A/S HILL CONSULTATIONS WITH MOFA DG SASAE

C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 005042 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2026 TAGS: PREL PARM JA KS KN SUBJECT: A/S HILL CONSULTATIONS WITH MOFA DG SASAE Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer. Reasons: 1.4(B)(D) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) MOFA Asia/Oceania Director General Sasae reiterated to EAP Assistant Secretary Hill on September 4 the need for actions implementing UNSCR 1695, saying we had to show North Korea there were consequences before the next round of DPRK brinksmanship. A/S Hill said USG decisions on implementing UNSCR 1695 were expected soon, probably in advance of the 5 5 meeting in New York. DG Sasae recommended an increased focus on human rights problems in North Korea, worried about trends in Burma, and tried to allay U.S. concerns about new regional fora that did not include the United States. DG Sasae thought Japan-China relations would improve with the election of a new Japanese Prime Minister, but was not optimistic on Japan-ROK relations, citing the potential for more trouble if a notification regime for maritime surveys could not negotiated before the end of October. End summary. Whither Kim Chong-Il? -------------- ¶2. (C) MOFA Director General for Asia and Oceania Kenichiro Sasae began a September 4 working dinner with Assistant Secretary Hill, Ambassador Schieffer, USFJ LtGen Wright and SIPDIS embassy officers by saying Japan was aware of reports that "someone" from North Korea was in China and that three North Korean trains had been at the DPRK/PRC border. Japan did not know, however, if those reports meant Kim Chong-Il was in China, or even if he were planning to go to there. UNSCR 1695 Implementation -------------- ¶3. (C) MOFA had been instructed by Chief Cabinet Secretary Abe, DG Sasae said, to closely coordinate with the U.S. on implementing UN Security Resolution 1695, adopted in the wake of the DPRK missile launches. Japan was working on measures basically in line with U.S. actions that designated North Korea entities involved in missile and WMD-related activities, and had found some similar entities in Japan. Sasae added that Japan wanted to take actions in concert with the U.S., and perhaps other countries such as Australia, and to coordinate closely on timing. ¶4. (C) A/S Hill reviewed the recent U.S. demarche on UNSCR 1695 implementation, and DG Sasae observed that China and the ROK appeared to be opposed, arguing that scrutinizing bank accounts went beyond the scope of UNSCR 1695. Sasae asserted that whether or not further action provoked North Korea, the "core countries" needed to do something regarding implementation of UNSCR 1695. A/S Hill said USG discussions about measures to implement UNSCR 1695 were ongoing, with decisions expected soon, probably in advance of the 5 5 meeting in New York scheduled for September 21. In regard to the 5 5 forum, Sasae supported the idea of including the EU, UK and France, saying more participants would make a clearer differentiation between that forum and the 6-Party talks. ¶5. (C) DG Sasae pointed out that the DPRK's top four trading partners were China, the ROK, Thailand and Japan, and that unless China and the ROK agreed to cooperate in further measures vis--vis North Korea, they would not have much effect. He noted Japan had asked the U.S. Treasury Department for additional information on the twelve designated entities and that Prime Minister Koizumi had recently suggested to PM Howard that Australia designate some North Korean companies. "We have to let North Korea know there are consequences" before the next round of DPRK brinksmanship, Sasae reiterated. If we did nothing, it would be a case of "big thunder; little rain." Regarding a possible DPRK nuclear test, Sasae felt that if China were thinking about just another UNSC resolution without sanctions, actions to prevent a North Korean test would fail -- "verbal warnings will not suffice." DG Sasae thought that, despite growing Chinese economic and trade ties with the DPRK, relations were not growing closer, and that a DPRK nuclear test would move China and the DPRK toward more normal relations, i.e., away from the "special" relationship that continued to exist. ¶6. (C) DG Sasae and A/S Hill agreed there was a difference of views between the U.S. and Japan on the one hand, and China and the ROK on the other, about how to deal with North Korea. Elaborating on this point, Sasae said it would therefore be important what the President said to ROK President Roh during their upcoming summit meeting -- "it may have some influence." Human Rights in North Korea -------------- ¶7. (C) DG Sasae characterized North Korea as a collapsed state, adding it would be impossible for the Kim regime to transform the DPRK into a