ASO, NUKAGA AGREE WITH AMBASSADOR ON DPRK MISSILE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 005176

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2016
TAGS: MARR PGOV PREL JA
SUBJECT: ASO, NUKAGA AGREE WITH AMBASSADOR ON DPRK MISSILE
LAUNCHES 'LESSONS LEARNED'


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Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer, reasons 1.5 (b, d).


1. (S) SUMMARY: In separate meetings with Foreign Minister
Aso and Defense Minister Nukaga, Ambassador Schieffer
highlighted recommendations on how to further strengthen
U.S.-Japan alliance coordination from the September 7
"Capstone Lessons Learned Conference" on the bilateral
response to recent North Korean missile launches. Both
Ministers welcomed the recommendations from the conference,
including the need for concrete improvements in intelligence
sharing, bilateral interagency cooperation, military
operations, and ballistic missile defense. Aso stressed that
the most important 'lesson learned' was the need to break
down the bureaucratic 'stove pipes' preventing efficient
intelligence sharing within the Japanese government. END
SUMMARY.


2. (S) Ambassador Schieffer met separately with Foreign
Minister Aso and Defense Minister Nukaga September 7 to
review the conclusions of a high-level, inter-agency
bilateral conference held earlier that day to assess
U.S.-Japan cooperation in response to the North Korean
missile launches of July 4/5. The conference (details
reported septel) included senior U.S. representatives from
State, OSD, the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence (DNI),PACOM, Pacific Fleet, Seventh Fleet, USFJ
and component commands. Japanese representatives took part
at a similar level from the Cabinet Office, MOFA, the Japan
Defense Agency, and all branches of the Japan Self Defense
Forces (SDF).


3. (S) U.S.-Japan cooperation in response to North Korea's
missile launches had been unprecedented in its intensity and
effectiveness, said the Ambassador. It had validated gains
made in the ongoing effort to realign and transform the
bilateral alliance. The U.S. had proposed the 'lessons
learned' conference to build on that success, he said, and to
identify what could be done better, especially considering
that the next crisis might come with far less warning.


4. (S) In similar presentations to both Ministers, the
Ambassador highlighted key conclusions of the conference in
four areas: intelligence sharing, bilateral inter-agency
cooperation, military operations, and ballistic missile
defense.

-- On intelligence sharing, the Ambassador emphasized the
need to standardize the system by which classified
information is handled within the Japanese government, to
allow shared intelligence to flow faster to Japanese
policy-makers with greater confidence that it will not be
leaked. He stressed that leaks, particularly those
compromising sources and methods, benefit our enemies and
undermine our ability to collect information on them. A
clear example of the damage caused by leaks, he said, was a
report last year in an American newspaper on U.S. satellite
monitoring of a North Korean possible nuclear test site,
which had tipped off Pyongyang to better camouflage its
activities.

-- On bilateral inter-agency coordination, the Ambassador
noted that, while the tie-up between policy-makers on both
sides during the missile crisis had been excellent,
arrangements had been ad hoc. It was vital to somehow
formalize those arrangements so that both sides identify in

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advance "who will be sitting across the table" in a crisis.
Since a future provocation could come suddenly, allowing no
time for an ad hoc response, it is vital to set up a
bilateral inter-agency group before a crisis occurs.

-- On operational coordination, the Ambassador highlighted
the value of Japanese BADGE air defense data, which had been
shared (intermittently) with U.S. forces during the crisis.
U.S. Aegis ships in "stare mode" monitoring the North Korean
missile launches were unable to focus on air defense, he
said, and the BADGE data reduced their vulnerability. It
would benefit both countries' forces to ensure that such data
sharing can be institutionalized.

-- On ballistic missile defense (BMD),the Ambassador noted
that, although the missile crisis had occurred when BMD
capabilities were in their infancy, it had made clear to the
public in both countries that BMD was increasingly important
for their security. Both sides needed to clarify their BMD
command-and-control arrangements to enable swift, operational
decisions in the event of a future launch. With such limited
lead time, each side must be certain what the other is
prepared to do in response to a launch.

