JAPAN STATUS UPDATE ON HSPD-6 INITIATIVE

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SUBJECT: JAPAN STATUS UPDATE ON HSPD-6 INITIATIVE

REF: A. SECSTATE 109771

B. PHILL-MPILZ E-MAIL ON 12JUNE2006: "RE: UPDATED
HSPD-6 MOU"


1. (U) SUMMARY: Post has seen progress on several fronts in
advancing the HSPD-6 Terrorist Screening Information
Initiative. Post's inter-agency working group on HSPD-6 has
been working closely to identify and educate key GOJ
contacts, and to find solutions to potential obstacles. On
June 6, 2006, Post delivered to the Foreign Ministry a draft
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for HSPD-6 to jump-start
substantive discussions on the exchange of terrorist
screening information. Post awaits a formal response on the
proposal. While an agreement to allow one point of contact
for terrorist screening data exchange and information
feedback seems unlikely, individual GOJ agencies appear
motivated to find a solution and begin information exchange.
Post's newly arrived Consular Visa Chief will take over as
the main point of contact for this initiative as of August
14, 2006. END SUMMARY.

PROGRESS
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2. (SBU) The HSPD-6 process in Japan continues to advance in
a positive direction, albeit at a slow and deliberate pace.
The multiple Mission agencies involved formed a working group
in 2005 and invited key Japanese contacts to the Embassy for
presentations on the HSPD-6 process and to discuss issues
involved with information sharing. Each Mission agency has
also deliberated formally and informally on key issues with
respective Japanese agency contacts.


3. (U) Post has identified Rokuichiro Michii, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (MOFA) Foreign Policy Bureau, International
Counter-terrorism Cooperation Division Director, as the point
of contact for discussions regarding advancement of HSPD-6
objectives. In hopes of jump-starting substantive dialogue,
on June 6, 2006, Post presented Michii with a draft
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for consideration (ref B).
He stated that he would initiate coordination among the
relevant ministries and agencies, noting that the discussions
would likely include MOFA lawyers who will also want to study
the issue.


4. (SBU) Post is trying to pursue a single comprehensive
agreement that will allow exchange of terrorist screening
data between the United States and Japan and provide one
point of contact for information requests and feedback
between the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) and the
Government of Japan (GOJ). While the GOJ agrees, in
principal, that this information exchange will be a valuable
tool in the fight against terrorism, it has expressed
concerns that regulatory and institutional limitations will
necessitate several points on contact. However, given the
enthusiastic support of individual Japanese agencies, we are
exploring alternative solutions, including engaging in
separate agreements with the various Japanese agencies are
being explored. Post awaits formal feedback from Michii on
the MOU in order to pursue these alternatives, as appropriate.

OBSTACLES
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5. (SBU) Reciprocity and Process of information exchange: In

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June 2006, Director Michii informally raised concern over the
amount and redundancy of information that may be given in
exchange for U.S. data. While we encouraged Japan to share
as much data with us as possible, we assured Michii that we
do not expect to receive the same amount of data from Japan
that we will provide to it. He also noted that the GOJ
interpretation of information sharing provisions restricts
the Japanese Immigration Bureau (JIB) from sharing
immigration information with non-immigration services. This
poses a problem because JIB, the most likely end-user
organization, would be unable to share information with
anyone other than immigration officials in the Department of
Homeland Security. One possible solution would be for a JIB
official to serve as Japan's POC (thereby offering JIB a
direct channel of communication to the TSC) but
inter-ministerial rivalries (explained below) would likely
hamper JIB's ability to manage the flow of information.


6. (SBU) Limits of Information Sharing: Sensitivities and
institutional limitations within GOJ for sharing information
across GOJ agencies will make designating any one agency as
POC unlikely. This would require an institutional shift
within the GOJ to expand the inherent limits of inter-agency
cooperation and such a shift would take time. While the hope
is that HSPD-6 will encourage Japanese agencies to improve
cooperation to allow information sharing and designation of a
singular point of contact in the long term, an interim
solution may be needed to achieve the immediate goals of
HSPD-6 information sharing.

POC CHANGE
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7. (U) The Consular contact for HSPD-6 has changed. Michael
Garrote, the new Consular Visa Chief, will take over HSPD-6
issues as of August 14, 2006.
SCHIEFFER