NAVY SECRETARY WINTER STRESSES U.S.-JAPAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 005080 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/06/2016 TAGS: PREL MARR MASS PGOV JA SUBJECT: NAVY SECRETARY WINTER STRESSES U.S.-JAPAN COOPERATION WITH FM ASO Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer. Reasons 1.4 (B) (D) ¶1. (C) Summary. During a 20-minute meeting on August 28, Secretary of the Navy Donald Winter told Japan,s FM Taro Aso SIPDIS that the Secretary's visit symbolized the U.S. perception of the importance of cooperation between the navies and governments of both countries. The Secretary emphasized the importance of implementing agreemnts reached through the Defense Posture Review Initiative (DPRI). The deployment of the USS Shiloh, he noted, highlighted the U.S. intention to provide the best possible resources to its allies. ¶2. (C) Aso welcomed the U.S. decision to forward-deploy ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems to Japan. Though the decision to accept the nuclear-powered USS George Washington at Yokosuka Base had been "very difficult," the Japanese government understood that nuclear-powered ships had visited Japan many times over the years and had never had an accident, Aso said. End Summary. -------------- Middle East Distraction -------------- ¶3. (C) On August 28, Navy Secretary Donald Winter met with Japanese FM Taro Aso to review current and planned bilateral cooperation between the U.S. and Japan. Secretary Winter was joined by Navy Assistant Secretary B.J. Penn, Embassy Charge Donovan, and Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Japan Rear-Admiral James Kelly. FM Aso's team included MOFA North American Affairs Bureau DG Kawai. ¶4. (C) FM Aso began by noting that political discussion in the U.S. appeared to be focused on the Middle East, Lebanon, Iraq, and Afghanistan. However, the ambiguous and unstable situation in the Taiwan Strait and elsewhere in East Asia meant that America,s presence was required to maintain stability. Aso expressed appreciation for the Navy,s role in strengthening the U.S.-Japan relationship. -------------- Visit Symbolic of Cooperation -------------- ¶5. (C) Under Prime Minister Koizumi,s administration, Aso continued, the U.S. and Japan had accomplished much. This successful cooperation was due, in large part, to the good personal relationship between PM Koizumi and President Bush. Close coordination between the countries had been proven by a series of cooperative steps the two sides had taken in the Indian Ocean and Iraq. ¶6. (C) Secretary Winter responded that his visit symbolized the critical need for cooperation between the Navies and governments of both countries. The close relationship between the U.S and Japan was evident through activities such as the recent successful ballistic missile tests near Hawaii and biennial RIMPAC exercises. ¶7. (C) The U.S. looked forward to working together in the future on alliance transformation issues, including Okinawa and Guam, Winter said. Implementation of the May 1 DPRI Roadmap should now be our priority. The Secretary drew particular attention to the importance of making progress on Futenma MCAS relocation and finding a permanent site for night-landing practice. Aso interjected that the Futenma situation was "very difficult." Winter responded that, while the U.S. understood the complicated nature of the problem, it was important for Japan and the U.S. to find ways to move forward. -------------- TOKYO 00005080 002 OF 002 Aso Thanks for BMD Deployments -------------- ¶8. (C) Turning to ballistic missile defense, Secretary Winter noted his plan to re-enter Japan on August 29 at Yokosuka aboard the USS Shiloh, a deployment that symbolized the U.S. commitment to providing the best possible resources to its allies. Aso expressed thanks for the U.S. decision to forward-deploy BMD assets to Japan. Japan,s Self Defense Forces would also look to deploy and utilize other missile defense-related equipment. The threat posed by North Korean missiles requires that Japan consider augmenting its resources. Secretary Winter reiterated that the two countries would need to work together to ensure interoperability between forces in order to increase deterrence and security in the region. -------------- Safety Assurances on CVN George Washington -------------- ¶9. (C) Yokosuka Mayor Kabaya had taken a political risk in permitting the nuclear-powered carrier CVN USS George Washington to base there, Aso commented. It was important to continue to explain the safety of nuclear carriers to the public. Aso remarked that the Japanese government has estimated that nuclear-powered ships had visited Japan 1250 times over the years without a single accident. ¶10. (C) Stating that he understood the political risks involved, Secretary Winter reassured Aso about the safety aspects of the planned forward deployment. Commenting that the sailors assigned to nuclear carriers also lived in the community, Winter expressed full confidence in the CVN,s safety. The Navy was nevertheless prepared to provide additional safety information to the Japanese public. SCHIEFFER