Aso: Japan must improve internal intel-sharing
-------------- -


5. (S) Foreign Minister Taro Aso welcomed the conclusions of
the 'lessons learned' conference. The important task now for
both sides, he said, was to translate those recommendations
into concrete action. He stressed the need for the U.S. and
Japan to coordinate their bilateral response in advance
against any future North Korean provocation, whether it be
more missile launches or a nuclear test. To deter North
Korea, it was vital to deepen cooperation in the alliance,
and to show the public in both countries that the U.S. and
Japan are united in their response.


6. (S) The most important 'lesson learned' for Japan,
stressed Aso, was the need to improve intelligence sharing
within the Japanese government. "Stove-piping" was
preventing critical intelligence from flowing to
policy-makers in a timely fashion, he said, and this needed
to change.


7. (S) On bilateral inter-agency coordination, Aso agreed
that specific personnel should be identified in advance on
both sides to speed coordination before the next crisis.


8. (S) On BMD, Aso said the launches had caused a "landslide
change" in Japanese public concern over North Korea's
missiles, especially among those living on the Sea of Japan
coast. There was a keen awareness that every one of the
seven missiles launched was capable of hitting Japan, he
noted. The Japanese government was set to approve added
funding for missile defense, with "not a soul" in the
political world raising objections. The failure of the
Taepodong-2 launch would surely give Pyongyang reason to fire
another one, he said.


9. (S) A related Japanese priority, Aso added, was to
continue coordination with the U.S. on the follow-up to UN
Security Council Resolution 1695, passed in the wake of the
missile launches. The Japanese government would soon target
financial sanctions against "twelve groups and one

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individual" with links to the Pyongyang regime, he said.

Nukaga: Expanding data exchange helps operations
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10. (S) Defense Minister Fukushiro Nukaga praised the results
of the 'lessons learned' conference. For JDA, he said, it
provided an excellent way to examine the practical steps
needed to improve U.S.-Japan cooperation, especially in the
operational area, based on response to a "real-world threat."


11. (S) On intelligence sharing, Nukaga said that during the
missile crisis, JDA had played a central role as a conduit
for exchanges with the U.S. Communications had been kept
secure, and all equipment and capabilities had functioned
well, he said. Within the Japanese government, however,
events had highlighted the need to improve the protection of
sensitive information, which JDA needed to pass to other
agencies (including MOFA and the Prime Minister's Office) to
facilitate policy decisions. Depending on the threat, JDA
would need to share information with officials in the
National Policy Agency (NPA),as well as officials
responsible for railways, nuclear power plants and electronic
communications. The Japanese government should work
"realistically" to better institutionalize the internal
intelligence flow to enable swift decision-making, and to
clarify which officials would have access to intelligence
received from the United States.


12. (S) On operational coordination, the conclusions drawn
from the missile crisis would be relevant to the ongoing
consideration of the roles, missions and capabilities of each
branch of Japan's Self-Defense Forces (SDF). More
specifically, it was now clear that information exchange
between U.S. and Japanese forces -- via BADGE air defense
data and the communications designed to link both countries'
Aegis ships -- was valuable to both sides. Information
exchange between U.S. and Japanese forces was not an abstract
issue, but a real-world, practical concern that must be
addressed "so that our operators can talk to each other."
More progress was needed in bilateral planning, he added, a
process ongoing under the "2 2" agreement.


13. (S) On BMD, Nukaga cited Japan's standing requests to
accelerate the provision of BMD assets to Japan, and to
accelerate the deployment of U.S. BMD assets to the region.
He looked forward to working with the U.S. in the follow-up
to those requests, he said.

Ambassador press comments
--------------


14. (SBU) In brief comments to reporters after the meetings
at MOFA and JDA, the Ambassador said he had held discussions
on the close U.S.-Japan cooperation that took place in
response to the recent missile crisis. Noting that it would
not be helpful to go into details, it was clear that
increasing cooperation in the alliance would bring benefits
to the public of both countries. He added that the U.S.
regards its alliance with Japan as the cornerstone of
security in the region.
SCHIEFFER