US-JAPAN COORDINATION ON DPRK MISSILES LAUNCHES:

S E C R E T TOKYO 004543

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/11/2026
TAGS: PREL MARR PINR KN JA
SUBJECT: US-JAPAN COORDINATION ON DPRK MISSILES LAUNCHES:
LESSONS LEARNED

Classified By: AMBASSADOR J. THOMAS SCHIEFFER. REASON:1.4(B)(D)


1. (S) Summary: A U.S.-Japan inter-agency meeting August 9
concluded that bilateral coordination in the period
surrounding the July DPRK missile launches was extremely
good, but room for improvement remained. The Japanese side
reiterated their strong desire to learn what steps the USG
was contemplating against North Korea in accordance with
UNSCR 1695. Both sides agreed that additional North Korean
actions, without much advance warning, should not be ruled
out. It was therefore imperative to continue close bilateral
coordination, including an early September meeting that would
include the Ambassador, Japan Defense Agency Minister Nukaga
and a senior Foreign Ministry official such as VFM Yachi.
End Summary.


2. (S) MOFA Deputy Vice Minister for Foreign Policy
Masaharu Kohno and DCM Donovan co-chaired a bilateral,
inter-agency meeting on August 9 to examine U.S.-Japan
coordination and cooperation during the period preceding,
during, and following the July 5 North Korean missile
launches. Both sides agreed that bilateral cooperation had
been extremely good and virtually unprecedented, but that
room for improvement remained.


3. (S) Asked to speak first, the DCM said that while
bilateral coordination had been very good, "we probably
aren't done yet," referring to the likelihood that North
Korea would present new challenges to the alliance. The DCM
noted that with indications of pre-launch preparations
visible well in advance, Kim Jong-il had given the U.S. and
Japan time to prepare. "We might not have the same luxury
next time," he pointed out. The DCM suggested both sides
look at areas where things might be done better, as well as
other issues, in preparation for a proposed senior-level
meeting in early September that would include Ambassador
Schieffer, JDA Minister Nukaga and a senior MOFA official
such as VFM Yachi.


4. (S) DVM Kohno cited the comments of Foreign Minister
Aso, who praised the "wonderful" cooperation between the U.S.
and Japan in Tokyo and Washington, as well as with Ambassador
Bolton in New York. FM Aso had highlighted the importance of
the many direct conversations between himself and the
Secretary, as well as between NSA Hadley and Chief Cabinet

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Secretary Abe, that contributed to keeping the two sides in

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sync. He echoed the DCM's comments about future challenges,
saying North Korea had maintained silence since the missile
launches, and that Japan did not know what the DPRK might do
next. Whatever it might be, it could threaten not only
Japan, but others in the region and beyond.


5. (S) The Prime Minister's office was coordinating an
inter-agency study of possible additional measures to take
against the DPRK, in accordance with UNSCR 1695, particularly
paragraph four, DVM Kohno related. He noted that the
government of Japan would designate 12 entities in this
regard, adding that as Japan went further, and particularly
as MOFA coordinated with other ministries, it would be very
important to know where the USG was heading. In this regard,
Kohno said he understood there had been a USG inter-agency
meeting on the subject August 8 and asked for a quick
readout. The Japanese government's overall policy approach
would be to apply pressure on North Korea, while at the same
time holding open the door for dialogue, including a
resumption of the Six-Party Talks.


6. (S) MOFA Director-General for Intelligence and Analysis
Haruhisa Takeuchi commented that intelligence cooperation had
been very good, including cooperation among Japanese
government agencies. Throughout the process, however, Japan
had difficulty discerning DPRK intentions. Embassy RAS chief
provided an overview of the current situation in North Korea,
lauded our successful cooperation, and highlighted a few
areas for future improvement. (Additional details will be
reported in a separate channel.)


7. (S) MOFA Director-General for North American Affairs
Chikao Kawai focused his remarks on Japan's need for missile
defense (MD). He said the U.S. would be "bringing in the USS
Shiloh," and noted placement of the X-band radar in Aomori
Prefecture, but concluded that more needed to be done
bilaterally on MD. JDA Policy Division Director Ro Manabe
picked up on the subject, saying JDA was taking action to
acquire PAC-3 and additional AEGIS capability, but needed to
accelerate procurement as much as possible on PAC-3s, where
most of the components were produced by U.S. firms. The DCM
noted that those procurement issues were being worked in the
U.S. and that the embassy would continue to support those

efforts. Manabe also referred to the USS Shiloh deployment,
but asked that the U.S. deploy additional systems to Japan,
if possible, at least until Japan acquires its own MD
systems. Finally, he suggested that the two sides accelerate
work on a bilateral "war-fighting conplan," citing the lack
of any plan to attack an enemy missile base, if the need
arose. DG Kawai said that MD was important, but only part of
the equation, and he echoed the need for discussions on
"contingency planning" as soon as possible.


8. (S) The DCM suggested that the 1997 US-Japan Defense
Guidelines provided a reference for cooperation on
operational matters, and that the coordination during the
period surrounding the DPRK missile launches had been a
virtual "de-facto" execution of the Guidelines' Bilateral
Coordination Mechanism. USFJ J5 Col. Paul Vosti echoed the
Guidelines' call for a Bilateral Coordination Mechanism, but
pointed out that while USFJ thought the bilateral centers
should stand up very early, it had not been clear on the
Japanese side.


9. (S) USFJ Chief of Staff COL Brown noted that SDX was
coming on line and that the objective was to have a seamless
mutual sharing of information in order to achieve a common
operational picture. He pointed out that when this was
achieved down to the level of individual ships, it had been
very welcome to the operators.


10. (S) DVM Kohno flagged another "big issue" for
consideration: How to work, and how deeply to work, with
China? The DCM agreed we needed to look at how to work with
China. He observed that our successful effort to get China
on board with the UNSC resolution resulted from good
coordination among Tokyo, Washington and New York. China, he
continued, had seen that the US-Japan alliance was strong, a
powerful message to China.


11. (S) MOFA Deputy DG for Intelligence and Analysis Shigeo
Matsutomi noted what he called four "minor points" for
consideration: 1) the GOJ had incorrectly anticipated that
the missile launches would be in the daytime; 2) there had
been large differences between US and Japanese weather
forecasts; 3) the GOJ had made a serious mistake in its
calculation of the length of the Taepodong missile; and 4)
the GOJ still had come to no conclusion about the DPRK's
intentions, i.e., whether the launches had been a message to
the world, or whether it may also have been for domestic
consumption and/or for the ROK or China.
SCHIEFFER