normal country. "The more we look, the more criminal activity we find," he said, adding that this applied as well to the abduction issue. DG Sasae recommended an increased focus on human rights issues in North Korea. He told A/S Hill that the families of Japanese abductees were considering a visit to New York where they might meet with Ambassador Bolton. A/S Hill thought Ambassador Bolton would be happy to meet with the group, and noted that Special Envoy for North Korea Human Rights Lefkowitz may come to Japan during North Korea Human Rights Week in December. Possible Humanitarian Aid to the DPRK -------------- ¶8. (C) DDG Umeda observed that following initial reports of 500 fatalities and limited crop damage resulting from the floods in North Korea, there were now reports of 3,000 fatalities and crop damage of up to two million tons, i.e., half the annual harvest. If the latter case were true, he asked, what would be the U.S. policy on humanitarian assistance? A/S Hill noted the three principles that governed U.S. humanitarian assistance (severity of the problem; competing needs; adequate monitoring) and said that if severe need were confirmed and satisfactory answers to the three principles were obtained, the U.S. would probably participate in providing humanitarian assistance. DG Sasae observed that, at this point, the Japanese political situation would not support any humanitarian aid to North Korea. Burma -------------- ¶9. (C) DG Sasae said Burma was "trying to show" it was serious about reform, implying it was nothing but a show. Japan was "fed up" with Than Shwe, he continued, and worried that Burma might turn into a country like North Korea. Sasae said we needed to keep an eye on Burma's relations with North Korea, citing their military connections and exchanges on nuclear development. China, he observed, knew about those activities but turned a blind eye and remained one of the very few countries friendly toward Burma. Japan did not want to see Chinese influence in Burma continue to increase, Sasae concluded. Regional Architecture -------------- ¶10. (C) A/S Hill raised U.S. concerns about regional architectures that did not include the United States, including a recent METI initiative that had been proposed without any consultations with the U.S. DG Sasae explained that Japan was worried about China's attempt to increase its influence via the ASEAN 3 forum. Japan, accordingly, was promoting ASEAN 6 (adding India, Australia and New Zealand) to make a "more open and balanced" forum. Sasae admitted that Japan's strategy was not succeeding, since China was aware of Japan's motives, i.e., to check China. DG Sasae downplayed the chances of success for proposals like a regional OECD-like structure or an East Asia free trade area, and in regard to these ideas he urged A/S Hill, "don't worry," they were not inconsistent with APEC and not inconsistent with U.S. interests. Japan-China Relations -------------- ¶11. (C) DG Sasae said that China wanted to take advantage of the upcoming LDP Presidential election and subsequent election of a new Japanese Prime Minister to improve bilateral relations. China realized that it had gone too far in reacting to the Yasukuni Shrine visits, he asserted. Japan-ROK Relations -------------- ¶12. (C) Problems with South Korea, DG Sasae said, were more difficult, as the issues had become emotional and matters of sovereignty. He observed that until recently, Japan had done maritime surveys around the Liancourt Rocks (Takeshima/Dokdo) for 13 years without a problem. He said he would leave on September 6 for Seoul, together with Vice Foreign Minister Yachi, to try to work out a maritime survey notification regime, noting Japan had one already in effect with China. The problem, he continued, was there was not much time left for negotiations. The environmental survey had to be conducted before the end of October, when seas turned too rough for such work. If a notification regime could not be hammered out by then, Japan would seek ROK acknowledgment that its position was not in accord with international law. DG Sasae added that if there were no agreement, "more offensive measures would be needed." Japan-DPRK Relations: No Change Post-Koizumi -------------- ¶13. (C) Asked if Japan is seeing signs North Korea fears the transition to Abe from Koizumi will result in tougher Japanese policies toward the DPRK, DG Sasae replied, "Yes, they think Abe will be more hawkish; but they'll be wrong." Sasae thought the DPRK would not do anything special in the next three weeks, and DDG Umeda pointed out that in the midst of Japan's strong response to the North Korean missile launches, Chief Cabinet Secretary Abe had carefully stated that the Pyongyang Declaration, adopted at the time of PM Koizumi's first visit to the DPRK, remained in effect. SCHIEFFER