Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06TOKYO5017
2006-09-01 07:48:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tokyo
Cable title:  

ISAO IIJIMA ON SHINZO ABE'S LEADERSHIP, U.S.-JAPAN

Tags:  PGOV PREL MARR JA 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 005017 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR JA
SUBJECT: ISAO IIJIMA ON SHINZO ABE'S LEADERSHIP, U.S.-JAPAN
RELATIONS, RUSSIA, AND OKINAWA GOVERNOR RACE

REF: A. TOKYO 4740

B. TOKYO 4561

Classified By: CDA JOSEPH R. DONOVAN. REASONS 1.4 (B)(D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 005017 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR JA SUBJECT: ISAO IIJIMA ON SHINZO ABE'S LEADERSHIP, U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS, RUSSIA, AND OKINAWA GOVERNOR RACE REF: A. TOKYO 4740 ¶B. TOKYO 4561 Classified By: CDA JOSEPH R. DONOVAN. REASONS 1.4 (B)(D) ¶1. (C) Summary. Isao Iijima, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's most trusted advisor, shared the following frank and perhaps self-serving observations with Acting DCM Meserve on August 23: -- Shinzo Abe, Japan's next prime minister, may lack the political skills to lead the ruling LDP in next year's elections; he is surrounded by too many advisors and needs an Iijima-like gatekeeper to be a "bad guy" and harness the flow of information; -- plans for a U.S.-style National Security Council are unlikely to succeed, given the current state of Japan's intelligence community; -- Japan and the U.S. must become more like "separable" partners, allowing Japan to cultivate good relations with countries that may have an anti-U.S. bias; Prime Minister Koizumi will announce a private sector initiative along those lines after he leaves office; -- The Okinawa gubernatorial race outcome is uncertain; -- Koizumi made a conscious decision to handle Russia's firing on a Japanese fishing boat in waters off the disputed Northern Territories in as quiet and sensitive a manner as possible; and -- the U.S. should concentrate efforts at the vice governor level to ensure U.S. military aircraft can exercise their landing rights at the local airport in Aomori. End summary. Abe a Weak Leader? -------------- ¶2. (C) Over lunch on August 23 with acting DCM Meserve, Koizumi aide Isao Iijuma reviewed a wide range of topics. Most notably, Iijima told Meserve he was concerned about Abe's lack of a "bad guy", someone like Iijima, to unite LDP members together and exert control over the current complex situation. Highlighting this point, Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe's executive assistant, Yoshiyuki Inoue, called Iijima at this point during the lunch. Over the phone, Iijima suggested they meet to talk about how to streamline the too many Diet supporters for Abe. U.S.-Style NSC -------------- ¶3. (C) After hanging up, Iijima showed his slight frustration with Abe, saying "Abe san mo hakkiri shinai," Abe is not clear and decisive. He also commented negatively on Abe's idea to create a U.S.-
style National Security Council inside the Prime Minister's Office (Kantei),saying it would never work well because there was no single person who could exercise control over the current intelligence community. Iijima thought Abe must be able to exercise his leadership more effectively. U.S.-Japan Relations Should Evolve -------------- ¶4. (C) Iijima hoped U.S.-Japan relations would take on a more "complementary" shape, allowing both countries to take advantage of their relative strengths in foreign affairs. Describing the U.S. and Japan as "separable" allies in the eyes of many nations, he believed Japan could use its goodwill in the developing world to build relations with countries that do not necessarily look favorably on the U.S. He pointed out that Prime Minister Koizumi had already embarked down this path with visits to countries where Japan TOKYO 00005017 002 OF 003 might exercise greater influence to supplement weak ties with the U.S. He did not know whether Abe would continue this approach, but said that Koizumi would announce, after stepping down from office, a related private sector initiative that would contribute to better diplomatic relations for both Japan and the U.S. Low-key Handling of Russian Shooting -------------- ¶5. (C) Prime Minister Koizumi had deliberately chosen to adopt a low-key approach in response to the August 16 firing on a Japanese fishing vessel by a Russian patrol boat off Kunashiri Island in the disputed Northern Territories (ref C),Iijima told Acting DCM. He claimed that he had worked directly with Russian Charge Mikhail Galuzin and others to defuse this politically charged matter. Okinawa Governor Race -------------- ¶6. (C) The outcome of the Okinawa gubernatorial election in November was still uncertain, Iijima stated. While the LDP and Komeito have decided to field an influential local business leader, Okinawa Electric Power Company Chairman Hirokazu Nakaima, the LDP is not totally united in its support, either nationally or locally. He reserved harsh criticism for prospective candidate and former LDP Diet member Mikio Shimoji. Shimoji is still considering whether to run, Iijima related, but has almost no chance of winning. (Note. Iijima previously told Embassy Tokyo that he was strongly supporting Shimoji for governor.) Iijima, obviously disenchanted with Shimoji, charged that by becoming governor, Shimoji was merely trying to rebuild a "new collusion and corruption system" just for himself in Okinawa. Shimoji would fully support the U.S. force transformation initiatives, but would not be good for Okinawa, said Iijima. Aomori Airport: Iijima Promises Help for U.S. Forces -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) After A/DCM explained ongoing problems in getting landing permission at Aomori Airport for U.S. military aircraft and the importance of easy access for running the X-Band radar installation, Iijima offered to intervene. Noting that Hachinohe Mayor Makoto Kobayashi is his friend, Iijima offered to speak to Kobayashi to help ensure that U.S. military aircraft can exercise their rights to land at Aomori Airport. In general, he observed, the best way to get this sort of permission at the prefectural level is to go through the vice governor, rather than the governor. Vice governors are usually promising young bureaucrats from the Home Affairs Ministry who will return to their ministry after the prefectural assignment. Knowing the importance of maintaining good relations with Diet members, they are much more likely to listen to these requests than the actual governors, who are more focused on local issues. He noted that he himself had used the "vice governor channel" once to get permission for the Self Defense Forces to use a small airport in Hokkaido. Comment -------------- ¶8. (C) Iijima is the outgoing Prime Minister's most trusted advisor and political fixer. They have been together for over 30 years. Iijima's criticism of Abe is similar to what we have heard elsewhere; that Abe's support within the LDP is shallower and more nuanced than it appears, despite his runaway lead in the LDP presidential race (ref B). Iijima has shepherded Koizumi through some rocky shoals over the past five years and helped bring him to the end of his term with close to 50 percent approval ratings. With no "Iijima" of his own in sight, Abe may have a more difficult time controlling the LDP and keeping the factional fighting in check. TOKYO 00005017 003 OF 003 DONOVAN

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