds that the territorial dispute over the Sheba Farms must
be resolved in Lebanon's favor and that Israeli troops must
then withdraw from that area in order to deny Hizbollah the
stated reason for its existence. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) Embassy Tokyo Political Officer September 13 delivered
the talking points contained in reftel to Hideo Sato,
Director of MOFA's First Middle East Division of the Middle
East and African Affairs Bureau. PolOff noted we are
grateful for the $7 million Japan has pledged, particularly
the $2 million earmarked for the clearance of unexploded
ordnance. Sato replied that Japan agrees with the need to
maintain the momentum in Lebanon and fully supports the
implementation of UNSCR 1701. However, Japan is not
sympathetic to Lebanon's calls for additional funding.
Lebanon is a relatively wealthy country, with hundreds of
thousands of expats who are also in a position to help,
explained Sato. In fact, Lebanon's per capita GNP makes it
ineligible to obtain Official Development Assistance (ODA)
from Japan. In addition, pledges of assistance at the
Stockholm Conference nearly doubled the amounts sought by the
Lebanese. Finally, Sato said, Lebanon bears some of the
responsibility for the damage that took place because for
years it has made no move to disarm Hizbollah or other armed
groups as required by previous UNSCRs.
3. (C) PolOff emphasized that more is at stake than simply
the economic reconstruction of southern Lebanon. Also at
stake is the political imperative of enabling the Lebanese
government to exercise sovereignty over its own territory
without interference from outside powers. This, in turn,
will lead to greater political stability throughout the
region. Sato agreed that pressure on Syria and Iran, both
countries that have "normal" relations with Japan, is
required. But he said that Tokyo believes the best way to
engage both countries on this issue is through dialogue
rather than isolation. He pointed out that despite the fact
Japan maintains diplomatic relations with Syria, it makes it
a point not to send or receive high-level visitors or to
contribute significant ODA funds.
4. (C) The key to solving the underlying problem of Hizbollah
in southern Lebanon involves a three step process, according
to Sato. First, the Sheba Farms dispute must be put to rest.
Pressure must be brought on both Lebanon and Syria to solve
this by agreeing that the disputed land belongs to Lebanon.
Second, the Israelis must then be pressured to evacuate that
area, pursuant to UNSCR 425 which calls for their withdrawal
from Lebanon. Once the Israelis have departed, Hizbollah's
stated reason for existing - to fight against the Israeli
occupation of Lebanon - will be removed. He admitted that
many obstacles lie in the path of accomplishing this goal,
and that Hizbollah is unlikely to simply fade away. He also
expressed doubts that the Lebanese government possesses the
political will or strength to really confront and disarm
Hizbollah, although he said he is hopeful that the combined
force of 30,000 soldiers from the Lebanese Armed Forces and
the international community might serve to deter Hizbollah
and bring stability to the south.
5. (C) The morning following PolOff's meeting with Sato, the
Kyodo press service quoted unnamed government officials as
saying Japan, led by elements at MOFA, was considering making
Ground Self Defense Forces and/or Maritime Self Defense
Forces available to UNIFIL in support roles. When queried
about this report, Sato acknowledged that internal
discussions are being held, but since nothing has been
decided, the press reports are "incorrect."
6. (C) COMMENT: Japan will continue to provide vocal support
for UNSCR 1701, but is unlikely to contribute any additional
material assistance above and beyond the $7 million already
pledged unless pressed to do so at higher levels. As for
sending troops, no decision will be made at least until a new
government takes office later this month. We judge the
prospect of Japan sending troops to Lebanon as remote, given
the unsettled situation there and Tokyo's risk aversion, Iraq
and the small GSDF contingent in the Golan Heights
notwithstanding. END COMMENT.
