Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06TOKYO4892
2006-08-25 09:23:00
SECRET
Embassy Tokyo
Cable title:  

YOUR VISIT TO JAPAN

Tags:  PREL MARR MASS PGOV JA 
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TO RUENAAA/SECNAV WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 3931
RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY 4169
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0063
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA PRIORITY 0383
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI PRIORITY 6104
RUHBABA/CG III MEF CAMP COURTNEY JA PRIORITY
RUENAAA/ASSTSECNAV IE WASHINGTON DC//IE// PRIORITY
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUYNAAC/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA PRIORITY
RHHMHBA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI PRIORITY
RHOVVKG/COMSEVENTHFLT PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 004892 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR SECRETARY WINTER FROM CHARGE DONOVAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2016
TAGS: PREL MARR MASS PGOV JA
SUBJECT: YOUR VISIT TO JAPAN


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Joseph R. Donovan, reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 004892 SIPDIS SIPDIS FOR SECRETARY WINTER FROM CHARGE DONOVAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2016 TAGS: PREL MARR MASS PGOV JA SUBJECT: YOUR VISIT TO JAPAN Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Joseph R. Donovan, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The July 5 DPRK missile launches have generated unprecedented interest among Japanese in the U.S.-Japan defense relationship. This is particularly true for Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD). Your meetings in Tokyo, and the high-profile you will lend to the USS Shiloh's arrival in Yokosuka, will contribute to strengthening the capability of our bilateral alliance to support U.S. interests. We want to move beyond Japan's current focus on simply acquiring new BMD equipment. It is crucial that we secure commitments on enhanced planning, coordination, and information sharing before the next crisis. We also must convince Japan that it needs to fully fund non-BMD programs, including Alliance Transformation, training and operations, and Host Nation Support. END SUMMARY. Entering a New Era -------------- ¶2. (C) U.S.-Japan relations are the strongest in decades. Polls show public support for the security alliance has reached an unprecedented 80 percent. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's commitment to the relationship and his friendship with the President have contributed to this positive trend. The strength of our alliance, however, rests on a broader set of shared interests and values. The debate here a decade ago over Japan's need to choose between America and Asia is over. Japanese elites, and a growing segment of the public, understand that Japan's interests are best served by a close partnership with the United States. This judgment is the basis for the foreign policy of the next Prime Minister, widely expected to be current Chief Cabinet Secretary SHINZO Abe, and those who follow him. SIPDIS ¶3. (C) The July 5 DPRK missile launches have focused public attention on the alliance. BMD issues will be foremost on the minds of your interlocutors. For many, BMD is now the defining issue for the alliance, and the engine of continued transformation. The deployment of U.S. SM-3-capable Aegis vessels to Japan (including USS Shiloh),a PAC-3 Patriot battalion to Okinawa, and installation of an FBX radar in Shariki are generating intense media interest. Japan is expanding its own BMD capabilities, through agreements with the U.S. to upgrade their Aegis to be SM-3 capable, co
-develop the next generation SM-3 missile, and purchase PAC-3 batteries. In your meetings with the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) and MOFA, you will likely be asked about Navy plans to forward deploy six SM-3-capable Aegis vessels to the Pacific. ¶4. (S) We want to capture the momentum from July 5 to forge ahead with closer cooperation not only on BMD, but in the policy, operational, and intelligence spheres. We are working with Japanese counterparts to review our responses to the DPRK launches. This will culminate in a bilateral "capstone" lessons learned meeting September 7-8, coordinated by OSD and chaired by Ambassador Schieffer with flag officer participation from USFJ, Seventh Fleet and PACOM. The goal will be to produce a concrete "to do" list to strengthen cooperation before the next crisis. In your calls at JDA in particular, it would be helpful to encourage senior Japanese participation in this effort. DPRI Realignments -------------- ¶5. (S) We want to encourage the Japanese not to limit their focus to acquiring BMD hardware. Alliance transformation, both the base realignment and efforts to expand bilateral roles, missions and capabilities, will take political leadership as well as money and manpower. ¶6. (C) Although only in its early stages, implementation of the May 1 Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) roadmap is TOKYO 00004892 002 OF 002 progressing smoothly. For the Okinawa realignments, including the relocation of Futenma MCAS to a new facility, a key variable will be the Okinawa gubernatorial election in November. Victory by an opposition candidate could delay the timetable for the move to Futenma. ¶7. (C) The political environment for transfer of the carrier air wing to Iwakuni is favorable. The Governor of Yamaguchi prefecture, which hosts the base, announced his support for the move this week, and urged the Iwakuni Mayor to drop his opposition. Yamaguchi is the home district of the likely next Prime Minister, SHINZO Abe, a strong supporter of the alliance, which should also help. Progress is slower on the nearly 30-year effort to identify a permanent site for the air wing's Field Carrier Landing Practice (often called "Night Landing Practice"). Bilateral working level discussions are due to begin soon with the goal of finding a site by 2009, but the Japanese are not making this a high priority. It would help if you could remind those you meet at MOFA and the Japan Defense Agency about the importance of finding a permanent site. ¶8. (C) The next challenge for implementing DPRI will be to create the funding and legislative mechanisms needed to implement agreed upon base realignment activities. JDA Minister Nukaga has told us that the cabinet has agreed to fund base realignment outside of the JDA budget. Funding for the Marines move to Guam, both loans and direct costs, are likely to be put before the Diet during the January regular session. This is welcome news. You may wish to stress that DPRI funding should not come at the expense of Host Nation Support, including the Special Measures Agreement and Facilities Improvement Program (which covers base-related construction performed by the Japanese government). CVN Deployment, Port Visits -------------- ¶9. (C) Navy ship visits to Japanese ports -- 25 this year alone -- continue to raise awareness of the U.S. commitment to Japan's defense, valuable at a time of public anxiety about North Korea and the rise of China. Participation by a Seventh Fleet frigate in a natural disaster drill by the Tokyo City Government next month will also boost the image of the Navy presence here. ¶10. (C) Preparations for the USS George Washington's 2008 deployment to Yokosuka are proceeding smoothly, thanks in large part to the hard work of Rear-Admiral Kelly and his staff at CNFJ. We expect the Yokosuka Mayor to approve permits by August 31 for the first stage of a project to dredge Yokosuka harbor to CVN depth. In mid-September, we will start consultations with MOFA and Yokosuka City on arrangements for emergency drills and an all-purpose city-base disaster response agreement. Japan's International Role -------------- ¶10. (C) Finally, your visit will also offer an opportunity to commend Japan's contributions to the Global War on Terrorism. While the last Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) unit withdrew from Iraq last month, Japan's government has made clear its intention to extend the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) deployment to the Indian Ocean for another six-month cycle. Legislative authority for the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) mission in Kuwait will remain effective until July 31, ¶2007. You may wish to offer suggestions on new overseas initiatives that would maintain the momentum from the Iraq deployment and help the government justify passage of a permanent SDF dispatch law. It will also be useful to urge Japan to move more quickly to complete the Heart road project in Afghanistan. DONOVAN

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