JAPAN STATUS UPDATE ON HSPD-6 INITIATIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 004663 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS PLEASE PASS TO ERIN TREACY (CA/P/IP) E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: CVIS PTER PINR PGOV PREL JA SUBJECT: JAPAN STATUS UPDATE ON HSPD-6 INITIATIVE REF: A. SECSTATE 109771 ¶B. PHILL-MPILZ E-MAIL ON 12JUNE2006: "RE: UPDATED HSPD-6 MOU" ¶1. (U) SUMMARY: Post has seen progress on several fronts in advancing the HSPD-6 Terrorist Screening Information Initiative. Post's inter-agency working group on HSPD-6 has been working closely to identify and educate key GOJ contacts, and to find solutions to potential obstacles. On June 6, 2006, Post delivered to the Foreign Ministry a draft Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for HSPD-6 to jump-start substantive discussions on the exchange of terrorist screening information. Post awaits a formal response on the proposal. While an agreement to allow one point of contact for terrorist screening data exchange and information feedback seems unlikely, individual GOJ agencies appear motivated to find a solution and begin information exchange. Post's newly arrived Consular Visa Chief will take over as the main point of contact for this initiative as of August 14, 2006. END SUMMARY. PROGRESS -------------- ¶2. (SBU) The HSPD-6 process in Japan continues to advance in a positive direction, albeit at a slow and deliberate pace. The multiple Mission agencies involved formed a working group in 2005 and invited key Japanese contacts to the Embassy for presentations on the HSPD-6 process and to discuss issues involved with information sharing. Each Mission agency has also deliberated formally and informally on key issues with respective Japanese agency contacts. ¶3. (U) Post has identified Rokuichiro Michii, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) Foreign Policy Bureau, International Counter-terrorism Cooperation Division Director, as the point of contact for discussions regarding advancement of HSPD-6 objectives. In hopes of jump-starting substantive dialogue, on June 6, 2006, Post presented Michii with a draft Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for consideration (ref B). He stated that he would initiate coordination among the relevant ministries and agencies, noting that the discussions would likely include MOFA lawyers who will also want to study the issue. ¶4. (SBU) Post is trying to pursue a single comprehensive agreement that will allow exchange of terrorist screening data between the United States and Japan and provide one point of contact for information requests and feedback between the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) and the Government of Japan (GOJ). While the GOJ agrees, in principal, that this information exchange will be a valuable tool in the fight against terrorism, it has expressed concerns that regulatory and institutional limitations will necessitate several points on contact. However, given the enthusiastic support of individual Japanese agencies, we are exploring alternative solutions, including engaging in separate agreements with the various Japanese agencies are being explored. Post awaits formal feedback from Michii on the MOU in order to pursue these alternatives, as appropriate. OBSTACLES -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Reciprocity and Process of information exchange: In TOKYO 00004663 002 OF 002 June 2006, Director Michii informally raised concern over the amount and redundancy of information that may be given in exchange for U.S. data. While we encouraged Japan to share as much data with us as possible, we assured Michii that we do not expect to receive the same amount of data from Japan that we will provide to it. He also noted that the GOJ interpretation of information sharing provisions restricts the Japanese Immigration Bureau (JIB) from sharing immigration information with non-immigration services. This poses a problem because JIB, the most likely end-user organization, would be unable to share information with anyone other than immigration officials in the Department of Homeland Security. One possible solution would be for a JIB official to serve as Japan's POC (thereby offering JIB a direct channel of communication to the TSC) but inter-ministerial rivalries (explained below) would likely hamper JIB's ability to manage the flow of information. ¶6. (SBU) Limits of Information Sharing: Sensitivities and institutional limitations within GOJ for sharing information across GOJ agencies will make designating any one agency as POC unlikely. This would require an institutional shift within the GOJ to expand the inherent limits of inter-agency cooperation and such a shift would take time. While the hope is that HSPD-6 will encourage Japanese agencies to improve cooperation to allow information sharing and designation of a singular point of contact in the long term, an interim solution may be needed to achieve the immediate goals of HSPD-6 information sharing. POC CHANGE -------------- ¶7. (U) The Consular contact for HSPD-6 has changed. Michael Garrote, the new Consular Visa Chief, will take over HSPD-6 issues as of August 14, 2006. SCHIEFFER