SCHIEFFER
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA DONICK
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2016
TAGS: PREL PTER ECON IS LE JA
SUBJECT: JAPAN ON MAINTAINING THE MOMENTUM ON LEBANON
REF: STATE 148157
Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer for reasons 1.4(b),(d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: Japan agrees that momentum must be
maintained promoting peace in Lebanon and fully supports the
implementation of UNSCR 1701. Tokyo is hesitant to
contribute additional funds, however, citing Lebanon's wealth
and the fact that assistance pledges at the Stockholm
Conference yielded nearly twice what was requested. In
addition, while Japan agrees pressure must be exerted on Iran
and Syria to stop their unhelpful activities, Tokyo believes
these countries must be engaged, rather than isolated. MOFA
holds that the territorial dispute over the Sheba Farms must
be resolved in Lebanon's favor and that Israeli troops must
then withdraw from that area in order to deny Hizbollah the
stated reason for its existence. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) Embassy Tokyo Political Officer September 13 delivered
the talking points contained in reftel to Hideo Sato,
Director of MOFA's First Middle East Division of the Middle
East and African Affairs Bureau. PolOff noted we are
grateful for the $7 million Japan has pledged, particularly
the $2 million earmarked for the clearance of unexploded
ordnance. Sato replied that Japan agrees with the need to
maintain the momentum in Lebanon and fully supports the
implementation of UNSCR 1701. However, Japan is not
sympathetic to Lebanon's calls for additional funding.
Lebanon is a relatively wealthy country, with hundreds of
thousands of expats who are also in a position to help,
explained Sato. In fact, Lebanon's per capita GNP makes it
ineligible to obtain Official Development Assistance (ODA)
from Japan. In addition, pledges of assistance at the
Stockholm Conference nearly doubled the amounts sought by the
Lebanese. Finally, Sato said, Lebanon bears some of the
responsibility for the damage that took place because for
years it has made no move to disarm Hizbollah or other armed
groups as required by previous UNSCRs.
3. (C) PolOff emphasized that more is at stake than simply
the economic reconstruction of southern Lebanon. Also at
stake is the political imperative of enabling the Lebanese
government to exercise sovereignty over its own territory
without interference from outside powers. This, in turn,
will lead to greater political stability throughout the
region. Sato agreed that pressure on Syria and Iran, both
countries that have "normal" relations with Japan, is
required. But he said that Tokyo believes the best way to
engage both countries on this issue is through dialogue
rather than isolation. He pointed out that despite the fact
Japan maintains diplomatic relations with Syria, it makes it
a point not to send or receive high-level visitors or to
contribute significant ODA funds.
4. (C) The key to solving the underlying problem of Hizbollah
in southern Lebanon involves a three step process, according
to Sato. First, the Sheba Farms dispute must be put to rest.
Pressure must be brought on both Lebanon and Syria to solve
this by agreeing that the disputed land belongs to Lebanon.
Second, the Israelis must then be pressured to evacuate that
area, pursuant to UNSCR 425 which calls for their withdrawal
from Lebanon. Once the Israelis have departed, Hizbollah's
stated reason for existing - to fight against the Israeli
occupation of Lebanon - will be removed. He admitted that
many obstacles lie in the path of accomplishing this goal,
and that Hizbollah is unlikely to simply fade away. He also
expressed doubts that the Lebanese government possesses the
political will or strength to really confront and disarm
Hizbollah, although he said he is hopeful that the combined
force of 30,000 soldiers from the Lebanese Armed Forces and
the international community might serve to deter Hizbollah
and bring stability to the south.
5. (C) The morning following PolOff's meeting with Sato, the
Kyodo press service quoted unnamed government officials as
saying Japan, led by elements at MOFA, was considering making
Ground Self Defense Forces and/or Maritime Self Defense
Forces available to UNIFIL in support roles. When queried
about this report, Sato acknowledged that internal
discussions are being held, but since nothing has been
decided, the press reports are "incorrect."
6. (C) COMMENT: Japan will continue to provide vocal support
for UNSCR 1701, but is unlikely to contribute any additional
material assistance above and beyond the $7 million already
pledged unless pressed to do so at higher levels. As for
sending troops, no decision will be made at least until a new
government takes office later this month. We judge the
prospect of Japan sending troops to Lebanon as remote, given
the unsettled situation there and Tokyo's risk aversion, Iraq
and the small GSDF contingent in the Golan Heights
notwithstanding. END COMMENT.
SCHIEFFER