DEFENSE WHITE PAPER: EMPHASIS ON CHINA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 004499 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/07/2016 TAGS: MARR PREL JA SUBJECT: DEFENSE WHITE PAPER: EMPHASIS ON CHINA REF: A. A) TOKYO 4365 (030811Z AUG 06) ¶B. B) TOKYO 4229 (280705Z JULY 06) Classified By: AMBASSADOR J. THOMAS SCHIEFFER. REASON 1.4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (C) Japan Defense Agency (JDA) Councilor Hideshi Tokuchi, principal editor of the 2006 JDA White Paper, pointed out to us just prior to the paper's August 1 release that its treatment of China was likely to grab a fair amount of attention. The report highlighted PRC reconnaissance flights, maritime activities, and concerns over the lack of PLA transparency, all of which were dealt with in greater detail this year than previously. ¶2. (SBU) The 2006 JDA White Paper (ref A) devotes eight pages of text to China; just about twice the length of last year's report. It results mainly from greater detail, but in some cases from entirely new material, in describing China's military capabilities. For example, the 2005 report stated that China's 2005 Anti-Secession Law stipulated best efforts to solve the Taiwan issue in a peaceful manner, but that China might take non-peaceful measures if Taiwan showed movement toward independence. By contrast, the 2006 White Paper contains essentially that same language but adds the following: "It is important for China to possess capabilities for deterring and interdicting both any Taiwanese move toward independence and a potential foreign military intervention in (a) future Taiwan Strait crisis. And the main purpose of Chinese vigorous military modernization, funded by a large amount of increase of its defense expenditure, is considered to be ensuring these capabilities." ¶3. (SBU) There are several other areas in which the 2006 report offers greater detail: -- Transparency and Budget: The 2005 report notes defense budget increases of over 10% for 17 consecutive years, points out defense expenses are only part of Chinese military expenditures, and concludes: "It is more than desirable that China will make an additional effort to improve transparency of its defense policy and military." The 2006 report contains the same factual information, but adds, "Historically, China has not disclosed information on its possession status of specific equipment, the pace of improvement, the unit-level compositions of personnel, records of main military operations and exercises, or the amount and detailed breakdowns of the national defense budget, etc." As if that were not clear enough, this year's report concludes: "It needs to be pointed out that improvement in transparency was not necessarily tried in visible ways (in) four (Chinese) white papers issued in the past." -- Nuclear Forces: The 2006 report provides the following detail that goes beyond comparable sections of last year's report: "China has...conducted test launches of a new-type ICBM, DF-31, and its variants within its territory...it is believed that conversion of DFG-21 missiles of a solid-fuel propulsion system, which can be transported and operated on board the TEL (Transportor-Erector-Launcher),has been progressing...it is believed that efforts to improve performances of aforementioned ballistic missiles such as accuracy are being continued, and also, research-and-development works on multiple warheads are reportedly progressing." -- Expanded Scope of Maritime Activities: The words "expanded scope of" in this section's title are new and make clear the importance JDA has assigned to this most expanded part of the White Paper. Seven paragraphs and almost a full page in length, it catalogues Chinese naval exercises, intelligence collection activities, natural resource exploration, and oceanographic research "within the exclusive economic zone of Japan." It then posits four likely objectives of this increased Chinese naval activity: 1) "to intercept naval operations by enemies as far as possible to defend Chinese territory and territorial waters"; 2) "to develop military capacity to deter and discourage independence of Taiwan"; 3) "to acquire, maintain and protect maritime rights and interests"; and 4) "to defend sea lanes of China...beyond Chinese home waters." TOKYO 00004499 002 OF 002 ¶4. (C) Much of what JDA has U&7RUCent sponsored by the China Daily, Peking University and a Japanese think-tank, opened in Tokyo, offering a timely opportunity for a Chinese broadside on JDA's treatment of China in the White Paper. Chinese Ambassador Wang Yi, however, used his speech to call on Japan to remove "political obstacles" that had chilled bilateral relations, an observation universally interpreted here as aimed at Japanese political leaders' visits to Yasukuni Shrine. Chief Cabinet Secretary Shintaro Abe also spoke to the conference, and he, too, focused on the broader bilateral relationship. Abe compared a poll taken in 1980, in which 78% of Japanese had positive attitudes about China, with a recent survey in which only 32% of Japanese had similar feelings. "For me, those are shocking figures," Abe said. ¶6. (C) Comment: It is a week since the JDA White Paper was published, and reaction from China appears more muted than expected. There is probably good news/bad news at work here. The good news is that JDA has apparently been able to get on the record an official Japanese Government expression of concern about China's military activities without unduly poisoning bilateral relations. The bad news is that the continuing media drumbeat in Japan over Yasukuni -- sparked by Emperor Hirohito's critical words from the grave (ref B), and given new life with the revelation that CCS Abe visited the shrine in April -- continues to drown out most other commentary. SCHIEFFER